The Threat From Transkei

Long before Transkei 'independence' in 1976, Transkei President Matanzima demanded the amalgamation of the Transkei and the Ciskei into a single greater Xhosa homeland.^[32] It was generally agreed on both sides of the Kei river that the

Transkei, being much the larger, wealthier and more populous, would swallow up the Ciskei in any merger which might take place. Matanzima was openly willing to sponsor any Ciskei politician who supported amalgamation, and it is rumoured that Mabandla, Sebe and L.F. Siyo all received Transkeian aid while they were in opposition. The Transkei assembly passed a motion unilaterally annexing the Ciskei, and Transkei paid the costs of two Supreme Court legal battles against the establishment of a second Xhosa homeland.

Although Matanzima is not a popular figure in the Ciskei, many people are well-disposed towards unification. 'We are all one people,' they tend to say, if the subject of unification is broached, and they regard the creation of two separate Xhosa states as a device to ensure the safety of the white corridor. Ciskei government spokesmen struggle to answer the case for unification. Clearly they cannot state publicly that they fear for their power and their positions. Vice-President Willie Xaba, using the Afrikaans word 'suiwer', argued that the Ciskeians were 'pure' Xhosa, whereas the Transkei consisted of mixed Xhosaspeaking tribes.^[33] In the Supreme Court, Ciskei counsel stated that Ciskeian ethnic groups were 'independent' of Transkeian ethnic groups. These arguments collapse in the face of the existence of the Transkei Rharhabe and the traditional subordination of the Rharhabe to the Transkei-based Gcaleka royal house. As for the Mfengu, there are four Mfengu magisterial districts in the Transkei, which together constitute a Regional Authority known as Fingoland. Clearly the Ciskei government urgently required a national identity for the Ciskei which sharply differentiated it from the Transkei.

The years since the Soweto Uprising of 1976 have seen an upsurge in public opposition to the Ciskei authorities. School boycotts in 1976, 1977, 1980 and 1983; riots at Fort Hare, including an attack on Sebe's motorcade; trade union organization; clandestine ANC paramilitary activity; and the bloody Mdantsane bus boycott of 1983—all indicate the growing disaffection of the mass of the so-called 'Ciskeian' population who never accepted ethnicity or homelands in the first place. Sebe was forced to close down his own alma mater at Lovedale and the old mission institution of Healdtown. He is clearly perturbed by his lack of appeal to the rising generation, and his calls to 'the youth' are not without a touch of pathos:

We need our youth in our nation-building . . . they must stop their revolt now as the bright day of justice emerges. . . . When the clarion calls to defend our great South Africa against the ever-increasing Communism threat, the great Ciskeians will be the first to defend the temples of our fathers, the shrines of this country.^[34]

Ciskei clearly faced a crisis of legitimacy. It lacked any basis in historical reality, popular support or educated opinion, and it had been forced to supress whatever genuine ethnic feeling had once existed. The Ciskei nation had to be created from scratch.