Five Safety Standards and Labeling Requirements for Woodstoves
1. Schwartz, "The Consumer Product Safety Commission," 32, 71-73. [BACK]
2. Sunset Homeowner's Guide to Wood Stoves (Menlo Park, Calif.: Lane Publishing, 1979), 5. [BACK]
3. The Epidemiology Directorate of the CPSC estimates the following losses due to residential solid-fuel beating equipment:
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Consumer Product Safety Commission, "FY 1984 Wood and Coal Heating Equipment Report" (transmitted to the Commission by cover memorandum from the Office of Program Management on April 4, 1985), 15. [BACK]
4. For an example of the criticisms lodged against the CPSC's hospital survey information, see Edward Heiden, Allan Pittaway, and Rosalind O' Connor, "Utility of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission's Injury Data System as a Basis for Product Hazard Assessment," Journal of Products Liability Law 5 (1982): 295. [BACK]
5. A trade association representative complains that "there is a big thick volume on how to fill out the NFIRS reports but most of that stuff is ignored and there is a pattern of common answers." He reports that firemen have told members of the trade association that "design deficiency" is "just a buzzword we use" to categorize fires of unknown origin. [BACK]
6. Richard D. Peacock, Center for Fire Research, National Bureau of Standards, A Review of Fire Incidents, Model Building Codes, and Standards Relating to Wood-Burning Appliances, NBSIR 79-1731 (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1979), 5-6. [BACK]
7. A study for the Department of Energy concluded that 10 percent of woodstove fires are attributable to "improper equipment design" and another 4.3 percent to "equipment malfunction." A Massachusetts study, attributed no more than 2 percent of woodstove fires to "defective or unsafe" appliances. The difference is partly definitional. Scenarios that were considered the users' fault in one study were considered design errors in another. [BACK]
8. Underwriters Laboratories v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 135 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1943). [BACK]
9. Underwriters Laboratories, 1984 Annual Report (n.p., 1985), 1, 9, 18. [BACK]
10. Underwriters Laboratories, UL 1482: Safety Standard for Room Heaters, Solid-Fuel Type, 2d ed. (Northbrook, Ill.: UL, 1983), sect. 5.2, table 5.1, p. 8 (hereafter referred to as UL 1482). [BACK]
11. Ibid., sec. 17.20, p. 35. [BACK]
12. Ibid., sec. 6.7, p. 10. [BACK]
13. The secrecy UL is famous for serves several purposes: it assures manufacturers with trade secrets that they will not be revealed through the product certification process; it facilitates discussion of matters that might involve product liability suits; and it hinders outside review and potential embarassment. [BACK]
14. Similarly, the proposed standard stated that the test structure should be "reasonably free of drafts." The revised version specifies that it is "to be erected within a room having ventilation capable of maintaining the buildup of carbon monoxide to less than 100 parts per million throughout the period of any test." Other revisions added flexibility to the standard, again with no obvious implications for safety. The original proposal specified the use of Type J (iron-constantan) thermocouples—the thermoelectric device for measuring temperature differences. The revised version allows Type K (chromel-alumel) as well. [BACK]
15. For example, the January 1978 proposal included primarily installation instructions, with few operating instructions. The installation instructions did not provide details about floor protection or chimney connectors. There was no reference to creosote buildup and no caution about storage or use of flammable liquids. Underwriters Laboratories, "Report of Meeting of Underwriters Laboratories Industry Advisory Conference for Fireplaces, Fireplace Stoves and Solid Fuel Type Room Heaters and PROPOSED EFFECTIVE DATES" (Memorandum to the Fire Council, manufacturers, and others interested, January 1 8, 1979; capitalization in original), appendix B, B2-B5. [BACK]
16. UL of Canada is unrelated to the UL in this country. There are apparently myriad differences between ULC and UL standards. Whether they reflect differences in testing philosophy or, as a UL spokesman claims, ULC's desire to protect its own turf is a topic for future research. [BACK]
17. Underwriters Laboratories, "Proposed Revisions to Proposed First Edition of the Standard for Solid Fuel Type Room Heaters, UL 1482 and PROPOSED EFFECTIVE DATE" (Memorandum to the Fire Council, manufacturers, and others interested, April 25, 1979; capitalization in original), 1-3. [BACK]
18. The same is true of NFPA. In both instances, ANSI "approval" is routine, and neither UL nor NFPA would be likely to change its standards were it necessary for ANSI approval. One major standards-writer, the American Society for Testing and Materials, stopped sending its standards through ANSI several years ago. [BACK]
19. See, generally, American National Standards Institute, "Procedure for the Development and Coordination of American National Standards (Approved by the ANSI Board of Directors, March 30, 1983)" (typescript, 1983). The procedures for canvass by an accredited sponsor basically involve: (1) developing a list of all interests known to be directly and materially affected by the standard, (2) having ANSI review the list and solicit other interested parties to join the proceeding, (3) transmitting the standard along with a brief history of how it was developed to those on the list, (4) attempting to resolve any objections by those canvassed, and (5) reporting the results to ANSI. Those opposed to the canvass method, including some current members of the ANSI Board of Directors, object that it is a "review process," not a method of developing standards, so, it is argued, the participants play a much less significant role. [BACK]
20. Irwin Benjamin, Fire Safety Division, National Bureau of Standards, argued in a letter of June 27, 1979, to UL (on file in the Standards Department at UL headquarters in Northbrook, Illinois) that the proposed standard "does not include any provisions covering a room heater's tendency toward creosoting." Similar arguments were advanced by John Shultz in one of three letters from an NFPA technical committee. [BACK]
21. C. P. Ramani, of the Open Forum of the ICBO, objected by letter of August 7, 1979, to testing stoves without a grate so long as the manufacturer instructs the consumer accordingly: "We believe that if a conventional grate could be placed in a heater, then it should be tested with one. Use of a cautionary label alone will not insure safe use of the product." Rober Nelson, ASHRAE, objected by letter of June 2, 1979, that "the extent of testing by impact is unreasonable. Six different blows will increase the cost of glass without providing a safer product." [BACK]
22. On file in the Standards Department at UL headquarters in Northbrook, Illinois. [BACK]
23. One of the most outspoken critics of UL's "desk standards" is the author of a newsletter called TMO Update: National and International Developments Concerning Product Certification, Laboratory Accreditation, and Standardization. See, for example, "NEMA and OSHA and Those UL Desk Standards," TMO Update 9, no. 14 (August 15, 1984). For a reply by UL's president, see Jack Bono, "The Role of UL Standards—Published and Unpublished," Standards Engineering, March/April 1985, 46-47. [BACK]
24. Underwriters Laboratories, "Proposed Revisions to Proposed First Edition of UL 1482," 2. [BACK]
25. See for example, David Hemenway, Performance vs. Design Standards, NBS/GCR 80-287 (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1980). [BACK]
26. UL 1482, sec. 16.2, p. 31. [BACK]
27. See, for example, ibid., foreword, sec. A, p. 4. [BACK]
28. Ibid., sec. 15.1, p. 30. [BACK]
29. For a discussion of these standards (UL 1409 and UL 1410), see Al Gengler, "The UL Investigation of Portable Video Recording Systems," [UL] Lab Data 16, no. 1 (1985): 11-15. [BACK]
30. UL 1482, sec. 11.8, p. 25; sec. 12.10, p. 27; sec. 14.7, p. 29. [BACK]
31. An internal memorandum dated September 6, 1979, from C. E. Layman, an associate engineer at UL's Santa Clara, California, office (and on file at the Standards Department at UL headquarters in Northbrook, Illinois), states, "We are unable to comment at this time on the 90 and 117F temperature rise." [BACK]
32. See note 21 above. [BACK]
33. "Return of the Wood Stove," Consumer Reports 46, no. 10 (October 1981): 566, 572. [BACK]
34. A round-robin study by NBS found "real systematic differences" when different labs used UL 1482 to test the same model stove. In one case, the measured temperature in the same test on the same model stove was 430° F at one lab and 809° F at another. These differences were most likely due to allowable variations in test methods (e.g., moisture content of the wood, air circulation in the test structure). See National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program, National Bureau of Standards, "NVLAP Proficiency Testing, Stove LAP: Round 1" (NVLAP Tech Brief, February 1983), table 1 (and cf. Lab C and Lab D on "center rear stove" measurements for the radiant fire test). [BACK]
35. For example, UL 1482 leaves considerable latitude to the testing labs in determining the moisture content of the wood and the amount of air circulation in the test structure—two factors that directly affect performance. A small stove manufacturer, who cannot afford to send an engineer to the testing laboratory for a few days, complains that some decisions are influenced by whether the manufacturer has an engineer present during the tests. "You practically need a lobbyist," as he puts it, "or you take the standard as it is." Interviews with manufacturers at a trade show at which most items were certified by either UL or Factory Mutual support the contention that lab technicians occasionally change their interpretations of test procedures to placate an irritated (and often better educated) engineering representative. The waiting room at UL headquarters in Northbrook frequently houses industry representatives seeking through UL's informal appeals process to receive a more favorable interpretation than they received from the technician. Many are apparently successful. [BACK]
36. The fireplace insert standard is controversial because the safety of the product depends directly on the type of masonry chimney (specifically, the number and location of wooden headers). Not only is there considerable variance in existing chimneys, but most do not comply with the code requirements normally used in product testing—NFPA's. Metal chimneys are controversial because UL, in a very unusual tactic, certifies them to two different standards: UL 103 and UL 103HT. The HT standard requires a higher tolerance than UL 103, one high enough to withstand the damage from a typical chimney fire. The CPSC and many others believe that UL 103 should adopt the HT requirements. [BACK]
37. A small manufacturer complained that "UL lost its credibility when it certified [an inexpensive brand imported from Taiwan]." No one else interviewed in connection with this study, however, including safety advocates at the National Bureau of Standards and in the consulting business, agreed with the assertion that this particular brand is a threat to anything but competition. [BACK]
38. In a letter seeking financial support for a research project to improve various aspects of UL 1482, noted woodstove expert Jay Shelton argued: "In addition to lacking a measure of creosote, UL 1482 may have features which indirectly increase creosote accumulation. Specifically, the temperature limits for flue gas are sometimes difficult to pass. A common design modification is to use an air inlet stop to limit the maximum amount of combustion air which can enter the combustion chamber. The reduced amount of combustion air can increase creosote accumulation" (Letter from Shelton Energy Research to, among others, the National Bureau of Standards, the Society of Fire Protection Engineers, and the Wood Heating Alliance, dated November 13, 1984, p. 2). [BACK]
39. NVLAP, "NVLAP Proficiency Testing for Stoves: Rounds 1 and 2." [BACK]
40. 15 U.S.C. sec. 2056 (d) (1976) (repealed 1981). For a detailed discussion of the offeror process, see Schwartz, "The Consumer Product Safety Commission," 32, 57-72. [BACK]
41. Peacock, A Review of Fire Incidents, 15. [BACK]
42. Statement of Irwin Grief, Office of Program Management, Consumer Product Safety Commission, in Public Hearing before the Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, D.C., March 14, 1979. [BACK]
43. The three trade associations were GAMA (the Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association), the Fireplace Institute, and the Wood Energy Institute. GAMA had been in the business the longest, but only as a sidelight to its main activities and a courtesy to gas appliance manufacturers who also made wooodstoves. The other associations were new and between them had a small portion of the market. In 1982 an agreement was reached forming the Wood Heating Alliance in place of these uncoordinated efforts. [BACK]
44. For a discussion of the lawn mower proceedings, see Schwartz, "The Consumer Product Safety Commission," 77-95 (Appendix A: "A Case Study—The Lawn-Mower Standard"). See also W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating Consumer Product Safety (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1984), 93-96. For a discussion of the chain saw proceedings, see Elaine Thomas, C. E. Benton, and Werne L. Roberts, Safe Chain Saw Design (Durham, N.C.: Institute for Product Safety, 1983). [BACK]
45. "Briefing Paper on Proposed CPSC 27(e) Labeling Rule for Coal and Wood Burning Appliances" (Office of Program Management, CPSC, September 1980), 3. [BACK]
46. Beatrice Harwood and Paul Kluge, "Hazards Associated with the Use of Wood or Coal-Burning Stoves or Free-Standing Fireplaces" (Directorate for Hazard Identification and Analysis, CPSC, February 1980), table 1, p. 11. [BACK]
47. For example, the assumption that all firms would select the lowest-cost testing laboratory. The staff also assumed that increases in the price of woodstoves would not affect industrywide sales. See T. R. Karels, CPSC, memorandum of March 27, 1981, on Coal and Wood Stove Label Rule, p. 2 (located at Tab E of May 1981 briefing package to the commission). [BACK]
48. T. R. Karels, Division of Special Economic Studies, CPSC, "Coal and Woodburning Stoves, Section 27(e) Labeling Rule: Preliminary Economic Impact Analysis," February 1980, 4. [BACK]
49. Federal Register 48 (May 16, 1983): 21898, 21912 (final rule). [BACK]
50. Robert S. Adler and R. David Pittle, "Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?" Yale Journal on Regulation 1, no. 2 (1984): 159-93. [BACK]
51. See note 3 above. [BACK]
52. Stephen E. Taub, technical division chief, Consumers Union, letter of December 19, 1980 to the CPSC (Comment #CC9-80-27). [BACK]
53. Eleanor Perry, CPSC, "Provisions for Labeling and Instruction Manuals in the Underwriters Laboratories Standards for Fireplace Stoves (UL737) and Solid Fuel Room Heaters (UL1482)" (Memorandum to Margaret Neily, program representative, for James Hoebel, Fire and Thermal Burn Program manager, May 25, 1982). [BACK]
54. Federal Register 47 (April 6, 1982): 14711 (deferral of consideration of final rule). [BACK]
55. Elizabeth Gomilla and Eileen Keisler, CPSC, "Report on the Coal and Woodburning Stove Survey Conducted in February 1982" (n.d.; transmitted to the Office of Program Management by memorandum of July 14, 1982). [BACK]
56. Only the CPSC, for example, requires information about venting through a wall or ceiling. [BACK]
57. Eleanor Perry, CPSC, "Provisions for Labeling and Instruction Manuals," 2. [BACK]
58. The Enforcement Directorate reported in 1985 that 31 percent of the three hundred firms responding to the CPSC's request for information were "clearly in violation of the rule." Another 29 percent had "relatively minor violations." If the incidence of violations is larger among those not responding to the CPSC, it is likely that at least 40 or 50 percent of all firms are "clearly in violation." See CPSC, "FY 1984 Wood and Coal Heating Equipment Report," 77. [BACK]
59. Aqua Slide 'n' Dive v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978). [BACK]
60. 16 C.F.R. sec. 1406.4(a)(1) ("The appliance shall bear a legible notice containing the following performance and technical data"); 16 C.F.R. sec. 1406.4(a)(3) ("the written information required ... shall be readily visible during normal use"); 16 C.F.R. sec. 1406.4(b)(1) ("This statement shall be conspicuous"). [BACK]
61. CPSC, "FY 1984 Wood and Coal Heating Equipment Report," 78. [BACK]