1. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, 374. [BACK]

2. Of course, there are various degrees of self-regulation ranging from industrywide to intraorganizational. See Ian Maitland, "The Limits of Business Self-Regulation," California Management Review 27, no. 3 (Spring 1985): 132-47. [BACK]

3. Eads and Reuter, Designing Safer Products, 43. [BACK]

4. This will obviously depend on, among other things, the elasticity of demand for the product and the availability of substitutes. [BACK]

5. UL often points to its "Consumer Advisory Council," for example. Yet the CAC meets once every two years, and several committee members describe the group as a "public relations gimmick." [BACK]

6. These organizational problems are well understood. See, for example, Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. Lack of interest, a much less popular explanation, also accounts for the minimal participation of various groups in private standards-setting. "You don't capture anyone's imagination with fire extinguishers," explains a lobbyist for the Association of Flight Attendants. The issue is both too specific and too technical. UL had a similar problem with television receivers, finding that some consumers lost interest in the technical discussions (see S. David Hoffman and Janis C. Farr, "Developing a Proposed CPSC Standard for Television Receivers: The UL Experience," ASTM Standardization News, May 1977). [BACK]

7. UL developed the HT (high-tolerance) metal chimney standard largely because the Reinsurance Association of Minnesota, which reinsures most homeowner policies in the state, decided not to insure homes with woodstoves without high-tolerance metal chimneys. [BACK]

8. Royal Edwards, representative of the National Chimney Sweeps Guild, convinced the Technical Committee for NFPA 211 to prohibit stoves requiring more than a thirty-six-inch clearance. A trade association representative complained that the guild "was on a bit of a do-good crusade" in this respect. The action was eventually overturned by the Standards Council. [BACK]

9. Robert W. Grant, president, NFPA, "President's Report" (Speech delivered at the NFPA 89th Annual Meeting, Chicago, May 13, 1985). [BACK]

10. The AGA at large is more concerned with the overall sales and marketing of gas than is AGA Labs. Accordingly, AGA was more concerned that banning the unvented heater would result in the substitution of electric heat in many homes. [BACK]

11. Hunt, "Trade Associations and Self-Regulation." [BACK]

12. Garvin, "Can Industry Self-Regulation Work?" 43. [BACK]

13. UL claims to do some standards on a pro bono basis. The only standard that UL officials could point to, however, is the standard for septic tanks. [BACK]

14. Thomas P. Grumbly, "Self-Regulation: Private Vice and Public Virtue Revisited," in Social Regulation: Strategies for Reform, ed. Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1982), 97. [BACK]

15. See, for example, Louis Lasagna, "Who Will Adopt the Orphan Drugs?" Regulation, November/December 1979, 27-32. [BACK]

16. The creosote tests conducted by the National Bureau of Standards were done over a period of several months in order to most closely replicate creosote production during a typical heating season. Obviously, in order to be economically practical a commercial creosote test would have to be accelerated or the results would have to be extrapolated. Either way, there would likely be criticisms that the accelerated test method is not realistic. [BACK]

17. Interview data from members of UL's Consumer Advisory Council. [BACK]

18. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 7. [BACK]

19. American National Standards Institute, 1984 Progress Report (New York: ANSI, 1984), 9. [BACK]

20. "National Fire Protection Association Statement of Revenues and Expenses, 1984," Fire Journal, May 1985, 82. [BACK]

21. Staber and Aldrich, "Trade Association Stability and Public Policy," 4. [BACK]

22. This embarrassing incident prompted criticism and review of NFPA's rules for adopting standards and eventually resulted in changes granting the Standards Council the formal authority for ratifying standards approved by the membership (see NFPA, "Regulation Governing Committee Projects," sec. 13-5). The power does not go unused. The Standards Council recently rejected an amendment to NFPA 211 (Venting for Woodstoves) that was adopted by the general membership over the objection of the sponsoring committee. (The provision would have essentially banned stoves requiring a clearance of more than thirty-six inches.) [BACK]

23. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, 371. [BACK]

24. Maitland, "The Limits of Business Self-Regulation," 136-37. [BACK]

25. See, for example, Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute v. F.T.C., 152 F.2d 478 (7th. Cir. 1946); United States v. Institute of Carpet Manufacturers, CCH Trade Reg. Service (9th ed.), par. 52,517 (S.D.N.Y.); Bond Crown and Cork Co. v. F.T.C., 176 F.2d 974 (4th. Cir. 1949). [BACK]

26. Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). [BACK]

27. Kahn, "Cartels and Trade Associations." [BACK]

28. American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp. [BACK]

29. Floor votes still occur, but standards cannot be adopted in final form by the membership at large. The Standards Council has the ultimate authority to issue standards. It acts as a check on "political" floor votes. Moreover, objections from the floor usually result in a remand of the issue to committee. [BACK]

31. Muris, in ANSI, Standards and the Law, 7. [BACK]

32. Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 202 F.Supp. 166 (E.D.Tenn. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 373 U.S. 949. See also Roofire Alarm Co. v. Underwriters Laboratories, 188 F.Supp. 753 (E.D.Tenn.), aff'd per curiam, 284 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1960). [BACK]

33. Interview data from three sources at UL. [BACK]

34. Interview data from a member of the NFPA Standards Council. [BACK]

35. "Misuse" has been interpreted rather narrowly in many jurisdictions. In Illinois, for example, "misuse" is a defense only if the product was used "for a purpose neither intended nor foreseeable (objectively reasonable) by the defendant" (Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309 [1970]). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 402A, comment n (1965) (seller not liable where injury results from "abnormal use"). [BACK]

36. Several members of the Z21.11.2 committee mentioned this concern privately, but none wanted to be quoted. [BACK]

37. Schwartz, "The Consumer Product Safety Commission," 73. [BACK]

38. Aqua Slide 'n' Dive v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978). [BACK]

39. D. D. Bean & Sons v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 574 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1978). [BACK]