Revolution Discontinued?
In the "Resolution on CPC History" adopted by the Sixth Plenum, the Party has come closer to announcing an official termination of the Chinese revolution than ever before. Although the resolution states that "the triumph of the Chinese revolution is the most important political event since World War II and has exerted a profound and far-reaching impact on the international situation and the development of the people's struggle throughout the world,"[123] that revolution is conceived in chronologically discrete terms. None of the identifiably Maoist attempts to prolong or revive the revolution in the post-Liberation era, from the acceleration of agricultural cooperativization in 1955 to the campaign to criticize Deng in 1976, receive favorable notice. The theory of continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, said to have provided the theoretical rationale for the Cultural Revolution, is repudiated for being "obviously inconsistent with the system of Mao Zedong Thought." Thus, one concurrent article notes that although Marx said explicitly (in The Class Struggle in France , 1848–1850 ) that "this kind of socialism is to declare an uninterrupted revolution," he and Engels later modified their position: "we can now say that uninterrupted revolution is only a tactic under special historical circumstances."[124] Another article carefully distinguishes between revolution and reform, salvaging the latter from the Marxist terminological trashpile as the preferred mode of political change for postrevolutionary systems:
Before the overthrow of the exploiting system, they [viz., reformism and revolution] were absolutely incompatible; revolution precluded reformism. However, after the overthrow of the exploiting system, the relations between them are completely different. Not only are they tolerant of each other, but the means of reform must be used to complete the new revolutionary tasks. . . . To promote a political revolution whereby one class overthrows another after the proletariat has seized political power will inevitably create nationwide chaos.[125]
[123] Resolution , p. 10.
[124] Guang Chuizhan, "Marx and the Idea of Uninterrupted Revolution," Shangyao Shizhuan Xuebao , no. 1, 1981, as quoted in Xinhua Yuebao , August 1981.
[125] Xue Hanwei and Pan Guohua, "On Revolutionary Reformism," Xuexi yu Tansuo [Study and exploration] (Harbin), no. 6 (1981): 4–9; this article is approvingly cited in Liu Hefu, "On Revolutionary Reformism," GM , January 12, 1982, p. 3.
All the same, in the concluding section of the resolution, the need to "carry on revolutionary struggles with determination" is resoundingly reaffirmed:
Socialism aims not just at eliminating all systems of exploitation and all exploiting classes but also at greatly expanding the productive forces, improving and developing the socialist relations of production and the superstructure and, on this basis, gradually eliminating all class differences and all major social distinctions and inequalities which are chiefly due to the inadequate development of the productive forces until communism is finally realized. This is a great revolution, unprecedented in human history.[126]
To be sure, the type of revolution to be "carried on" is implicitly redefined: "this revolution is carried out not through fierce class confrontation and conflict, but through the strength of the socialist system itself, under leadership, step by step and in an orderly way." The revolution has entered a "period of peaceful development" that will "not only take a very long historical period to accomplish but also demand many generations of unswerving and disciplined hard work and heroic sacrifice."[127] It is consistent with this redefinition that many historical transformations previously denigrated as "reformist" are now conceived to have revolutionary aspects (e.g., the Xinhai Revolution of 1911).[128] As Zhao Ziyang puts it in his report on the work of the government, neatly conflating the two apparent alternatives, "This reform is a revolution, but of course it is not a fundamental change in the social system and must
[126] Resolution , p. 84.
[127] Ibid., pp. 84–85. It is worth noting that "revolution" as now conceived more closely resembles that revolution described by Marx in the Communist Manifesto :
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. . . . The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. . . . The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls. . . . (Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party , in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader [New York: W. W. Norton, 1978 ed.], pp. 475–77.)
The theoretical implication of a "bourgeois democratic revolution" under the auspices of a firmly entrenched Communist Party leadership would be a return to a New Democratic regime (wherein bourgeois democratic and socialist revolutions could be "telescoped"). Although it is now often conceded that the departure from this earlier "stage" was forced and premature, there is at this point still a theoretical aversion against turning back the historical clock.
[128] See also He Fangchuan, "Reform Movements in the Upper Levels of Eastern Countries in the Middle of the 19th Century," Lishi Yanjiu , no. 4 (August 15, 1981): 88–101; and Ma Hongliang, "The 1898 Reform Movement," RR , September 15, 1981, p. 5.
not rock or depart from the socialist system. Rather it represents self-improvement and self-perfection on the basis of socialism itself."[129]
The ambiguity of this somewhat forced synthesis[130] left it open to further revision, and in retrospect the Sixth Plenum might be viewed not only as the high-water mark in the repudiation of the concept of continuing revolution but as the beginning of a regrouping of the forces most reluctant to relinquish it. No sooner had the leadership of the "Maoist" factional network been decapitated, it seems, than its ideological initiatives began to find official favor.[131] Contrariwise, the boldest advocates of reform fell upon political hard times, particularly after the Twelfth Congress.[132] The fact that Deng's faction prospered organizationally rather than suffering in the course of this shift suggests that Deng agreed with it or at least wished to give its advocates their lead.
Why the turn to the left, after eliminating the leading leftists? Partly, perhaps, in order to co-opt their political base. After all, unless the propaganda organs were to be altogether disbanded, they had to be given something to do; "practice as the sole criterion" rendered them superfluous, and morale was apparently sagging.[133] Among the population
[129] Tang Wensheng and Jia Chenfeng, "Reform is Self-perfection of the Socialist System," HQ , no. 13 (July 1, 1983): 32–36.
[130] Outside observers have sometimes welcomed the reconstrual of revolution in terms of modernization (see for example Donald Zagoria, "China's Quiet Revolution," Foreign Affairs [Spring 1984]: 880). But in the context of China's revolutionary experience, before and after Liberation, any such analogy appears superficial and unconvincing. The changes now under way fundamentally repudiate charismatic leadership, mass mobilization, a "breakthrough" mentality—all the earmarks of revolution as it has been practiced for the last thirty years. Although the political structure is not unaffected, it is no longer the mainspring or focus of change.
[131] Since the fall of the "small gang of four," the residual "whatever faction" has reportedly taken great interest in "political and ideological work," in the name of "resisting the erosion of bourgeois ideology." Their initiatives in this area have included a major attempt to reorient art and literature toward the praise of socialist virtue. Bi Dingtang, "Beijing Coup and Beijing Reform," Dong Xi Fang , no. 19 (July 10, 1980): 72–76.
[132] Though not purged, many of the most prominent reformers were demoted, including Feng Wenbin, Hu Jiwei, Wang Ruoshui, and Liao Gailong. In the elections to the Twelfth Congress, neither Hu Jiwei (former RR editor-in-chief, "kicked upstairs" to the post of director in May 1982) nor Deputy Editor-in-Chief Wang Ruoshui were listed among CC members, though the new editor-in-chief, Qin Chuan, became a full member. Feng Wenbin, already replaced by Hu Qili as director of the CC General Office, was relegated to the CAC. Liao Gailong was transferred from the CC's Policy Research Office to the Party History Research Center; his name was not to be found on any of the committees at the Twelfth Congress. HQ editor-in-chief Xiong Fu also failed to be elected to the CC, although his deputy (Wang Renzhi) became an alternate member. Qi Xin, "Personnel Changes of the CCP Twelfth Congress," QN , no. 10 (October 1982): 16–19.
[133] This morale problem was apparent in efforts to clad ideological work in the more prestigious raiments of "science" (previously, the transfer of status had been in the opposite direction!); see for example Zhang Weiping, "Why Is Ideological and Political Work aScience?" Xin Shiqi [New era] (Beijing), no. 11 (November 1981): 2–4; also Chao Yang, "Is Publicizing Communist Ideology Contradictory to the Principle of Social Existence Determining Social Consciousness?" HQ , no. 4 (February 16, 1983): 48 Still, the press noted that "many cadres do not care for the study of theory," considering this "useless," because "theories are changing all the time." Fujian Ribao , June 19, 1982.
at large, de-Maoization seemed to have given rise to a "crisis of faith," in which doubt was fairly openly expressed about the legitimacy of the Communist Party and Marxist-Leninist ideology.[134] The leadership associated this ideological secularization with a juvenile crime wave, black marketeering, corruption, and other problems stemming from a more materialist worldview, betimes deeming all to be manifestations of renascent "class struggle."[135] It was both morally distasteful and economically infeasible to displace ideological crusades with pragmatic materialism at one fell swoop, the leadership seems to have concluded,[136] so an induced mass consensus upon certain ideological verities was still useful—even as reform continued. This revival entailed the suppression of "erroneous" notions as well as an educational effort designed to generate a popular consensus around "correct" tenets. Toward this end, the leadership has returned to a number of time-tested techniques, including the institutions of "study" and "criticism and self-criticism," which had apparently been permitted to lapse in many places.[137]
[134] Two secret polls taken among students at Fudan University in Shanghai in 1979 and September 1980 by the Federation of Students and then briefly posted on the university's bulletin boards suggest that this crisis of faith is fairly widespread. Asked what they thought of current leaders' ability to achieve the Four Modernizations, 78 percent took a "wait and see" attitude; when asked whether people like the Gang of Four might return to power within the next ten years, only 5.4 percent responded with a firm "no," while half thought it was "possible" and 39 percent considered it "difficult to avoid." With regard to what the students believed in, only a third said "Communism," nearly a quarter said "fate," and 25 percent said "nothing at all." Time 116, no. 19 (November 10, 1980): 57.
[135] There is also a tendency to attribute such degenerative tendencies to Western influence—and indeed there is some evidence to support such a thesis, at least in some areas. See Deng Ziben, "Guangzhou qing shaonian wenti" [Problems of youth in Guangzhou], Guang Jiao Jing , no. 98 (November 16, 1980): 8–12, which documents the change of value patterns in Guangzhou through statistics, implying that these may be traced to Western influence emanating from Hong Kong. See also Lin Nan, "Zhongguo de zhengzhi daigou" [The political generation gap in China], ZM , no. 32 (June 1980): 36–39; and Luo Bing, "Wu zhong quan hui he qiangren zhengzhi" [The Fifth Plenum and strongman politics], ZM , no. 29 (March 1980): 5–9.
[136] "We cannot subscribe to the view that once the economy improves the ideology of people in various sectors will automatically become better," warns Hu Yaobang. "On the contrary, there is actually this kind of condition even in countries with very flourishing economies. The people (naturally not all the people) lack ideals and convictions and suffer from a spiritual void." Quoted from Hu's speech at a forum on ideological problems convened by the CC Propaganda Department on August 8, 1981, in HQ , no. 23, pp. 2–22.
[137] "Owing to the damage caused by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, the Party's tradition of attaching importance to theoretical study was suspended for a fairly long time," concedesHQ , "The problem in which some cadres look down on and even detest and reject theoretical studies has not been completely solved." Zhao Shouyi, "The Key to Building the Two Civilizations," HQ , no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 13–14; see also Li Biyan, "Put an End to the Practice of Allowing Theoretical Study to Take Its Natural Course," HQ , no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 18.
But the restoration of institutions of routine political resocialization alone was apparently deemed inadequate. Conceding that the CC renounced political campaigns at its Third Plenum and had subsequently reaffirmed this decision "many times," one writer justified its tacit reversal in terms of "the need for everyone to concentrate more on opposing a certain tendency, or solving a certain problem":
Not carrying out political campaigns naturally does not mean that no campaigns whatever should be carried out. To resolve certain problems, the adoption of the form of the mass movement is necessary. For example, in promoting sanitation, we must persevere and make it a habit. However, mobilizing everyone to do a crash job sometimes creates enthusiasm which often leads to better results. . . . There remain certain problems which, like all the relatively widespread unhealthy tendencies, will be difficult to resolve if we do not build strong public opinion pressure and have a definite momentum.[138]
Thus the period from the spring of 1981 to the fall of 1983 witnessed the mobilization of three consecutive "noncampaigns," one positive, two negative: the criticism of "bourgeois liberalization," the promotion of "socialist spiritual civilization," and the drive to clear up "spiritual pollution."
The first ideological initiative was launched preemptively by the PLA just prior to the Sixth Plenum, by publishing (apparently unilaterally) a series of articles criticizing a screenplay (never actually produced) entitled "Unrequited Love" (Kulian ), by a military writer named Bai Hua. The campaign won CC endorsement at the Sixth Plenum in June, and criticisms were then somewhat grudgingly taken up by People's Daily and the other pace-making media.[139] The campaign continued through
[138] Shen Baoxiang, "Do Not Exaggerate the Concept of 'Political Campaign,'" Jiefang Ribao , November 12, 1981, p. 4. This argument was however controversial, particularly among intellectuals. At a forum held at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences under the auspices of Guangming Ribao , Li Shu, editor of Lishi Yanjiu , opined; "Just as we have announced that we will no longer launch political movements in the future, I think we should explicitly proclaim that we will not launch academic criticism movements again." He complained that "articles that are in conflict with current policies are not permitted to be published." NCNA Beijing, September 15, 1979, reported in GM on the same date; translated in JPRS no. 74296 (October 3, 1979): 1–8.
[139] On July 17, 1981, Deng reportedly summoned a meeting in Zhongnanhai whose participants included Wang Renzhong, Zhou Yang, Hu Jiwei, Zeng Tao, and Zhu Muzhi, in which he attacked the Party leadership of literature and art for its "slackness" (huansanruanruo ), calling for criticism of Bai Hua, Ye Wenfu, et al. At a meeting of the CC Propaganda Department in early August, Hu Yaobang relayed this message to the Party leadership of the cultural sector. Immediately after this meeting, the Party issued CD no. 30, containing the speeches of Deng and Hu as well as other materials. Luo Bing, "Deng Xiaoping fadong da pipan neiqing" [The inside story of the mass criticism launched by Deng Xiaoping], ZM , no. 48 (October 1981): 7–17.
the summer, broadening into a critique of "bourgeois liberalization" (zichan jieji ziyouhua ), and the possibility of "peaceful evolution," raising the old specter of a "capitalist road."[140]
The "socialist spiritual civilization" drive was intended to "foster socialist ethics and educate the young people to have ideals, pay attention to morality and discipline, be polite and work hard," according to Deng Xiaoping. "Everyone should be patriotic and have a sense of national dignity. All these are closely connected with our efforts to modernize the country."[141] In language redolent of the Kuomintang's "New Life" movement of the 1930s, mass organizations were urged to pay attention to the "five stresses, four beauties, and three loves,"[142] or the "four haves, three attentions, and two fear-nots." The concept of "socialist spiritual civilization," nowhere to be found in Marx, Engels, or Lenin, is based on the Maoist premise that the ideological superstructure is to some degree autonomous from the economic base, thereby justifying continuing Party leadership in moral and ideological socialization efforts—crime or immorality are not to be blamed on the material environment (even on class background), but on disobedience to the Party.[143]
The flip side of "spiritual civilization" is "spiritual pollution," which came under attack following the Second Plenum of the Twelfth CC in mid-October 1983, with Deng's strong endorsement. In its initial phase this movement focused on the polluting influence of Western ideology, as manifested for example in the concepts of "alienation" and "humanism" (ironically both Marxist terms, deriving from Marx's earlier writings). But before long it gave rise to interference in economic reforms by resentful local cadres. Beginning in November 1983, agricultural and industrial issues were thus exempted, restricting the field of investigation
[140] See for example Li Jiansheng, "The Threat of 'Peaceful Evolution' Is Far from Being Eliminated," Dazhong Ribao (Jinan), April 1, 1982, p. 3.
[141] "Deng on China's Open Policy," BR , vol. 25, no. 10 (March 8, 1982), p. 9.
[142] The "five stresses" are on decorum, courtesy, hygiene, discipline, and morals; the "four beauties" are of mind, language, behavior, and environment; the "three loves" (appended in early 1983) are of the motherland, socialism, and the Party.
[143] See Zhang Qihua's two articles, "On Spiritual Civilization and Marxism," HQ , no. 10 (May 16, 1982): 39–43; and "Is There Class Character in Spiritual Civilization?" HQ , no. 23 (December 1, 1982): 38–39; also An Tung, "Why Is It Necessary to Carry Out Communist Ideological Education at the Socialist Stage?" HQ , no. 22 (November 16, 1982): 41–43; and Commentator, "Socialist Spiritual Civilization," BR , no. 45 (November 8, 1982): 13–17, 30.
to the ideological and literary fronts;[144] under these constraints, the drive soon lost momentum.
Do such countercyclical developments signal a revival of "continuing revolution"—or even simply the arrest of reform (the two are not equivalent)? In answer to this question, a final review of the three functional requisites of continuing revolution is in order: charismatic leadership, mass mobilization, and an antistructural animus.
1. Charismatic leadership on the whole played a functional role in the achievement of the revolutionary objectives of the 1950s, declining significantly at the end of the first decade as a result of having accomplished the basic revolutionary agenda on the one hand and having overreached itself in going beyond it on the other. Having to a considerable degree personified itself in the charismatic leader as a way of enhancing its mass appeal, the regime had an interest in preserving Mao's charisma and increasingly resorted to artificial techniques to shore it up, in the process losing control of the source of its own legitimacy. All of this redounded disastrously during the Cultural Revolution, when the charismatic leader and the bureaucracy became pitted against one another. Despite charisma's triumphant revival in 1966–68, the economically austere and culturally bleak prospects of continuing the revolution adversely prejudiced the mass verdict even before Mao's demise. Charisma degenerated into despotism, as the emancipatory slogans of cultural revolution became transformed into a socially enforced form of totalitarianism. Even so, it took several years thereafter for the renunciation of charismatic ideology to be publicly worked through.
Chinese politics still responds to personal power bases that are more independent of the institutional structure in which they are embedded than in most political systems, and a regeneration of charismatic leadership under critical circumstances cannot be precluded.[145] Yet the public commitment to collective leadership (led by Deng himself, who rose to power on a critique of the cult of personality) is firmer than ever before, and it has become rooted in institutional arrangements that seem to be functioning effectively. As a whole, Chinese bureaucrats must see considerable risk to their security interests in any reconcentration of power under monocratic leadership. Barring a crisis of comparable magnitude
[144] See Deng Liqun, in RR , December 10, 1983, p. 3; also Bo Yibo's statement in RR , January 6, 1984, p. 1.
[145] Although he has repudiated the "personality cult" and the concept of "continuing revolution," Deng has occasionally manifested monocratic propensities, as in his support of Democracy Wall activists in the fall of 1978 (for which he subsequently made a self-criticism), or his outspoken public refutation of an apparent NPC commitment not to post PLA troops in Hong Kong (in May 1984). NYT , May 26, 1984; FEER , 124:23 (June 7, 1984): 13–14.
to that which hit Weimar Germany in the 1920s, China's newly established institutional arrangements and commitment to orderly growth have foreclosed radical policy breakthroughs emanating unpredictably from the charismatic imagination of an heroic leader. More likely than authentic charisma, perhaps, is the advent of the "charismatic illusion" characteristic of systems (such as the United States or the Soviet Union) with well-institutionalized political structures. Here the popular yearning for charisma arises not from the disarray of institutions but from their firmly entrenched positions in defense of the status quo, in which the rhetoric of a magnetic personality appears to offer the only hope for dramatic change. Upon the leader's winning office this prospect however vanishes like a mirage, as the leader for pragmatic reasons shifts from an anti-establishment posture to a more compromising and cooperative role. (As should be clear from the foregoing chapters, the problems of over-institutionalization should still be considered remote ones for China.)
2. Mass mobilization was motivated by a combination of remunerative and normative incentives during the first post-Liberation decade, and principally by normative incentives thereafter. Experience since that time has demonstrated that normative incentives may be motivationally effective only if the regime allows significant latitude for mass initiative—which in turn reduces the steering capability of the elite, permitting the movement to factionalize uncontrollably. In the post-Mao era, after initially renouncing mobilizational approaches to the generation of mass support, the regime seems to have reconsidered. But having detached mass mobilization from the fragile economic sector that once supplied material incentives, and having sharply circumscribed the ambit for mass initiative (à la democracy movement), the regime seems to have approximately the same chances of really "moving" the masses as Mao had of persuading incumbent cadres to participate actively in the Cultural Revolution.
Though apparently a case of plus ça change , closer scrutiny reveals important differences in the "noncampaigns" launched after 1981.[146] First, they are not as all-encompassing as previous such efforts, coinciding indeed with continuing reform efforts in the economic and political sectors (e.g., the 1982 constitutional reforms). Second, such human targets as Bai Hua and Ye Wenfu (another young military writer, who had written a poem, "General, You Cannot Do This," about a rehabilitated Cultural Revolution victim who converts an orphanage into his private villa) were publicly criticized but not "struggled" against, and were apparently able to continue to work and live normally; the campaign was
[146] See Tang Tsou, "Political Change and Reform: The Middle Course," in Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 219–59.
not permitted to spread beyond a few initial targets.[147] Third, there was less pressure upon members of the intellectual community to conform with the public opinion wave being orchestrated from above; although no one dared publish a "countercriticism" disputing the attacks made on the leading liberals, it was apparently possible to remain silent, and many leading intellectuals in fact did so.[148]
3. In its first decade, the regime succeeded in smashing the frames of the residual political and social structure. When it then turned its attentions to the aversive structures that had emerged in the course of constructing a modern socialist system, it became much more difficult to generate a politically decisive consensus, due to the vested interests that had arisen in defense of the new status quo. Mao eventally succeeded in generating sufficient support to smash emergent structures (in part by tapping cumulative popular resentment of earlier radical fiascoes, ironically enough), only to find that his vision of what lay beyond those structures was either incoherent or politically impractical. Though the repudiation of "continuing revolution" signifies above all a reconciliation to the existence of structures, popular attitudes toward them are likely to remain ambivalent and even perhaps somewhat volatile as long as structures inhibit the movement of people, commodities, or ideas. A satisfactory synthesis of structure and movement remains the task of structural reform.