Equality

Equality is a value frequently set in juxtaposition to both negative liberty and economic efficiency.^[37] We may usefully distinguish between equality of results, which has not achieved considerable support in theory or in practice among Americans, and equality of opportunity, which in limited senses, at least, has become a core American value.

The essence of the relationship between socioeconomic rights and equality of results was presented in chapter 2. Because equality of results remains a controversial value in American political culture, my proposal for socioeconomic rights is based on a limited conception of this principle, one designed to minimize the conflict with negative liberty and economic efficiency. My contention that people who contribute to the social product from which basic resources are derived have rights to these resources beyond

what market allocation provides entails a reduction in the relative inequalities of some results. But both the manner of assuring certain minimums for those at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy and the means of rewarding efforts at self-help fit reasonably well with American political culture.^[38] Beyond these basic resources, for which distributive justice demands allocation on the basis of effort, market or other means of distributing tangible and intangible resources are acceptable; my proposal for socioeconomic rights does not attempt what Michael Walzer calls simple equality or roughly equal shares of resources.^[39]

As we have seen, these limited socioeconomic rights involve some sacrifice of liberty by some persons to meet the needs of others. While the United States has engaged in a variety of practices that sacrifice liberty to achieve greater equality of selected results,^[40] the nation has characteristically done so grudgingly, complaining all the way, and frequently implementing the redistributive mechanisms in a hostile manner inimical to the abstract intent of achieving greater equality of results. By requiring contributions to the social product as a prerequisite to recipient status, I intend to make more palatable such tradeoffs between liberty and equality. Like beneficiaries of social security and public education, recipients would be entitled to benefits in return for constructive activity. And the requirement that effort be exerted in the paid labor market brings equality of results within the bounds of economic efficiency as well.

In contrast to equality of results, limited senses of equality of opportunity have achieved considerable support, in both theory and practice, within the United States. One aspect of this value is procedural fairness, the use of performance-related criteria rather than sex, race, or age in the distribution of work or educational opportunities, unless such native characteristics are directly relevant to performance.^[41] While the historical record of American practice leaves a lot to be desired and our progress has been slow and painful, it is probably appropriate to identify this aspect of equality of opportunity as part of the American creed.

The most obvious shortcoming in this regard evinced by existing social programs involves race. Because social security and other public insurance programs serve a broad cross-section of the population, while AFDC and public assistance programs have a

disproportionate number of minority recipients, many socioeconomically comfortable Americans view public assistance as an "us-versus-them" issue. If programs created to help our most economically vulnerable citizens are to acquire greater political viability, they must be designed to emphasize inclusiveness, serving minorities as an indistinguishable aspect of serving a much broader and more representative constituency.

A second aspect of equality of opportunity relates to differences in developmental opportunities, or the equality of life chances.^[42] Obviously procedural fairness will not in itself equalize opportunity among youngsters who attend private preparatory schools and the children of migrant farmworkers. Nor can efforts to equalize life chances by giving disadvantaged youngsters extra preschool or afterschool activities put them on a par with children whose lives are richer in the developmental experiences and role models that foster abilities to compete successfully for educational and occupational positions. Related efforts to give preferential consideration to school or job applicants who have disadvantaged backgrounds have been highly controversial.

The sources of resistance to efforts to realize greater equality of life chances are several: such efforts necessarily constrain negative liberty and procedural fairness, and they sometimes unnecessarily abridge other values as well; and racism and related forms of prejudice predispose some constituencies to oppose any form of affirmative action. While conservatives in the late 1970s and 1980s made a constructive contribution in emphasizing the desirability of eliciting greater responsibility from people who sought social protection or assistance, conservative thinkers have balked at fathoming the full array of problems that profound social disadvantage presents.

The socioeconomic rights that I have suggested are necessary, but far from sufficient, for improving the life chances of the disadvantaged. Government programs can and should provide food for hungry children, but social programs cannot supply these children with the supportive parents, peers, and school environments that encourage intellectual and emotional growth.^[43]

The situation in the case of episodic social hazards is more encouraging, for here benefits serve to mitigate the effects of problematic episodes in the lives of those who generally cope relatively

well. In such cases equality of opportunity greatly resembles developmental liberty, with socioeconomic rights expanding the opportunities of those whose fortunes, were they limited to private means, would be more restricted.

Though socioeconomic rights lead us in the direction of greater equality of life chances, these rights are not forceful facilitators of this value. And they are of less help in cases of disadvantage than when applied to episodic problems. But in the process of lending minimal support to equalities of results and opportunities, these socioeconomic rights reflect some of the tension inherent in our nation's troublesome commitment to two incompatible values, negative liberty and equality.