1. For theoretical and empirical analyses of the involvement of the defense industries in government procurement and R & D, see Steven Rosen, ed., Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973). C. Wright Mills, in The Causes of World War III (New York: Ballantine, 1958), suggests that the concept applies both to the United States and U.S.S.R. in the sense that in both countries an alliance exists between heavy industry and the military services, buttressed by a commonly held ideological commitment to the cold war, which exerts strong influence in perpetuating high levels of military procurement and R & D. As a general structural principle, the concept undoubtedly has some merit. As an explanatory theory, however, it fails to account either for specific decisions or for incremental changes in overall defense expenditures. In some versions, the concept implies that military contracting is more lucrative than ordinary business, but a recent study indicates that although the data are not available to support a definitive analysis, no clear-cut evidence exists that defense industries earn "excess profits." The same study notes, however, that defense industry costs—including levels of compensation, payment for lobbying, and inefficiencies in production—tend to be higher than for civil industry. See David E. Kaun, Where Have All the Profits Gone? An Analysis of the Major U.S. Defense Contractors, 1950-1985, Research Paper no. 4 (La Jolla: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1988). For an insightful comparative examination of the links between technological advances and the superpower arms race, see Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). [BACK]

2. In a thoughtful historical study of the impact of atomic weapons on strategic concepts and practice, Lawrence Freedman rightly points out that the introduction of the atomic bomb did not immediately make previous conceptions of warfare obsolete. At first, most strategists were inclined to think of the new device as one that would extend and increase the importance of strategic bombing, which had already come to play a critical role in World War II. Only gradually, as the Soviet Union also became a nuclear power, as ICBMs entered the arsenals of two blocs, and as it became more and more obvious that nuclear war could not easily be kept limited, did the concept of stable deterrence become a commonly accepted framework for strategic planning. Within this framework there is still room for disagreement over counterforce targeting or assured destruction, levels of sufficiency, the role of first-strike and second-strike weapons, and a host of other similar issues. The basic framework is generally accepted and represents a fundamentally new way of thinking about warfare, allowing for a corresponding consensus on the value of arms control as a means of preserving parity and stability at the lowest possible levels of armament. Freedman is nevertheless right to warn that "an international order that rests upon a stability created by nuclear weapons will be the most terrible legacy with which each succeeding generation will endow the next. To believe that this can go on indefinitely without major disaster requires an optimism unjustified by an historical or political perspective. ... The major task for the future must be to address the problems of nuclear arsenals in a world of political change." Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), p. 399. [BACK]

3. For a fuller account of President Truman's decision to develop a thermonuclear bomb, see Herbert F. York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976). [BACK]

4. "A powerful flow of people and money moves between the defense contractors, the Executive branch (DOD and NASA), and Congress, creating an 'iron triangle' on defense policy and procurement that excludes outsiders and alternative perspectives." Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1981), p. 3. [BACK]

5. The Thor-Jupiter conflict is a classic instance of interservice rivalry in weapons innovation. For a useful critical account, see Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). The army's promotion of Jupiter is also "a textbook example of how personal determination and zeal, combined with interservice rivalry, can fuel the arms race and result in the production and deployment of needless weapons and in the needless expenditure of billions of dollars." Herbert F. York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 98. [BACK]

6. Reagan had help in resuscitating the B-1, however, not only from the prime contractor, Rockwell, and the others organized by Rockwell to lobby for the plane, but also from two influential Democratic politicians, Sen. Alan Cranston (D., Calif.) and Sen. John Glenn (D., Ohio). In 1980 they sponsored a successful amendment to a bill calling for development of a "strategic weapons launcher," guaranteeing that the next president would have $350 million to spend and an early deadline for producing plans for a new aircraft. Bipartisan congressional support kept the program alive and enabled Reagan to fulfill his campaign pledge to reverse Carter's decision. See Nick Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics, and the B-1 Bomber (New York: Pantheon, 1988), p. 194. [BACK]

7. Lt. Gen. Harley Hughes, U.S. Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans and operations (Address to an Air Force Association symposium), quoted in Military Space, June 8, 1987, p. 8. [BACK]

8. Louis Harris and Associates, October 22, 1984. [BACK]

9. CBS News / New York Times, October 25, 1984. [BACK]

10. CBS News / New York Times, January 2-4, 1985. [BACK]

11. ABC News / Washington Post, October 14, 1986. [BACK]

12. CBS News / New York Times, October 24-28, 1986. [BACK]

13. Roper Organization, October 15-16, 1986. [BACK]

14. NBC News / Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1986. [BACK]

15. ABC News / Washington Post, November 10-13, 1985. [BACK]

16. ABC News / Washington Post, October 24-28, 1985. [BACK]

17. Gallup Organization, October 14, 1985. [BACK]

18. Gallup Organization, November 13-14, 1985. [BACK]

19. CBS News / New York Times, November 6-10, 1985. [BACK]

20. Yankelovich, Clancy, Shulman, September 8-10, 1986. [BACK]

21. CBS News / New York Times, January 4, 1985. [BACK]

22. ABC News / Washington Post, October 24-28, 1985. [BACK]

23. Los Angeles Times, November 1-7, 1985. [BACK]

24. CBS News / New York Times, January 18-21, 1987. [BACK]

25. William Schneider, a public-opinion analyst, has interpreted the poll data as indicating that the public "simply does not see any inconsistency between support for SDI and arms control." The Democrats in Congress opposed to SDI, he noted, were trying to "educate" the public to appreciate the difficulties SDI was posing for arms control. See William Schneider, "Congress Openly Defies Public Opinion on SDI," National Journal 19 (May 23, 1987): 1366. Although Schneider's analysis of the data is plausible, there is enough inconsistency in responses to questions that do and do not link SDI to arms control to suggest significant confusion and ambivalence. [BACK]

26. Louis Marquet's comments on the costs of early deployment are quoted in Arms Control Reporter (January 19, 1987) 575.B.185. [BACK]

27. Lloyd Dumas, The Overburdened Economy: Uncovering the Causes of Chronic Unemployment, Inflation, and National Decline (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), p. 211. [BACK]

28. The document appeared to be typed on the stationery of the Heritage Foundation and was identified as "NSR [National Security Report?] #46: High Frontier: A New Option in Space." Excerpts were published in John Bosma, "A Proposed Plan for Project on BMD and Arms Control," in Harper's (June 1985), p. 22. In a letter to the British newspaper, The Observer, July 27, 1985, an official of the foundation disclaimed responsibility and attributed the report to High Frontier. See E. P. Thompson, "Folly's Comet," in Star Wars: Science-Fiction Fantasy or Serious Probability?, ed. E. P. Thompson (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1985), n. 4, p. 157. Thompson gives great weight to this document to support his blanket indictment of SDI as a deceptive conspiracy on the part of the munitions makers: "The cynicism of this well-funded salesmanship is such as to bring into question the integrity of all appearances. ... In the marketing of bad faith, the proponents of arguments about human destiny wear masks, and the zealous advocates of 'defence against missiles' (not only in the USA but in Europe) may have a secret retainer from the U.S. aerospace industry," ibid., p. 96. That a professional historian should attach so much significance to a document of such doubtful provenance and bearing is a striking illustration of the degree to which political passions often influence judgments on SDI. [BACK]

29. Ashton B. Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space (Background paper prepared under contract for the Office of Technology Assessment [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, April 1984]). [BACK]

30. See Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, and Henry W. Kendall, The Fallacy of Star Wars (New York: Random House, 1984), and John Tirman, ed., Union of Concerned Scientists, Empty Promise: The Growing Case Against Star Wars (Boston: Beacon, 1986). [BACK]

31. Robert Jastrow, "Reagan vs. the Scientists: Why the President Is Right About Missile Defense," Commentary 77 (January 1984): 23-32 (an exchange of letters followed in the same magazine's June issue), and "The War Against 'Star Wars,'" Commentary 78 (December 1984): 19-25. [BACK]

32. Harvey Brooks, "The Strategic Defense Initiative as Science Policy," International Security 11 (Fall 1986): 177-84. [BACK]

33. John P. Holdren and F. Bailey Green, "Military Spending, the SDI, and Government Support of Research and Development: Effects on the Economy and the Health of American Science," F.A.S. Public Opinion Report 39 (September 1986): 1-17. [BACK]

34. See Lisbeth Gronlund et al., "A Status Report on the Boycott of Star Wars Research by Academic Scientists and Engineers," May 13, 1986, typescript, and John Kogut and Michael Weissman, "Taking the Pledge Against Star Wars," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42 (January 1986): 27-30. [BACK]

35. Report on the NAS poll prepared by Peter Stein, professor of physics, Cornell University, December 17, 1986 See also Science 234 (November 14, 1986): 816. [BACK]

36. Report by Michael Heylin, Chemical & Engineering News (July 21, 1986), p. 18. [BACK]

37. Ibid. [BACK]

38. Ibid. [BACK]

39. Roy D. Woodruff, quoted in Robert Scheer, "The Man Who Blew the Whistle on Star Wars," Los Angeles Times Magazine, July 17, 1988. See also William J. Broad, New York Times, July 15, July 24, 1988. [BACK]

40. Harvey Brooks, "The Military Innovation System and the Qualitative Arms Race," in Arms, Defense Policy, and Arms Control, ed. Franklin A. Long and George W. Rathjens (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 91. [BACK]

41. David Lorge Parnas, "Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems," American Scientist 73 (September-October 1985): 432-40, and "SDI: A Violation of Professional Responsibility," Abacus 4 (Winter 1987): 46-52, rpt. in David Lorge Parnas and Danny Cohen, SDI: Two Views of Professional Responsibility, Policy Paper no. 5 (La Jolla: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1987). [BACK]

42. "Joint Opening Statement of Drs. Lowell Wood and Gregory Canavan before the House Republican Research Committee, May 12, 1987" typescript. See also Gregory H. Canavan, Nicolaas Bloembergen, and C. Kumar Patel, "Debate on APS Directed-Energy Weapons Study," Physics Today 40 (November 1987): 48-53. [BACK]

43. Edward Teller, "An Open Letter to Hans Bethe," Policy Review 39 (Winter 1987): 20, 23. [BACK]

44. Erik Pratt, John Pike, and Daniel Lindley, "SDI Contracting: Building a Star Wars Constituency," in Lost in Space: The Domestic Politics of the Strategic Defense Initiative, ed. Gerald M. Steinberg (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), p. 111. [BACK]

45. Nathan Rosenberg, "Civilian Spillovers from Military R & D Spending: The U.S. Experience Since World War II," in Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance, ed. Sanford Lakoff and Randy Willoughby (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 174-75. [BACK]

46. Pratt, Pike, and Lindley, "SDI Contracting," p. 114. [BACK]

47. Ibid., pp. 115-17. [BACK]

48. Ibid. [BACK]

49. Ibid., p. 120. [BACK]

50. William D. Hartung et al., with Jeb Brugman, in The Strategic Defense Initiative: Costs, Contractors & Consequences, ed. Alice Tepper Marlin and Paula Lippin (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1985), table 3.5, p. 33. [BACK]

52. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Pentagon's R & D Chief Roils the Waters," Science, April 25, 1986, pp. 443-45. [BACK]

53. John E. Pike, "Corporate Interest in the SDI," F.A.S. Public Interest Report 40 (April 1987): 6. [BACK]

54. Pratt, Pike, and Lindley, "SDI Contracting," p. 114. [BACK]

55. Ibid., p. 138. [BACK]

56. Gerold Yonas, quoted in David E. Sanger, New York Times, February 11, 1987. [BACK]

57. President Ford made this remark during a question-and-answer session following a lecture delivered at the Faculty Seminar on International Security, the University of California, San Diego, February 4, 1986. [BACK]

58. Jack Kemp, "The Politics of SDI," National Review 38 (December 31, 1986): 28-31. [BACK]

59. Douglas Waller, James T. Bruce, and Douglas Cook, "SDI: Progress and Challenges" (U.S. Congress, staff report submitted to senators William Proxmire, J. Bennett Johnston, and Lawton Chiles, Washington, D.C., March 17, 1986, typescript). [BACK]

60. Douglas Waller, James T. Bruce, and Douglas Cook, "SDI: Progress and Challenges, Part II" (U.S. Congress, staff report submitted to senators William Proxmire, J. Bennett Johnston, and Lawton Chiles, Washington, D.C., March 19, 1987, typescript). [BACK]

61. James T. Bruce, Bruce W. MacDonald, and Ronald Tammen, "Star Wars at the Crossroads: The Strategic Defense Initiative After Five Years" (U.S. Congress, staff report to senators J. Bennett Johnston, Dale Bumpers, William Proxmire, Washington, D.C., June 12, 1988, typescript), p. 97. [BACK]

62. Ibid., p. 98. [BACK]

63. Ibid. [BACK]

64. Ibid., p. 99. [BACK]

65. Ibid. [BACK]

66. Ibid., p. 38. [BACK]

67. Ibid., pp. 69-71. [BACK]

68. Ibid., p. 33. [BACK]

69. Defense News, March 23, 1987. [BACK]

70. For Senator Nunn's analysis, see "Interpretation of the ABM Treaty, Part One: The Senate Ratification Proceedings," Congressional Record 133 (March 11, 1987). [BACK]

71. Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 77. [BACK]

72. Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy (New York: Basic, 1976), p. 99. [BACK]

73. See Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986). [BACK]