The Cigarette Papers "d0e7723"

Freon

Tobacco used in cigarettes may be "puffed" or expanded by a variety of processes. Expansion decreases the mass per unit weight, which is one way to reduce "tar" delivery and total tobacco content of a cigarette. In

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the 1970s R. J. Reynolds developed a process called G-13, which used Freon-11 for expanding tobacco (11, 12). The process was used by RJR, Liggett & Myers, American Tobacco, and Lorillard. Only Philip Morris and B&W were not using this process as of mid-1977 {1309.01}. An undated and unsigned report, apparently reviewing toxicology studies conducted by RJR for B&W, indicates that in the 1970s RJR tested Freon-11 for its carcinogenicity in mouse skin–painting experiments and also attempted to determine whether Freon had any acute toxicity for the respiratory system {1309.04}. The report indicated that scientists at RJR found no evidence that Freon-11 was toxic under the conditions tested, but the report expressed reservations about these conclusions, since the data had not been evaluated by an independent, outside consultant.

A June 2, 1977, memorandum from Ernest Pepples, the general counsel at B&W, to Dr. I. W. Hughes, head of R&D, describes Pepples's objections to B&W's use of tobacco treated with the G-13 process {1309.01}. Environmental groups had filed petitions with the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency was raising concerns that Freon could decompose into the poisonous gas phosgene (which had been used in World War I) when it was burned. The petitioners asked that Freon be banned from air conditioning systems because of this potential hazard. Pepples believed that the finding of phosgene in cigarette smoke might present an opportunity for a products liability claim {1309.01, p. 3}. Moreover, some scientists suspected that Freon could damage the ozone layer of the atmosphere. Pepples worried that the same thing was happening when the Freon residue on the tobacco was heated by the burning coal of a cigarette {1309.06}, although it was not then publicly known that Freon was widely used within the cigarette industry {1309.01, p. 2}:

As we have previously discussed there are three problem areas in the use of the G-13 process:

1.	The safety of the smoker particularly in light of the phosgene theory.
2.	Safety of the workers at the site of the skid unit [where the freon treatment would be done].
3.	The ozone theory which involves the safety of future generations of persons inhabiting the earth. {1309.01, p. 1}

Pepples also made a strong argument for environmental protection:

There is another factor about which extensive comments are not needed. I refer to the morality of a step which would add 600 lbs. of F-11 [Freon-11] per day to the environment in the face of the already substantial scientific evidence that the chemical is actually harmful to the environment. {1309.01, p. 2}

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Pepples recommended that other processes be developed.

A memorandum dated December 5, 1977, from Stanley L. Temoko of Covington and Burling to the Committee of Counsel, a Tobacco Institute committee consisting of the chief counsels of the member companies, shared the news that the Consumer Product Safety Commission had denied the citizen petition "requesting a ban of 'Refrigerant 11' under the Consumer Product Safety Act" {1309.05}. With the threat of regulatory action against Freon diminished, Brown and Williamson began to utilize the G-13 process {1309.02}.

A May 1, 1978, memorandum from J. W. Webb, a research scientist at B&W, discusses the analysis of an expected shipment of expanded tobacco {1309.03}. Tests to be run included moisture content, glycerin content, residual Freon level, yield, percent fines, and fill value. These measures indicate that B&W was evaluating expanded tobacco made elsewhere for possible use. In June 1978 B&W signed a contract with Liggett Group to buy Liggett's excess capacity of G-13 processed tobacco {1309.02}.