| A Shield in Space? |
| Preface |
| Acronyms and Abbreviations |
| Chapter 1 Why SDI? |
| • | The Novelty Of SDI |
| • | The Political Background |
| • | The Role Of Edward Teller |
| • | Bypassing The "Establishment" |
| • | The Import Of The March 23 Speech |
| • | The Strategic Rationale For The SDI |
| • | The Economic Rationale |
| • | The Political Rationale |
| • | Adjusting The Focus |
| • | The SDI In Perspective |
| Chapter 2 The Elusive Quest For Strategic Defenses Lessons of Recent History |
| • | The United States' Defensive Effort From The 1950s To 1975 |
| • | The Soviet Effort In Defensive Systems |
| • | Why The Different Approaches? |
| • | The Militarization Of Space |
| • | The United States' Development Of ASATs |
| • | The Soviet Military Space Program |
| • | Civil Space Cooperation |
| Chapter 3 Measure for Measure The Technological Prospect |
| • | The Proposed Technologies |
| A Layered Defense: The SDI Architecture |
| • | Phase I: Boost-Phase Intercept |
| • | Phase II: Post-Boost-Phase Intercept |
| • | Phase III: Midcourse Intercept |
| • | Phase IV: Terminal Defense |
| • | Battle Management |
| • | The Testing Problem |
| • | The Aps Study |
| • | The Controversy Over The APS Report |
| • | The Proposal For Early Deployment |
| • | A More Modest Proposal: ALPS |
| • | From "Smart Rocks" To "Brilliant Pebbles": Another Supposed Last Move |
| What Might Come Of This Research? Four Possibilities |
| • | Case 1: Great Promise |
| • | Case 2: Some Promise |
| • | Case 3: Little Promise |
| • | Case 4: No Promise |
| Chapter 4 A Defense Transition? SDI and Strategic Stability |
| • | The Middle Course |
| • | The Case For A Defense Transition |
| Four Options |
| • | Option I. Deterrence As Usual |
| • | Option 2. The Case For A Limited Deployment |
| • | Option 3. Arms Reduction And A Moratorium On Deployment |
| • | Option 4. Unrestricted Competition |
| • | Is There No Better Alternative? |
| Chapter 5 "Don't Ask the Soviets. Tell Them" SDI and Arms Control |
| • | The ABM Treaty And Salt: The Link That Failed |
| • | From Deadlock To Dashed Hopes: The Impasse At Reykjavík |
| • | The Political Effort To Shore Up SDI |
| The Terms Of The ABM Treaty |
| • | The Testing Issue |
| Reinterpreting The Text: The Rise Of The "Legally Correct" Interpretation |
| • | Sofaer's Case For The "Broad" Interpretation |
| • | The Rebuttal Of The "New Interpretation" |
| • | The Treaty And SDI Experiments |
| • | The Disagreement At Reykjavík |
| • | The Soviet Position |
| • | Breaking The Impasse |
| Chapter 6 A "Maginot Line of the Twenty-first Century"? SDI and the Western Alliance |
| • | The Initial Shock |
| • | Mollifying Western Europe |
| • | The "Intermediate Option" In Europe: Toward A Division Of Labor |
| The ATBM Issue |
| • | Shifting Soviet Strategy |
| • | Possible NATO Responses |
| • | SDI And The Western Alliance: The Prospective Problems |
| Chapter 7 Deploy or Perish SDI and Domestic Politics |
| • | Democratic Principles And The Cold War |
| • | SDI And Earlier Military Projects: A Comparison |
| • | The "Iron Triangle" |
| • | The Political Auspices Of SDI |
| • | Public Support For SDI |
| • | Creating A Special Office: SDIO |
| The Debate Among The Scientists |
| • | Scientific Judgment And Political Commitment |
| • | Organizing A Constituency: SDIO And The Contractors |
| • | Congress And SDI: The Battle For The Future Of The Project |
| • | Drawing The Political Lesson |
| Chapter 8 Calculating the Costs and Benefits |
| • | The Research Phase: Projections And Actual Appropriations |
| • | The Present Status Of SDI |
| • | Reorienting The "Investment Strategy" |
| • | Gauging The Direct And Indirect Costs Of Deployment |
| • | Projecting The Costs Of Initial Deployment |
| • | Blechman And Utgoff's Four "Notional" Systems |
| • | The SDIO/Marshall Institute Phase I System |
| • | The Spin-Off Issue |
| Chapter 9 Security Through Technology An Illusory Faith |
| • | The Effects Of Politicization: Reviewing The Evidence |
| • | Prospects For U.S.-Soviet Agreement |
| • | The Consequences Of A Failure To Achieve Agreement |
| • | Motives And Consequences |
| • | Resistance To Arms Control: The Mindset Behind SDI |
| • | The Political System As A Corrective |
| • | The Myth Of Technological Determinism |
| • | Avoiding The Illusory Faith In Security Through Technology |
| Notes |
| • | Chapter 1 Why SDI? |
| • | Chapter 2 The Elusive Quest For Strategic DefensesLessons of Recent History |
| • | Chapter 3Measure for MeasureThe Technological Prospect |
| • | Chapter 4 A Defense Transition?SDI and Strategic Stability |
| • | Chapter 5"Don't Ask the Soviets. Tell Them"SDI and Arms Control |
| • | Chapter 6A "Maginot Line of the Twenty-first Century"?SDI and the Western Alliance |
| • | Chapter 7Deploy or PerishSDI and Domestic Politics |
| • | Chapter 8 Calculating the Costs and Benefits |
| • | Chapter 9 Security Through TechnologyAn Illusory Faith |
| Select Bibliography |
| Index |
| • | A |
| • | B |
| • | C |
| • | D |
| • | E |
| • | F |
| • | G |
| • | H |
| • | I |
| • | J |
| • | K |
| • | L |
| • | M |
| • | N |
| • | O |
| • | P |
| • | Q |
| • | R |
| • | S |
| • | T |
| • | U |
| • | V |
| • | W |
| • | X |
| • | Y |
| • | Z |