Under and Over the Hudson River
Demands for vehicular routes that would overcome the Hudson barrier to regional commerce and travel began long before 1900. The initial efforts failed because of differences in perspective and priorities between the states, and because of a desire to rely on private enterprise.
As early as 1868, New Jersey chartered a private company to construct a bridge across the Hudson, but concurrent authority was not obtained from New York State until 1894; the company made no progress and finally lost its charter in 1906 for nonpayment of taxes. In 1890, a second group obtained a federal charter for a private toll bridge, but could not raise money to begin construction. In 1917, the Public Service Corporation of New Jersey studied the possibility of a tunnel under the river but decided against it because of high costs.
As Erwin Bard notes, "private enterprise struggled for a long period with the problem of providing interstate crossings" for motor vehicle traffic.[35] Meanwhile, vehicular passengers and freight were compelled to use ferries and barges to cross the Hudson. Their slow journeys contrasted sharply with travel between New Jersey and New York City by rail tunnels after 1910. The completion of these tunnels under the river permitted the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Hudson and Manhattan rail company to bring their passengers from New Jersey directly into Manhattan terminals.
In the period between the two world wars, three major vehicular crossings were completed: the Holland Tunnel in 1927 and the George Washington Bridge in 1931, followed by the Lincoln Tunnel, which began operation at the end of 1937. Among the reasons for this sudden surge, with its considerable impact on the region's patterns of population growth and commerce, were the sharp rise in motor transportation during the 1920s, coupled with appeals from Bronx and Manhattan business groups, who favored the crossings as a way to reduce ferry congestion on the river and to improve business by reducing transportation time for customers west of the Hudson. Perhaps even more significant was the creation of new government organizations to overcome the interstate hiatus, together with the allocation of public funds for their construction activities, and the skillful efforts of these new agencies to enhance their power.
[35] Bard, The Port of New York Authority, p. 192. The factual data in this section are drawn mainly from Bard's definitive study.
The roads linking the New Jersey Turnpike and the Lincoln
Tunnel in Hudson County were built through
cooperative efforts of three major components
of the highway coalition—the Port Authority,
the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, and the New Jersey Highway Department.
Credit: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
After the early private efforts failed, the two states created commissions in 1906 to study ways of spanning the Hudson. Intermittent cooperation and several sporadic reports followed. The commissions suggested a tunnel under the river between lower Manhattan and Jersey City, but were unable to agree on how it would be financed or administered. "After years of groping and fumbling," the two states finally agreed in 1919 to establish independent state commissions to function in unison (it was hoped) and construct the proposed tunnel. The cost of the tunnel would be financed by tolls. Conflicts between the two commissions were frequent during the next several years, and cost overruns required additional state aid, but the Holland Tunnel finally opened in November 1927.[36]
Meanwhile, the Port of New York Authority had been established in 1921 as a joint agency of New York State and New Jersey. The authority was given broad responsibility for solving transportation problems in the region, but the main motivation for its creation was the widespread desire to improve the handling of rail freight. The agency's officials soon entered into complex
[36] Ibid., pp, 178–183; the quoted phrase is on p, 180. The original estimated completion date had been 1923.
negotiations with the railroads aimed at devising a more efficient system of consolidated freight yards and related facilities throughout the region.
At the same time, business and civic groups urged both states to approve additional vehicular crossings for the Hudson River. Neither governor was pleased with the performance of the dual commissions, and both agreed in 1923 that future bridges and tunnels should be "constructed and financed by the Port Authority." Initially, the authority showed little interest in turning to vehicular projects, as its negotiations with the railroads "seemed on the verge of important accomplishments." But when these discussions foundered, Port Authority officials began to look actively for an alternative program. As Erwin Bard, historian of the authority's development, commented:
Within the Port Authority the center of gravity began shifting to vehicular traffic. . . . The "do-something" policy in terms of construction was rising. It was imperative that the Port Authority's credit, hitherto entirely theoretical, be established. The bridge-building program offered a chance.[37]
The major project under consideration at this time was a bridge across the Hudson between upper Manhattan (about 178th Street) and Fort Lee, in Bergen County. A bridge in this location was favored by business and civic interests in Manhattan, and the proposal was pressed actively in the early 1920s by government officials and civic leaders in Bergen, who saw the bridge as a key factor in Bergen County's ability to attract the new wave of suburbanites. Among the leading New Jersey supporters of the project were the editors of the Bergen Record (whose economic strength and influence would grow with an expanding population) and state senator William B. Mackay (who hoped that leadership in meeting public concern for improved transportation facilities would advance his gubernatorial aspirations), as well as other civic leaders and government officials in the county.[38] Thus the campaign for the bridge illustrated the interrelationship between public demand, the interests of civic and business leaders, and strategic aims of public officials. Among the government units centrally involved was the Port Authority, whose leaders were actively seeking a path to success. They found it through undertaking the bridge project, and then used that effort to eliminate a rival organization and to establish a long-range financial strategy for institutional growth and power.
The Port Authority's leaders did not believe they could move publicly and decisively to harness the support which the 178th Street bridge commanded. For the proposal attracted opponents as well as enthusiasts. Some
[37] Ibid., pp. 182, 185.
[38] The most active civic group in the New Jersey campaign for the bridge was first named the Mackay Hudson River Bridge Association. The efforts of Mackay, the Record, local officials, and others are recounted in Jacob W. Binder, All in a Lifetime (Hackensack, N.J.: published privately, 1942; available in New Jersey libraries), pp. 181–198. Binder served as executive director of the Bridge Association. On the campaign for a bridge at 178th Street, see also "For Hudson Bridge Above 125th Street," New York Times, December 28, 1923; "Chamber Opposes Bridge at 57th Street," New York Times, January 4, 1924; "Greene Tells Plan for Hudson Bridge," New York Times, May 4, 1924; "Bridge Across Hudson at 178th Street is Discussed at Interstate Conference," New York Times, January 21, 1925; "Approves Hudson Bridge," New York Times, February 3, 1925; "Diners Hail Mackay as Father of Bridge," New York Times, April 23, 1925.
business and civic groups strongly favored a rival plan for a combined railroad-vehicular bridge, perhaps to be built by a private corporation, at 57th Street in Manhattan. Several conservation groups objected to the loss of park land that would occur if the bridge were built in the vicinity of 178th Street. Regional jealousy reared its expected head, when spokesmen for Queens criticized the project as catering to New Jersey's interests while the city's transportation needs were neglected. And some legislators in Trenton argued against expanding the Port Authority's role to include highway bridges.[39]
Amid these conflicts, the Port Authority moved cautiously. After a series of hearings in 1923, it concluded that a vehicular bridge should be built "north of 125th Street." As sentiment in favor of a span at 178th Street crystallized during the next year, the authority's chairman called such a crossing a "great necessity," and circumspectly announced in December 1924 that the authority was "ready to perform whatever tasks are designated to it" by the two states.[40] But when the authority was attacked as an advocate of the bridge proposal, its officials explained that the Port Authority had only concluded that "perhaps a bridge at some point" north of 125th Street was needed.[41]
Out of the public eye, however, Port Authority lawyers and engineers worked closely with both governors and with citizen groups who favored the bridge, as they pressed for legislative approval. Finally, in the spring of 1925, both states enacted legislation authorizing the Port Authority to construct the Hudson River bridge.[42]
Two years later, the Port Authority could speak about the project more expansively. The bridge across the Hudson, the agency declared, "means that the dream of many years and of many millions of persons will finally be realized." The "agitation" for such a bridge "took on the form of a public demand from the populations on both sides of the stream," the authority explained, "until the demand could be no longer logically be resisted."[43] Construction was begun at the 178th Street site in 1927, and the George Washington Bridge was opened to traffic in 1931, ahead of schedule and at a cost below the original estimate.
If Port Authority officials wished to satisfy their newly developed interest in motor transport, however, it seemed imperative that the revenue-
[39] The opponents' views are set forth in "Sees Need for Five New Hudson Tubes," New York Times, December 6, 1923; "Chamber Opposes Bridge at 57th Street," New York Times, January 4, 1924; "Insist on 57th Street Bridge," New York Times, January 6, 1924; "Ferries, Bridges and Tunnels," editorial, New York Times, January 15, 1924; "Hudson Bridge Bill Passed," New York Times, February 10, 1925; "Committee Favors 57th Street Bridge," New York Times, February 28, 1925; "Move to Save Park at Fort Washington," New York Times, March 18, 1925; "Fear Effects of Bridge," New York Times, March 28, 1925.
[40] Port of New York Authority, "Report to the Governors," December 21, 1923, reprinted in Port Authority, Third Annual Report: 1923 (New York: February 1, 1924), pp. 43–50; Julian Gregory, chairman of the Port Authority, quoted in "Explains Bridge Plan," New York Times, December 30, 1924.
[41] W. W. Drinker, Chief Engineer of the Port Authority, quoted in "Move to Save Park at Ft. Washington," New York Times, March 18, 1925.
[42] Laws of New Jersey, 1925, c. 41; Laws of New York, 1925, c. 211. In 1924–26, the authority was also authorized to build three smaller vehicular bridges between Staten Island and New Jersey.
[43] Port of New York Authority, 1926 Annual Report (New York: January 20, 1927), pp. 55–56.
producing Holland Tunnel be acquired. For the Holland Tunnel, opened by the dual commissions in the fall of 1927, proved an immediate success. High traffic volumes and substantial revenues generated enthusiasm within the two commissions for more projects, and in 1928 they recommended to both states that they be authorized to construct a tunnel to midtown Manhattan immediately, and three other crossings thereafter. Meanwhile, sagging toll revenues on the Port Authority's facilities raised doubts as to the ability of the authority to meet its financial obligations.[44]
At this point, the Port Authority exhibited the tactical skill that would become a hallmark of its operations. In private discussions and public debate, it argued for the following approach to regional transport development:
1. Interstate rail and highway projects should not be considered separately, but instead as part of one comprehensive transportation plan. (Since the Port Authority already had rail responsibilities and the dual commissions did not, this principle would support vehicular expansion by the authority and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the commissions' efforts.)
2. All interstate motor vehicle crossings should be financed by revenue bonds, not by using the credit of the states. (The authority was authorized to issue revenue bonds, while the commissions used state funds to be repaid out of toll revenues.)
3. To ensure that revenue bonds could be sold to investors, all interstate bridges and tunnels should be under the control of one agency. Otherwise, tolls on one facility (for example, the Holland Tunnel) might be reduced below that of other facilities, and this "unfair competition" would drain off traffic and revenue from the other crossings.
4. As a further aid to revenue-bond financing, income from all projects should be pooled, so that "excess returns from the more profitable enterprises" could support weaker or new facilities.
The authority put forth two other arguments that would not reappear in its later reports and announcements. "It is perfectly obvious," the authority declared, that the general level of tolls "could be placed on a much lower basis" if all facilities were under one management rather than under divided authority. Also, the revenues pooled in the general fund would be devoted to paying off the debt on the interstate crossings, "with a view to making these facilities free from tolls within the least possible time."[45] In fact, the general level of tolls remained at fifty cents until 1975 when it was raised to seventyfive cents.
At a series of meetings in 1930 and 1931, officials of both states finally accepted the Port Authority's arguments, the dual commissions were abolished, and the Holland Tunnel was transferred to the authority. Moreover, the states agreed that future interstate crossings would be developed by the
[44] The Port Authority opened two of its Staten Island bridges in 1928. In 1929 and 1930 revenues from these bridges were far below original estimates, and the first series of bonds seemed likely to face a default. See Bard, The Port of New York Authority, pp. 237–238.
[45] See Port of New York Authority, Eighth Annual Report (New York: December 31, 1928), pp. 59–61; and Port of New York Authority, 1929 Annual Report (New York: December 31, 1929), pp. 51–52.
authority, under the four principles summarized above. Perhaps understating the importance of the Port Authority's deft maneuvers, Bard concludes that the authority's "reputation for efficiency, its autonomous power to finance, and its established credit won in the race for survival."[46]
Through its activities and successes during these early years, the Port Authority established an approach to governmental action that would be repeated again and again in the New York area, as well as in other parts of the country. First, it set a precedent for financing highway facilities by revenue bonds, supported by tolls. This strategy obviated the need for state legislatures to appropriate moneys for such facilities out of general funds, or to approve the issuance of bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the state. Thus, the speed with which self-supporting bridges, tunnels, and turnpikes were constructed during the next four decades was greatly increased. The availability of revenue-bond financing also encouraged state officials to create additional public authorities as a way of avoiding direct responsibility for additional taxes.[47]
A second precedent, that each facility would be supported by the pooled revenues of all other authority projects, shaped the development of later public authorities in the transportation and port development fields.[48] It also had a decided impact on the evolution of the Port Authority itself. The pooling concept provided the rationale and financial base for extensive authority activity in airport, harbor and rail development. Otherwise, the agency would have been limited to those very few projects whose "self-supporting" nature was so evident from the outset that cautious investors would buy bonds without broader security. The pooling concept permitted the Port Authority to insulate individual projects from the short-run (and in some cases even the long-run) impact of market forces. Surpluses from bridges and tunnels could be used to underwrite new enterprises that might incur initial or continuing deficits, if those new projects seemed desirable in terms of overall regional development—or, at times, if they seemed beneficial in terms of the financial strength and public image of the authority and its officials.
[46] Bard, The Port of New York Authority, p. 191. In 1931, the Port Authority was authorized to proceed with the midtown Lincoln Tunnel. Strictly speaking, the dual commissions were not abolished, but merged with the PNYA, which absorbed some of the commissions' staffs.
[47] For example, the New Jersey Turnpike Authority was created in 1948 partly as a way to overcome the reluctance of the New Jersey legislature to provide substantial sums for highway building in the early postwar years.
Members of the dual state commissions and other critics of the authority concept argued that it would be less expensive, and therefore better, to finance new road facilities with state advances, to be repaid through toll receipts. This approach was used for the Holland Tunnel, and it probably would have been less costly for the later bridges, tunnels, and toll roads to have been financed in this manner, since interest rates on state-backed loans would have been lower than interest on bonds backed mainly by an authority's projected toll revenues. The political disadvantages of state appropriations, however, combined with the mixed administrative record of the dual commissions, were more persuasive at the time. See Bard, The Port of New York Authority, pp. 180 ff.
[48] On the influence of the Port Authority's structure and early evolution on the development of other public authorities, see Council of State Governments, Public Authorities in the States (Chicago: 1953), p. 23; State of New York, Temporary State Commission on Coordination of State Activities, Staff Report on Public Authorities under New York State (Albany: 1956), p. 15; and Richard Leach and Redding S. Sugg, Jr., The Administration of Interstate Compacts (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959), p. 8.
The George Washington Bridge,
looking east across the Hudson River at upper Manhattan with
the Port Authority's toll plazas in the foreground.
Credit: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
The Port Authority had spanned the Hudson River, and the new George Washington Bridge soon proved a major revenue producer for the authority. Along with the Holland Tunnel it provided the financial base for constructing the midtown Lincoln Tunnel in the 1930s, and for entering a wide range of other activities a decade later. The bridge also proved a valuable resource in maintaining the image of the Port Authority as an efficient and important regional enterprise. Opened with great ceremony in the fall of 1931, the
George Washington Bridge was widely praised for its design and construction—it was the longest suspension bridge in the world—and because of its impact on Bergen County. During the next two decades, the authority was frequently commended for inaugurating "a new era in bridge building" with this majestic span, and the bridge was called the "greatest single factor in Bergen County's growth."[49]
The new bridge did indeed have a significant impact on development west of the Hudson. Previously, rail lines and ferries provided only circuitous, time-consuming access to Bergen, and the sprawling county had remained a semirural enclave while nearby counties with better access to Manhattan urbanized rapidly before World War I.[50] Once the two states had approved the bridge in 1925, real estate speculators packed the county office building in anticipation of the land boom.[51] The next thirty years saw a tripling of Bergen County's largely middle-class population, many of the new residents having departed from the Bronx and other parts of the core to "reside in the pleasant environment of Bergen County."[52]
Property values also climbed rapidly. Between 1920 and 1954, assessed values increased by more than 250 percent in Bergen, compared with about 100 percent in Essex County and in the Garden State as a whole during this period. And the decision to span the Hudson at 178th Street, rather than at 125th Street or 57th Street (the latter across from Hudson County), altered the attractiveness of land and the pattern of growth within the county. Changes in property values among Bergen's towns illustrate the impact of the bridge: municipalities nearest the span saw their taxable property increase especially sharply, rising from three to ten times the 1920 values.[53]
For Port Authority strategists who recognized favorable publicity as a route to enhanced power, the George Washington Bridge and its impact gener-
[49] The quotations are, respectively, from "Development of New York Port Lesson in States Co-operation," Christian Science Monitor, May 5, 1946, and "The Birth of a Bridge," editorial, Bergen Evening Record, April 30, 1946.
[50] Much of Bergen County was as close to the Manhattan CBD as the Bronx and southern Westchester County, which were served by direct rail service and a growing highway network, and no more distant than Essex and Union counties in New Jersey, which had direct rail service to Manhattan. Travelers from Bergen County who did not wish to swim the Hudson reached Manhattan by journeying south via rail or road into Hudson County, where they could cross by the Weehawken ferry, or (going farther south) via the Hudson and Manhattan rail system (now PATH).
[51] "The proposed bridge over the Hudson River," reported the New York Times in December 1925, "has so stirred up real estate activities in Bergen County that the searcher's room in the new $1 million court house at Hackensack is wholly inadequate. Today petitions were circulated asking the Freeholders to provide more room for the lawyers' clerks and searchers." ("Bridge Talk Stirs Bergen County," New York Times, December 4, 1925.)
[52] Donald V. Lowe, "Port Authority Behind Bergen's Boom," Bergen Evening Record, October 30, 1953. During the period 1920–1954, while Essex County added 46 percent to its population and New Jersey as a whole gained 66 percent, Bergen's population rose by more than 200 percent. In addition to the bridge, other factors, such as a relatively large amount of undeveloped land (as of 1920), influenced Bergen County's high rate of population growth. For discussions of the interrelation of factors in suburban growth, see Chapters 1–3 above and Edgar M. Hoover and Raymond Vernon, Anatomy of a Metropolis, Chapter 8.
[53] Bergen County taxable property as a whole increased between 1920 and 1954 from $207 million to $760 million. Among the towns nearest the bridge, Teaneck's taxable property rose most sharply, from $4 million to almost $45 million; Hackensack's increased from $16 million to almost $52 million, and Cliffside Park from $4 million to more than $15 million. See PNYA and TBTA, Joint Studies of Arterial Facilities, p. 34.
ated a steady flow of heart-warming journalistic comments. The span was mentioned prominently in many articles during the 1930s and 1940s reviewing the authority's "far-sighted intelligence" and "monument of vast public works."[54] And if attention lagged, the agency was able to assist friendly editors by preparing informative essays such as the 1953 Bergen Record article, "Port Authority Behind Bergen's Boom," written by Donald V. Lowe, then vice-chairman of the Port Authority.[55]