2 The Nazi Turning and the Rectoral Address
1. Steiner sees this as the question which Heidegger's critics, including Adorno and Habermas, have failed to answer. See George Steiner, "Heidegger, abermals," Merkur 43, no. 2 (February 1989): 95. [BACK]
2. Sartre seems to have thought that in principle a total explanation of human behavior was indeed possible. See Jean-Paul Sartre, L'idiot de la famille: Gustave Flaubert de 1821 à 1857 , 3 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1971). [BACK]
3. The distinction between philosophical and nonphilosophical analyses of Heidegger's turn to Nazism neatly divides the French discussion of his politics into two camps. On the one hand, there are those who regard his Nazism as an isolated episode, unrelated to his position, such as Fédier and Aubenque. On the other, there are those, such as Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe, more sophisticated, who accept a link between his thought and Nazism, which, they argue, is overcome in the later evolution of his thought. [BACK]
4. For this list and discussion, see Gerald E. Myers, "The Psychology of Man after Auschwitz," in Echoes from the Holocaust (see Introd., n. 7), p. 313. Myers insists on the role of Hitler as a central cause of the Holocaust. [BACK]
5. This information is derived from Fritz Stern, Dreams and Delusions. National Socialism in the Drama of the German Past (New York: Vintage, 1989), pp. 130-131. [BACK]
6. For a classic formulation of this argument, see Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 3. [BACK]
7. For a recent effort to present a synthetic view of the Weimar Republic in its entirety, see Reinhard Kühnl, Die Weimarer Republik: Errichtung, Machtstruktur und Zerstörung einer Demokratie (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1985). [BACK]
8. Löwith reports a series of articles that appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung in December 1931 by Paul Tillich, Eduard Spranger, Karl Jaspers, and others under the title "Gibt es noch eine Universität?" See Karl Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933: Ein Bericht (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1989), p. 24. [BACK]
9. Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 144. [BACK]
10. See Neumann, Behemoth , p. 14. [BACK]
11. See Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition (Boston: Beacon, 1957), p. 467. [BACK]
12. For a discussion of the rise of Nazism as a conservative revolution, see Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), chap. 2, "The Conservative Revolution in Weimar," pp. 18-48.
13. For a presentation of these possibilities, see Kühnl, Die Weimarer
Republik , pp. 8-9. He argues that like the First World War, the demise of the Weimar Republic is due not to economic determinism but to conscious action on the part of those who controlled the economic levers of power. See ibid., "Nachwort," pp. 241-248. [BACK]
12. For a discussion of the rise of Nazism as a conservative revolution, see Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), chap. 2, "The Conservative Revolution in Weimar," pp. 18-48.
13. For a presentation of these possibilities, see Kühnl, Die Weimarer
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Republik , pp. 8-9. He argues that like the First World War, the demise of the Weimar Republic is due not to economic determinism but to conscious action on the part of those who controlled the economic levers of power. See ibid., "Nachwort," pp. 241-248. [BACK]
14. For a short summary, see Peter Gay, "A Short Political History of the Weimar Republic," in Gay, Weimar Culture , pp. 147-164. [BACK]
15. For a discussion of the Nazi assumption of power, see Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, and Gerhard Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung: Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland, 1933-1934 (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1960). [BACK]
16. Löwith has expressed a similar view. "Die deutsche Revolution von 1933 begann mit dem Ausbruch des Weltkriegs. Was seit 1933 in Deutschland geschieht, ist der Versuch, den verlorenen Krieg zu gewinnen. Das Dritte Reich ist das Bismarcksche Reich in zweiter Potenz und der 'Hitlerismus' ein gesteigerter 'Wilhelmismus,' zwischen denen die Weimarer Republik nur ein Zwischenakt war." Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland , p. 1. [BACK]
17. For an account of German intellectuals up to the Nazi seizure of power, see Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The Academic Communit)' 1890-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969). [BACK]
18. For a discussion of romantic anti-capitalism, see Michael Löwy, Georg Lukács-From Romanticism to Bolshevism , trans. by Patrick Camiller (London: New Left Books, 1979), pp. 22-66. [BACK]
19. See Rainer Lepsius, cited by Baum "HOLOCAUST" (see Introd., n. 7), p. 63.
20. See Dagmar Barnouw, Weimar Intellectuals and the Threat of Modernit y (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 18. For a good survey of the attitude of German intellectuals toward the Weimar Republic, see ibid., pt. 1: "Tempted by Distance: Intellectuals and the Grey Republic," pp. 11-42. [BACK]
19. See Rainer Lepsius, cited by Baum "HOLOCAUST" (see Introd., n. 7), p. 63.
20. See Dagmar Barnouw, Weimar Intellectuals and the Threat of Modernit y (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 18. For a good survey of the attitude of German intellectuals toward the Weimar Republic, see ibid., pt. 1: "Tempted by Distance: Intellectuals and the Grey Republic," pp. 11-42. [BACK]
21. See Max Scheler, Man's Place in Nature , trans. Hans Meyerhoff (Boston: Beacon, 1961). p. 4. [BACK]
22. Cited in Barnouw, Weimar Intellectuals , p. 2. [BACK]
23. See Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age , trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985). [BACK]
24. See Martin Heidegger, Heraklit: Freiburger Vorlesungen Sommer-semester 1943 und Sommersemester 1944 , ed. Manfred S. Frings (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), p. 181. [BACK]
25. For exceptions, see W. F. Haug, ed., Deutsche Philosophen 1933 (Hamburg: Argument, 1989), and Thomas Laugstien, Philosophieverhaltnisse im deutschen Faschismus (Hamburg: Argument, 1990). [BACK]
26. See Helmut Kuhn, "German Philosophy and National Socialism," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. Paul Edwards (New York and London: Macmillan, 1967), 3-4:310.
27. See Martin Heidegger to Karl Jaspers, Marburg, 2 Dec. 1926, in Martin Heidegger-Karl Jaspers, Briefwechsel 1920-1963 , ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (Frankfurt a.M., München and Zürich: Vittorio Klostermann and Piper,
1990), p. 69. Jaspers seems to have become aware of the problem of anti-Semitism very late. For instance, in a letter of 20 April 1933 to Heidegger, when Hitler had already come to power and Heidegger was about to become the philosophical Führer of the University of Freiburg, after a visit to Berlin Jaspers routinely distinguished between Jewish and German nationalist intellectual circles. See ibid., p. 153. [BACK]
26. See Helmut Kuhn, "German Philosophy and National Socialism," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. Paul Edwards (New York and London: Macmillan, 1967), 3-4:310.
27. See Martin Heidegger to Karl Jaspers, Marburg, 2 Dec. 1926, in Martin Heidegger-Karl Jaspers, Briefwechsel 1920-1963 , ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (Frankfurt a.M., München and Zürich: Vittorio Klostermann and Piper,
Page 310
1990), p. 69. Jaspers seems to have become aware of the problem of anti-Semitism very late. For instance, in a letter of 20 April 1933 to Heidegger, when Hitler had already come to power and Heidegger was about to become the philosophical Führer of the University of Freiburg, after a visit to Berlin Jaspers routinely distinguished between Jewish and German nationalist intellectual circles. See ibid., p. 153. [BACK]
28. See George M. Kren, "The Holocaust as History," in Echoes from the Holocaust (see Introd., n. 7), pp. 37-38. [BACK]
29. For discussion of Ian Kershaw's view, which omits anti-Semitism from Hitler's main themes in his rise to power, see Baum, "HOLOCAUST," pp. 66-67. [BACK]
30. See Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy , trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 12. [BACK]
31. See Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse , p. 52.
32. See ibid., p. 79.
33. See ibid., p. 25.
34. See ibid., p. 202.
35. See ibid.
36. See ibid., p. 27.
37. See ibid.
38. See ibid., p. 90.
39. See ibid., pp. 85-86.
40. See ibid., p. 90. [BACK]
31. See Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse , p. 52.
32. See ibid., p. 79.
33. See ibid., p. 25.
34. See ibid., p. 202.
35. See ibid.
36. See ibid., p. 27.
37. See ibid.
38. See ibid., p. 90.
39. See ibid., pp. 85-86.
40. See ibid., p. 90. [BACK]
31. See Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse , p. 52.
32. See ibid., p. 79.
33. See ibid., p. 25.
34. See ibid., p. 202.
35. See ibid.
36. See ibid., p. 27.
37. See ibid.
38. See ibid., p. 90.
39. See ibid., pp. 85-86.
40. See ibid., p. 90. [BACK]
31. See Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse , p. 52.
32. See ibid., p. 79.
33. See ibid., p. 25.
34. See ibid., p. 202.
35. See ibid.
36. See ibid., p. 27.
37. See ibid.
38. See ibid., p. 90.
39. See ibid., pp. 85-86.
40. See ibid., p. 90. [BACK]
31. See Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse , p. 52.
32. See ibid., p. 79.
33. See ibid., p. 25.
34. See ibid., p. 202.
35. See ibid.
36. See ibid., p. 27.
37. See ibid.
38. See ibid., p. 90.
39. See ibid., pp. 85-86.
40. See ibid., p. 90. [BACK]
31. See Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse , p. 52.
32. See ibid., p. 79.
33. See ibid., p. 25.
34. See ibid., p. 202.
35. See ibid.
36. See ibid., p. 27.
37. See ibid.
38. See ibid., p. 90.
39. See ibid., pp. 85-86.
40. See ibid., p. 90. [BACK]
31. See Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse , p. 52.
32. See ibid., p. 79.
33. See ibid., p. 25.
34. See ibid., p. 202.
35. See ibid.
36. See ibid., p. 27.
37. See ibid.
38. See ibid., p. 90.
39. See ibid., pp. 85-86.
40. See ibid., p. 90. [BACK]
31. See Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse , p. 52.
32. See ibid., p. 79.
33. See ibid., p. 25.
34. See ibid., p. 202.
35. See ibid.
36. See ibid., p. 27.
37. See ibid.
38. See ibid., p. 90.
39. See ibid., pp. 85-86.
40. See ibid., p. 90. [BACK]
31. See Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse , p. 52.
32. See ibid., p. 79.
33. See ibid., p. 25.
34. See ibid., p. 202.
35. See ibid.
36. See ibid., p. 27.
37. See ibid.
38. See ibid., p. 90.
39. See ibid., pp. 85-86.
40. See ibid., p. 90. [BACK]
31. See Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse , p. 52.
32. See ibid., p. 79.
33. See ibid., p. 25.
34. See ibid., p. 202.
35. See ibid.
36. See ibid., p. 27.
37. See ibid.
38. See ibid., p. 90.
39. See ibid., pp. 85-86.
40. See ibid., p. 90. [BACK]
41. Löwith insists on the relation between Schmitt's view of resoluteness and Hitler's rise to power. "Das Pathos der Entscheidung für die nackte Entschiedenheit hatte zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen einen allgemeinen Anklang gefunden. Es hat die Entscheidung für Hitlers Entschiedenheit vorbereitet und den politischen Umsturz als 'Revolution des Nihilismus' möglich gemacht." Karl Löwith, "Der okkasionnelle Dezisionismus von C. Schmitt," in Löwith, Sämtliche Schriften (see Introd., n. 12), 1:61
42. Hitler wrote: "So ist die Voraussetzung zum Bestehen eines höheren Menschentums nicht der Staat, sondern das Volkstum, das hierzu befähigt ist." Cited in Thomä, Die Zeit des Selbt (see Introd., n. 6), p. 559. Thomä points to the way in which Heidegger's view that the state can only be understood on the basis of the Volk coincides with Hitler's view. See ibid., p. 559. [BACK]
41. Löwith insists on the relation between Schmitt's view of resoluteness and Hitler's rise to power. "Das Pathos der Entscheidung für die nackte Entschiedenheit hatte zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen einen allgemeinen Anklang gefunden. Es hat die Entscheidung für Hitlers Entschiedenheit vorbereitet und den politischen Umsturz als 'Revolution des Nihilismus' möglich gemacht." Karl Löwith, "Der okkasionnelle Dezisionismus von C. Schmitt," in Löwith, Sämtliche Schriften (see Introd., n. 12), 1:61
42. Hitler wrote: "So ist die Voraussetzung zum Bestehen eines höheren Menschentums nicht der Staat, sondern das Volkstum, das hierzu befähigt ist." Cited in Thomä, Die Zeit des Selbt (see Introd., n. 6), p. 559. Thomä points to the way in which Heidegger's view that the state can only be understood on the basis of the Volk coincides with Hitler's view. See ibid., p. 559. [BACK]
43. G. W. E Hegel, Jenaer Realphilosophie I: Die Vorlesungen von 1803/4 , ed. J. Hoffmeister (Leipzig, 1932), p. 239, cited in Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972). p. 93. [BACK]
44. Lukács has shown that alienation is a central theme in Hegel's thought. See Georg Lukács, The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics , trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976). [BACK]
45. For a discussion of this point, see Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche :
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The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought , trans. David E. Green (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967). [BACK]
46. Bürger has argued that the difference between aestheticism and the avant-garde lies in the latter's concern to erect a theory of art into a theory of life. See Peter Bierget, Theory of the Avant-Garde , trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). [BACK]
47. See Craine Brinton, "Romanticism," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. Edwards, 7-8:209. [BACK]
48. See Jacques Droz, "Romanticism in Political Thought," in Dictionary of the History, of Ideas , ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 4:205-208. [BACK]
49. See Herr, Reactionary Modernism (see n. 12), p. 15. [BACK]
50. See Nathan Rotenstreich, "Volksgeist," in Dictionary of the History of Ideas , ed. Weiner, 4:490-496. [BACK]
51. See G. W. F. Hegel, "Fragmente fiber Volksreligion und Christentum (1793-1794)," in G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden , ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), vol. 1, Frühe Schriften , pp. 9-103, e.g., pp. 34, 42, etc. [BACK]
52. See Rotenstreich, "Volksgeist," p. 493. [BACK]
53. See Pierre Bourdieu, L'ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger (Paris: Éditions de minuit, 1988), pp. 16-18. [BACK]
54. See George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964). pp. 14-15. For a description of the conception of the Volk in the context of modern German anti-Semitism, see Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War against the Jews 1933-1945 (New York: Bantam, 1986). pp. 23-48. [BACK]
55. See Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts: Eine Wertung der seelischgeistigen Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit (Munich: Hoheneichen, 1930). [BACK]
56. For the category of romantic disillusionment, see Georg Lukács, La théorie du roman , trans. Jean Clarevoye (Paris: Éditions Gonthier, 1963), pp. 115ff. [BACK]
57. Isaiah Berlin, "Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism," The New York Review of Books 37, no. 14 (27 September 1990): 64. For a fuller account of Berlin's effort to revise the usual antiromantic reading of Maistre, see Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London: John Murray; New York: Knopf, 1991). [BACK]
58. On this point, see Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1973), p. xii. Although he died in 1925, Frege was also an early enthusiast of National Socialism. Entries in his Tagebuch (that has not yet been published) from 10 March to 9 May 1924 record: his desire for someone, although not a centrist, to free Germany from French pressure; his conviction that there were too many Jews in Germany and that he finally understood anti-Semitism; his preoccupation with, in his words, the "enormous difficulty" of distinguishing Jews from others; his suggestion that when new racial laws are
Page 312
established Jews should wear something that enables one to recognize them as Jews; and so on. (I owe this reference to Hans Sluga.) [BACK]
59. See Pierre Aubenque, "Encore Heidegger et le nazisme," Le Débat no. 48 (janvier-février 1988): 119.
60. See Janicaud, L'ombre de cette pensée (see Introd., n. 7), p. 58. But note that Janicaud holds that Heidegger's rejection of politics is in effect an "apolitic" ( apolitique ), that is, a particular form of political theory. See ibid., pp. 51-76. [BACK]
59. See Pierre Aubenque, "Encore Heidegger et le nazisme," Le Débat no. 48 (janvier-février 1988): 119.
60. See Janicaud, L'ombre de cette pensée (see Introd., n. 7), p. 58. But note that Janicaud holds that Heidegger's rejection of politics is in effect an "apolitic" ( apolitique ), that is, a particular form of political theory. See ibid., pp. 51-76. [BACK]
61. See Wolin, The Politics of Being (see chap. 1, n. 1). [BACK]
62. See Plato's Republic , trans. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1974) 1.352, p. 25. [BACK]
63. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , trans. Martin Ostwald (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1962), 1.2.1094b, p. 4. [BACK]
64. For a discussion of Heidegger's critique of the Aristotelian conception of human being, see Janicaud, L'ombre de cette pensée , pp. 58-64. [BACK]
65. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , 10.9.1181b, p. 302. [BACK]
66. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 74, "The Basic Constitution of Historicality." [BACK]
67. Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 210-211. [BACK]
68. For an example of the argument that Stalinism is contained in Marx's theory, see Leszek Kolakowski, "Marxist Roots of Stalinism," in Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation , ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1979); and Leszek Kolakowski, "Die sogenannte Entfremdung," Zukunft , February 1978. For an analysis, see Tom Rockmore, ''Kolakowski and Markovic on Stalinism, Marxist and Marx," Philosophy and Social Criticism 6, no. 3 (1979). [BACK]
69. There is an enormous and rapidly growing secondary literature on Heidegger's position. The best general account of Heidegger's thought of which I am aware is Pöggeler's classic study. See Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963, 3d ed., 1990). [BACK]
70. Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 19.
71. See ibid., §4, p. 32: "As ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of Being which this entity—man himself—possesses. This entity we denote by the term ' Dasein.' " [BACK]
70. Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 19.
71. See ibid., §4, p. 32: "As ways in which man behaves, sciences have the manner of Being which this entity—man himself—possesses. This entity we denote by the term ' Dasein.' " [BACK]
72. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 4, p. 32.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., § 4, p. 33.
75. Ibid.
76. See ibid.
77. Ibid., § 4, p. 34; see also p. 35.
78. Ibid., § 5, p. 38.
79. See ibid. [BACK]
72. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 4, p. 32.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., § 4, p. 33.
75. Ibid.
76. See ibid.
77. Ibid., § 4, p. 34; see also p. 35.
78. Ibid., § 5, p. 38.
79. See ibid. [BACK]
72. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 4, p. 32.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., § 4, p. 33.
75. Ibid.
76. See ibid.
77. Ibid., § 4, p. 34; see also p. 35.
78. Ibid., § 5, p. 38.
79. See ibid. [BACK]
72. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 4, p. 32.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., § 4, p. 33.
75. Ibid.
76. See ibid.
77. Ibid., § 4, p. 34; see also p. 35.
78. Ibid., § 5, p. 38.
79. See ibid. [BACK]
72. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 4, p. 32.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., § 4, p. 33.
75. Ibid.
76. See ibid.
77. Ibid., § 4, p. 34; see also p. 35.
78. Ibid., § 5, p. 38.
79. See ibid. [BACK]
72. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 4, p. 32.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., § 4, p. 33.
75. Ibid.
76. See ibid.
77. Ibid., § 4, p. 34; see also p. 35.
78. Ibid., § 5, p. 38.
79. See ibid. [BACK]
72. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 4, p. 32.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., § 4, p. 33.
75. Ibid.
76. See ibid.
77. Ibid., § 4, p. 34; see also p. 35.
78. Ibid., § 5, p. 38.
79. See ibid. [BACK]
72. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 4, p. 32.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., § 4, p. 33.
75. Ibid.
76. See ibid.
77. Ibid., § 4, p. 34; see also p. 35.
78. Ibid., § 5, p. 38.
79. See ibid. [BACK]
80. Goldmann has argued that Being and Time is intended as a response to Lukács's History and Class Consciousness . See Lucien Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy , trans. William Q. Boelhower (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). [BACK]
81. Heidegger's analysis includes numerous aspects that appear to be based on an appropriation or rethinking of Kierkegaardian concepts, including fear, death, anxiety, authenticity, repetition, etc.
82. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 2, p. 24.
83. See ibid., § 9, p. 68.
84. See ibid., § 9, p. 67.
85. Ibid., p. 68.
86. See ibid., p. 69.
87. See ibid., § 10, "How the Analytic of Dasein Is to Be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology," pp. 71-77. [BACK]
81. Heidegger's analysis includes numerous aspects that appear to be based on an appropriation or rethinking of Kierkegaardian concepts, including fear, death, anxiety, authenticity, repetition, etc.
82. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 2, p. 24.
83. See ibid., § 9, p. 68.
84. See ibid., § 9, p. 67.
85. Ibid., p. 68.
86. See ibid., p. 69.
87. See ibid., § 10, "How the Analytic of Dasein Is to Be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology," pp. 71-77. [BACK]
81. Heidegger's analysis includes numerous aspects that appear to be based on an appropriation or rethinking of Kierkegaardian concepts, including fear, death, anxiety, authenticity, repetition, etc.
82. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 2, p. 24.
83. See ibid., § 9, p. 68.
84. See ibid., § 9, p. 67.
85. Ibid., p. 68.
86. See ibid., p. 69.
87. See ibid., § 10, "How the Analytic of Dasein Is to Be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology," pp. 71-77. [BACK]
81. Heidegger's analysis includes numerous aspects that appear to be based on an appropriation or rethinking of Kierkegaardian concepts, including fear, death, anxiety, authenticity, repetition, etc.
82. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 2, p. 24.
83. See ibid., § 9, p. 68.
84. See ibid., § 9, p. 67.
85. Ibid., p. 68.
86. See ibid., p. 69.
87. See ibid., § 10, "How the Analytic of Dasein Is to Be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology," pp. 71-77. [BACK]
81. Heidegger's analysis includes numerous aspects that appear to be based on an appropriation or rethinking of Kierkegaardian concepts, including fear, death, anxiety, authenticity, repetition, etc.
82. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 2, p. 24.
83. See ibid., § 9, p. 68.
84. See ibid., § 9, p. 67.
85. Ibid., p. 68.
86. See ibid., p. 69.
87. See ibid., § 10, "How the Analytic of Dasein Is to Be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology," pp. 71-77. [BACK]
81. Heidegger's analysis includes numerous aspects that appear to be based on an appropriation or rethinking of Kierkegaardian concepts, including fear, death, anxiety, authenticity, repetition, etc.
82. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 2, p. 24.
83. See ibid., § 9, p. 68.
84. See ibid., § 9, p. 67.
85. Ibid., p. 68.
86. See ibid., p. 69.
87. See ibid., § 10, "How the Analytic of Dasein Is to Be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology," pp. 71-77. [BACK]
81. Heidegger's analysis includes numerous aspects that appear to be based on an appropriation or rethinking of Kierkegaardian concepts, including fear, death, anxiety, authenticity, repetition, etc.
82. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 2, p. 24.
83. See ibid., § 9, p. 68.
84. See ibid., § 9, p. 67.
85. Ibid., p. 68.
86. See ibid., p. 69.
87. See ibid., § 10, "How the Analytic of Dasein Is to Be Distinguished from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology," pp. 71-77. [BACK]
88. Heidegger's view of authentic thought bears a close relation to Kant's idea of maturity, of thinking for oneself as the criterion of appropriate thought. For Kant's view, see "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" in Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays , trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985). [BACK]
89. Heidegger does not claim that authenticity must be realized in practice, although it would make sense to do so. Wolin argues that authenticity is meaningful only if it is in fact realized. But the passage he cites, from Being and Time , p. 312, merely indicates that Heidegger is concerned at that point with a form of authenticity which is in fact realized, not that authenticity is meaningful only when this is the case. See Wolin, The Politics of Being , p. 34. [BACK]
90. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 44, p. 264.
91. Ibid.
92. See ibid., § 60, p. 344. For a general discussion of resoluteness that does not emphasize the lack of criteria nor discuss the political consequences, see Charles M. Sherover, "The Hermeneutic Structure of Resoluteness: A Preliminary Exploration," in Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Lectures and Essays , ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1988), pp. 41-66. [BACK]
90. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 44, p. 264.
91. Ibid.
92. See ibid., § 60, p. 344. For a general discussion of resoluteness that does not emphasize the lack of criteria nor discuss the political consequences, see Charles M. Sherover, "The Hermeneutic Structure of Resoluteness: A Preliminary Exploration," in Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Lectures and Essays , ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1988), pp. 41-66. [BACK]
90. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 44, p. 264.
91. Ibid.
92. See ibid., § 60, p. 344. For a general discussion of resoluteness that does not emphasize the lack of criteria nor discuss the political consequences, see Charles M. Sherover, "The Hermeneutic Structure of Resoluteness: A Preliminary Exploration," in Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Lectures and Essays , ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1988), pp. 41-66. [BACK]
93. Heidegger, Being and Time , § 61, p. 349.
94. See ibid., § 74, "The Basic Constitution of History." [BACK]
93. Heidegger, Being and Time , § 61, p. 349.
94. See ibid., § 74, "The Basic Constitution of History." [BACK]
95. For an expression of this view, see Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics (see chap. 1, n. 21), pp. 88-89. [BACK]
96. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 74, p. 435.
97. See ibid., § 74, pp. 435-436.
98. See ibid., § 74, p. 436; see also § 26, p. 159.
99. See ibid., § 74, p. 436.
100. See ibid., §74, p. 437. [BACK]
96. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 74, p. 435.
97. See ibid., § 74, pp. 435-436.
98. See ibid., § 74, p. 436; see also § 26, p. 159.
99. See ibid., § 74, p. 436.
100. See ibid., §74, p. 437. [BACK]
96. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 74, p. 435.
97. See ibid., § 74, pp. 435-436.
98. See ibid., § 74, p. 436; see also § 26, p. 159.
99. See ibid., § 74, p. 436.
100. See ibid., §74, p. 437. [BACK]
96. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 74, p. 435.
97. See ibid., § 74, pp. 435-436.
98. See ibid., § 74, p. 436; see also § 26, p. 159.
99. See ibid., § 74, p. 436.
100. See ibid., §74, p. 437. [BACK]
96. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 74, p. 435.
97. See ibid., § 74, pp. 435-436.
98. See ibid., § 74, p. 436; see also § 26, p. 159.
99. See ibid., § 74, p. 436.
100. See ibid., §74, p. 437. [BACK]
101. In partial defense, it should be noted that not only the National Socialists but other segments of society also, apparently including Communists as well as Catholics, likewise honored Schlageter's memory. For an analysis of Heidegger's homage to Schlageter, see Farias, Heidegger and Nazism (see In-trod., n. 4), pp. 87-95. According to Löwith, Heidegger's praise of Schlageter was based on Tolstoy's "Death of Ivan Ilitch." See Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland (see n. 8), p. 36. [BACK]
102. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 74, p. 438. This concept has attracted extensive attention in the literature. For a survey of the main approaches, see Thomä, Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit danach (see Introd., n. 6), pp. 153-162. [BACK]
103. For instance, in the Gutachten that formed the basis for Heidegger's suspension from his teaching functions after the Second World War, Jaspers stated that Heidegger's personal excuse should be partly acknowledged since Heidegger was by his very nature not political. See Ott, Martin Heidegger (see Introd., n. 3), p. 316. [BACK]
104. See Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt — Endlichkeit — Einsamkeit: Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1929/30 , ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm yon Herrmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983). For an analysis of the significance of this text for Heidegger's Nazism, see Winfried Franzen, "Die Sehnsucht nach Härte und Schwere: Über ein zum NS-Engagement disponierendes Motiv in Heideggers Vorlesung 'Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik' yon 1929/30," in Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie , ed. Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert and Otto Pöggeler (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1989). [BACK]
105. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 29: "Being There as State-of-Mind," pp. 172-179.
106. See ibid.. p. 178. [BACK]
105. See Heidegger, Being and Time , § 29: "Being There as State-of-Mind," pp. 172-179.
106. See ibid.. p. 178. [BACK]
107. Heidegger's formulation reads in part ( Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik , p. 244): "aber keiner ist der Verwalter der inneren Grösse des Daseins und seiner Notwendigkeiten." This passage calls for two comments. First, it is possible, as Zimmerman thinks, that Heidegger is here thinking of a F ü hrer . See Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity (see chap. 1, n. 23), p. 33. But it is also equally likely that he is saying that no one is really master of himself or herself. Second, it is startling to see that Heidegger here employs a locution, viz. "the inner greatness," very similar to the locution employed after his period as rector, in the Introduction to Metaphysics , where he speaks of the "inner truth and greatness of National Socialism.'' The significant point, beyond the linguistic similarity, is that in both cases he is referring to the problems of the authenticity of Dasein and ultimately to knowledge of Being. [BACK]
108. Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik , p. 243.
109. See ibid., § 18c, "Die tiefe Langeweile als die verborgene Grundstimmung der kulturphilosophischen Deutungen unserer Lage," pp. 111-116.
110. See ibid., p. 243.
111. Ibid., p. 248; Heidegger's emphases.
112. Ibid.
113. See ibid., p. 249. [BACK]
108. Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik , p. 243.
109. See ibid., § 18c, "Die tiefe Langeweile als die verborgene Grundstimmung der kulturphilosophischen Deutungen unserer Lage," pp. 111-116.
110. See ibid., p. 243.
111. Ibid., p. 248; Heidegger's emphases.
112. Ibid.
113. See ibid., p. 249. [BACK]
108. Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik , p. 243.
109. See ibid., § 18c, "Die tiefe Langeweile als die verborgene Grundstimmung der kulturphilosophischen Deutungen unserer Lage," pp. 111-116.
110. See ibid., p. 243.
111. Ibid., p. 248; Heidegger's emphases.
112. Ibid.
113. See ibid., p. 249. [BACK]
108. Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik , p. 243.
109. See ibid., § 18c, "Die tiefe Langeweile als die verborgene Grundstimmung der kulturphilosophischen Deutungen unserer Lage," pp. 111-116.
110. See ibid., p. 243.
111. Ibid., p. 248; Heidegger's emphases.
112. Ibid.
113. See ibid., p. 249. [BACK]
108. Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik , p. 243.
109. See ibid., § 18c, "Die tiefe Langeweile als die verborgene Grundstimmung der kulturphilosophischen Deutungen unserer Lage," pp. 111-116.
110. See ibid., p. 243.
111. Ibid., p. 248; Heidegger's emphases.
112. Ibid.
113. See ibid., p. 249. [BACK]
108. Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik , p. 243.
109. See ibid., § 18c, "Die tiefe Langeweile als die verborgene Grundstimmung der kulturphilosophischen Deutungen unserer Lage," pp. 111-116.
110. See ibid., p. 243.
111. Ibid., p. 248; Heidegger's emphases.
112. Ibid.
113. See ibid., p. 249. [BACK]
114. Mosse describes this concept as follows:" 'Volk' is one of those perplexing German terms which connotes far more than its specific meaning. 'Volk' is a much more comprehensive term than 'people,' for to German thinkers ever since the birth of German romanticism in the late eighteenth century 'Volk' signified the union of a group of people with a transcendental 'essence.' The 'essence' might be called 'nature' or 'cosmos' or 'mythos,' but in each instance it
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was fused to man's innermost nature, and represented the essence of his creativity, his depth of feeling, his individuality, and his unity with other members of the Volk." Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology (see n. 54), p. 4. [BACK]
115. There are at present two available translations into English due respectively to Karsten Harries and to Lisa Harries in collaboration with Karsten Harries. See "The Self-Assertion of the German University: Address, Delivered on the Solemn Assumption of the Rectorate of the University Freiburg [and] The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts," trans. Karsten Harries, Review of Metaphysics 38 (March 1985): 467-502, and "The Self-Assertion of the German University," in Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers (see Introd., n. 9), pp. 5-14. The same volume also has a translation of Heidegger's article, "The Rectorate: Facts and Thoughts," pp. 15-32. To avoid confusion, and because of the relatively greater availability of the earlier translations of the speech and the article, I shall refer to Karsten Harries's translations of both the rectoral address and the article "Facts and Thoughts" as ''Rectoral Address-Facts and Thoughts,'' followed by the page number. [BACK]
116. On this point, see Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage: Zur politischen Haftung Deutschlands (Munich and Zurich: Piper, 1987), p. 64. [BACK]
117. For discussion, see Farias, Heidegger and Nazism (see Introd., n. 4), pp. 96-112; Ott, Martin Heidegger , pp. 146-166; and Reiner Alisch, "Heideggers Rektoratsrede im Kontext," in Deutsche Philosophen 1933 , ed. Haug (see n. 25). [BACK]
118. For detailed discussion of this speech, see Farias, Heidegger and Nazism , chap. 9, "The Rector's Address: Its Assumptions and Its Effects," pp. 99-112; Ott, Martin Heidegger , "Das soldatische Umfeld der Rektoratsrede," pp. 146-166; and Alisch, "Heideggers Rektoratsrede im Kontext," pp. 69-98. For Ott's analysis of Heidegger's use of Göring as a model, see Ott, Martin Heidegger , pp. 145-148. For a recent analysis which largely follows Heidegger's self-justification of his actions, see Scott, The Question of Ethics (see Introd., n. 11), chap. 5, pp. 148-172. [BACK]
119. See Ott, Martin Heidegger , pp. 147f. [BACK]
120. See Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland , pp. 57-58. [BACK]
121. Cited in Emil L. Fackenheim, To Mend the World: Foundations of Future Jewish Thought (New York: Schocken Books, 1982), p. 267. [BACK]
122. See Fackenheim, To Mend the World , pp. 266-267. According to Fackenheim, this was Fichte's sole moment of truth. On Huber, see also Laugstien, Philosophieverhältnisse (see n. 25), pp. 58ff. [BACK]
123. The Platonism of Heidegger's turn to politics has been seen, particularly in the French discussion, where stress has been placed on the metaphysical aspect of Heidegger's political turn in order to argue that his later thought overcomes the metaphysical dimension by bringing his position in line with its own attempt to "destroy" the history of ontology. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, L'imitation des modernes. Typographies H (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1986), pp. 135-200, and Jacques Derrida, De l'esprit (see chap. 1, n. 28). I am less interested here in the internal consistency of Heidegger's position than in his apparent reliance on a quasi-Platonic model for the political role of philosophy. [BACK]
124. The parallels in this respect between Lukács and Heidegger are rarely explored. For an interesting discussion, see István M. Fehér, "Heidegger und Lukács. Eine Hunderjahrebilanz," in Wege und Irrwege des neueren Urngangs reit Heideggers Werk: Ein deutsch-ungarisches Symposium (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, forthcoming). [BACK]
125. See Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism , trans. P.S. Falla (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), vol. 3, chap. 7, "György Lukács: Reason in the Service of Dogma," pp. 253-307. [BACK]
126. Harries helpfully notes the first two senses of " Selbstbehauptung " but apparently misses the third, relevantly philosophical sense that was presupposed in Heidegger's claim for the role of philosophy in the realization of Nazism. See "Rectoral Address-Facts and Thoughts," p. 468.
127. Ibid., p. 470. [BACK]
126. Harries helpfully notes the first two senses of " Selbstbehauptung " but apparently misses the third, relevantly philosophical sense that was presupposed in Heidegger's claim for the role of philosophy in the realization of Nazism. See "Rectoral Address-Facts and Thoughts," p. 468.
127. Ibid., p. 470. [BACK]
128. Thomä, who fails to notice the discussion of the conception of the Volk in Being and Time , sees a shift in position between the conception of Dasein in Heidegger's fundamental ontology and the conception of the Volk developed here. See Thomä, Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit danach , p. 553. [BACK]
129. For the term "spiritual leader," see "Ernennung eines Kanzlers an der Universität Freiburg," Der Alemanne.' Kampfblatt der Nationalsozialisten Ober-badens . . ., Folge 178, 30 June 1933, p. 2, cited in Schneeberger, Nachlese zu Heidegger (see chap. 1, n. 34), p. 73. For an analysis of Heidegger's Nazism through the concept of leadership ( Fuhrung ) and the leader ( Führer ), see Hans Ebeling, Geschichte einer Täuschung (W ü rzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1990), "Das Ereignis des Führers: Heidegger's Antwort,'' pp. 9-34. [BACK]
130. On the leading role of the party, see V. I. Lenin, What Is to Be Done? , trans. Joe Fineberg and George Hanna, ed. Victor J. Jerome (New York: International Publishers, 1969). For Marx's view of the philosophers as the head of the revolution and the proletariat as its heart, see "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in Karl Marx, Early Writings , trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963). [BACK]
131. See Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 290ff. [BACK]
132. See Plato's account of the Myth of Er, in Plato's Republic , trans. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1974), 10.616f.. pp. 258f. [BACK]
133. Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 436. [BACK]
134. For a good discussion of this point, see Otto Püggeler, "Den Fuhrer führen? Heidegger und kein Ende," Philosophischer Rundschau 32, no. 1/2 (1985): 26-67. [BACK]
135. The same reaction was produced by Spengler, who enthusiastically welcomed the Nazi accession to power without ever mentioning Hitler. See Oswald Spengler, Jahre der Entscheidung, Erster Teil, Deutschland und die welt-geschichtliche Entwicklung (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1933). [BACK]
136. "Rectoral address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 471. [BACK]
137. See Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit , trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 6. [BACK]
138. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 471.
139. Ibid., p. 472. [BACK]
138. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 471.
139. Ibid., p. 472. [BACK]
140. See, e.g., Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961) 2:398, 413. [BACK]
141. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 473. [BACK]
142. Heidegger renders the Greek word " techne " as " Wissen, " or "knowledge.'' In a recent translation of Plato's Symposium the term is rendered as "profession," "science,'' and "expertise." See Plato: Symposium , trans. Alexander Nehemas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1989), p. xxvii. According to Liddell and Scott, the Greek term means "art," "skill," "craft," "cunning of hand," etc. These are all forms of knowing how, but not knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word. See Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon , 9th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 1785. [BACK]
143. For this argument, related to his turn to the concept of thought ( Denken ) as distinguished from philosophy, see "The Letter on Humanism." [BACK]
144. For a classic statement of this reading of Plato's theory, see Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development , trans. Richard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). [BACK]
145. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 474. [BACK]
146. See Martin Heidegger, Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister": Freibürger Vorlesung, Sommersemester 1942 , ed. Walter Biemel (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984), pp. 98, 106. [BACK]
147. On the relation between Heidegger's language, the language of Messkirch, and the terminology of National Socialism, see Robert Minder, "Heidegger und Hebel oder die Sprache von Messkirch," in Robert Minder, " H ö lderlin unter den deutschen" und andere Aufsätze zur deutschen Literatur (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1968). For a specific study of Nazi language, see Berel Lang, "Language and Genocide," in Berel Lang, Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 81-102. [BACK]
148. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 475; translation modified. [BACK]
149. See for this view Hegel's letter of 28 October 1808 to Niethammer, in Briefe yon und an Hegel , ed. J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), 1:253: "Die theoretische Arbeit, überzeuge ich mich täiglich mehr, bringt mehr zustande in der Welt als die praktische; ist erst das Reich der Vorstellung revolu-tioniert, so hält die Wirklichkeit nicht aus." [BACK]
150. See, e.g., Herbert Marcuse, Five Lectures (Boston: Beacon, 1970). [BACK]
151. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 475. [BACK]
152. For Marx's view, see "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in Marx, Early Writings , pp. 41-60. [BACK]
153. See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals , trans. Thomas K. Abbott (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1949), p. 12. [BACK]
154. Freiburger Studentenzeitung . . . 8. Semester (15), Nr. 1, 3. November 1933, p. 1, cited in Schneeberger, Nachlese zu Heidegger , p. 136. [BACK]
155. See "Only a God Can Save Us" (see chap. 1, n. 30), p. 271. [BACK]
156. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 498. [BACK]
157. See Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism 3:307. [BACK]
158. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 476. [BACK]
159. Heidegger's enumeration of three bonds of the German student recalls the appeal in May 1933 by von Papen for the cooperation of the Nazi movement, "Stalhelm" and "Konservative," which he regarded as "die drei grossen Säulen der nationalen Bewegung." See Haug, Deutsche Philosophen 1933 (see n. 25), p. 159. [BACK]
160. See Being and Time , § 26, p. 159. This idea of authentic being with others is never developed by Heidegger either in this work or in his later writings, although it is presupposed in his conception of the Volk . It apparently serves as the basis of Sartre's later view of the distinction between seriality and the group in fusion. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), trans. Alan Sheridan Smith as Critique of Dialectical Reason (London: New Left Books, 1976). [BACK]
161. See Being and Time , §§ 46-53. [BACK]
162. This episode is still not fully clarified. For a discussion, see Ott, Martin Heidegger , pp. 214-223. [BACK]
163. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 477.
164. Ibid.; see also p. 478 for a restatement of the same theme.
165. Ibid., p. 477. [BACK]
163. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 477.
164. Ibid.; see also p. 478 for a restatement of the same theme.
165. Ibid., p. 477. [BACK]
163. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 477.
164. Ibid.; see also p. 478 for a restatement of the same theme.
165. Ibid., p. 477. [BACK]
166. Heidegger's stress on Kampf , in connection with the realization of the Volk , which is one of the most noticeable aspects of this speech, directly recalls Hitler's view in Mein Kampf See Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich, 1934), p. 418, cited in George Mosse, Nazi Culture: A Documentary History (New York: Schocken Books, 1981), p. xxiii: "Every world-view, be it correct and useful a thousand times over, will be without importance for the life of a Volk unless its basic tenets are written upon the banners of a fighting movement." In this text, neither Hitler nor the National Socialist movement is directly mentioned. But there is an obvious link between Heidegger's repeated stress on the concept of Kampf and Hitler's book. Heidegger's awareness of this obvious link is a plausible reason for his determined effort in his article on the rectorate, at a time when he wishes to project the view that he has officially broken with Nazism of every form, to reinterpret the concept of Kampfin terms of Heraclitus's thought. [BACK]
167. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 479.
168. Ibid. [BACK]
167. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 479.
168. Ibid. [BACK]
169. Heidegger, Being and Time , p. 436. [BACK]
170. The extent of Spengler's influence on Heidegger is not often acknowledged. But it is important, particularly for the analysis of technology, as will emerge below. See chap. 6. [BACK]
174. See "Le dossier d'un nazi 'ordinaire,' " Le Monde , 14 October 1988, p. 12. [BACK]
175. "Rectoral Address—Facts and Thoughts," p. 480. Once again, Hei-
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degger appears deliberately to have taken liberties with the Greek, which does not mention a storm and literally reads "the great [things] are precarious." [BACK]
176. For a detailed discussion of Heidegger's mistranslation of this passage, see Bernd Martin, "'Alles Grosse ist gefährdet'—Der Fall Heidegger(s)," in Martin Heidegger und das "Dritte Reich": Ein Kompendium , ed. Bernd Martin (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), pp. 3-13.
177. Thomä, who throughout his study relatively deemphasizes the central role of Being in Heidegger's thought, curiously insists on the importance of Heidegger's effort to find a solution for the problem of the self, arising out of Being and Time , in the Nazi turn in 1933: "Die 'Läsung' des Jahres 1933 besteht dann darin, Handeln und Sprache gewaltsam zusammenzuzwingen." Thomä, Die Zeit des Selbt und die Zeit danach , p. 643. Thomä maintains that Heidegger finally finds the solution he was seeking in National Socialism in his theory of art. See ibid., p. 704. [BACK]
176. For a detailed discussion of Heidegger's mistranslation of this passage, see Bernd Martin, "'Alles Grosse ist gefährdet'—Der Fall Heidegger(s)," in Martin Heidegger und das "Dritte Reich": Ein Kompendium , ed. Bernd Martin (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), pp. 3-13.
177. Thomä, who throughout his study relatively deemphasizes the central role of Being in Heidegger's thought, curiously insists on the importance of Heidegger's effort to find a solution for the problem of the self, arising out of Being and Time , in the Nazi turn in 1933: "Die 'Läsung' des Jahres 1933 besteht dann darin, Handeln und Sprache gewaltsam zusammenzuzwingen." Thomä, Die Zeit des Selbt und die Zeit danach , p. 643. Thomä maintains that Heidegger finally finds the solution he was seeking in National Socialism in his theory of art. See ibid., p. 704. [BACK]
178. For a well-known attack on the antidemocratic consequences of Platonism, see Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies , 2 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1945). [BACK]