1. Quoted from a letter written "near the end" of Weber's life, by Arthur Mitzman, in The Iron Cage (New York, 1969), p. 182. [BACK]

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science , trass. Kaufmann (New York, 1974), p. 266 (§335); Nietzsche, The Will to Power , trans. Kaufmann and Hollingdale (New York, 1968), p. 307 (§569).

3. Ibid., p. 267 (§481); Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals , trans. Kaufmann (New York, 1969), p. 59 (II, §2). [BACK]

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science , trass. Kaufmann (New York, 1974), p. 266 (§335); Nietzsche, The Will to Power , trans. Kaufmann and Hollingdale (New York, 1968), p. 307 (§569).

3. Ibid., p. 267 (§481); Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals , trans. Kaufmann (New York, 1969), p. 59 (II, §2). [BACK]

4. Nietzsche, Will to Power , pp. 9, 40, 150 (§3, §57, §260). [BACK]

5. Nietzsche, Gay Science , p. 175 (§117). [BACK]

6. See, e.g., Nietzsche, Will to Power , pp. 267, 269-270, 271-272 (§481. §488, §492); also Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil , trans. Kaufmann (New York, 1966), pp. 25-27 (§19). [BACK]

7. Nietzsche, Gay Science , p. 280 (§343). [BACK]

8. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra , trans. Kaufmann, in Kaufmann, ed., The Portable Nietzsche (New York, 1954), p. 129. [BACK]

9. Nietzsche, Will to Power , p. 198 (§363). [BACK]

10. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil , pp. 111-112 (§200). [BACK]

11. Nietzsche, Will to Power , pp. 17, 463 (§20,§866). break [BACK]

12. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations , trass. Cairns (The Hague, 1960), p. 86: "This idealism . . . is sense-explication achieved by actual [phenomenological] work, an explication carried out as regards every type of existent ever conceivable by me. . . . But that signifies: systematic uncovering of the constituting intentionality itself. The proof of this idealism is therefore phenomenology itself." [BACK]

13. Husserl, The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology, trams . Carr (Evanston, Ill., 1970), p. 6 (§2).

14. See ibid., p. 299: "The reason for the failure of a rational culture . . . lies not in the essence of rationalism itself, but solely in its being rendered superficial, in its entanglement in 'naturalism' and 'objectivism.'" [BACK]

13. Husserl, The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology, trams . Carr (Evanston, Ill., 1970), p. 6 (§2).

14. See ibid., p. 299: "The reason for the failure of a rational culture . . . lies not in the essence of rationalism itself, but solely in its being rendered superficial, in its entanglement in 'naturalism' and 'objectivism.'" [BACK]

15. Husserl to Levy-Bruehl, 3-11-1935, quoted in Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague, 1969), p. 84. [BACK]

16. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York, 1962), p. 165 (I, 4, §27).

17. Ibid., p. 436 (II, 5, §74) : "Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksal] . This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen. . . . If Dasein, by anticipation, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, Dasein understands itself in its own superior power , the power of its finite freedom, which 'is' only in its having chosen to make such a choice, it can take over the powerlessness of abandonment to its having done so, and ran thus come to have a clear vision for the accidents of the Situation that has been disclosed. But if fateful Dasein, as Being-inthe-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a cohistorizing and is determinative for it as destiny [Geschick].  . . . Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein." Cf. Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons , trans. Malick (Evanston, 1969), p. 131:"For only in its Dasein with others can Dasein surrender its individuality in order to win itself as an authentic self."

18. Ibid., p. 127: "Freedom is the reason for reasons." [BACK]

16. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York, 1962), p. 165 (I, 4, §27).

17. Ibid., p. 436 (II, 5, §74) : "Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksal] . This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen. . . . If Dasein, by anticipation, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, Dasein understands itself in its own superior power , the power of its finite freedom, which 'is' only in its having chosen to make such a choice, it can take over the powerlessness of abandonment to its having done so, and ran thus come to have a clear vision for the accidents of the Situation that has been disclosed. But if fateful Dasein, as Being-inthe-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a cohistorizing and is determinative for it as destiny [Geschick].  . . . Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein." Cf. Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons , trans. Malick (Evanston, 1969), p. 131:"For only in its Dasein with others can Dasein surrender its individuality in order to win itself as an authentic self."

18. Ibid., p. 127: "Freedom is the reason for reasons." [BACK]

16. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York, 1962), p. 165 (I, 4, §27).

17. Ibid., p. 436 (II, 5, §74) : "Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksal] . This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen. . . . If Dasein, by anticipation, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, Dasein understands itself in its own superior power , the power of its finite freedom, which 'is' only in its having chosen to make such a choice, it can take over the powerlessness of abandonment to its having done so, and ran thus come to have a clear vision for the accidents of the Situation that has been disclosed. But if fateful Dasein, as Being-inthe-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a cohistorizing and is determinative for it as destiny [Geschick].  . . . Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein." Cf. Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons , trans. Malick (Evanston, 1969), p. 131:"For only in its Dasein with others can Dasein surrender its individuality in order to win itself as an authentic self."

18. Ibid., p. 127: "Freedom is the reason for reasons." [BACK]

19. See Goldmann, Lukacs et Heidegger (Paris, 1973), esp. pp. 91 ff. Goldmann speculates that the term "reification" ( Verdinglichung ) in Being and Time alludes to Lukacs; the term appears twice in the book: see Heidegger, Being , pp. 72, 487 (I, 1, §10; II, 6, §83). break

20. Ibid., p. 224 (1, 5, §38), where everyday existence in the social world is characterized by "falling, with temptation, tranquilization, alienation and entanglement as its essential characteristics." [BACK]

19. See Goldmann, Lukacs et Heidegger (Paris, 1973), esp. pp. 91 ff. Goldmann speculates that the term "reification" ( Verdinglichung ) in Being and Time alludes to Lukacs; the term appears twice in the book: see Heidegger, Being , pp. 72, 487 (I, 1, §10; II, 6, §83). break

20. Ibid., p. 224 (1, 5, §38), where everyday existence in the social world is characterized by "falling, with temptation, tranquilization, alienation and entanglement as its essential characteristics." [BACK]

21. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism , trans. Parsons (New York, 1958), p. 182. [BACK]

22. On the irrational aspects of action, see Weber, "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences," in Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences," trans. Shils and Finch (New York, 1949), p. 125. On the category of interest, see Weber's introduction to the Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen , cited by Wolfgang J. Mommsen in The Age of Bureaucracy (New York, 1977), p. 106. [BACK]

23. Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in Gerth and Mills, eds., From Max Weber (New York, 1946), pp. 137, 148, 149. [BACK]

24. Horkheimer, "Materialism and Metaphysics," in Horkheimer, Critical Theory , p. 12. [BACK]

25. Horkheimer, "The Latest Attack on Metaphysics," ibid., p. 138; "Notes on Science and the Crisis," ibid., p. 7. [BACK]

26. Adorno, Minima , p. 154 (§99). [BACK]

27. Adomo, "Sociology and Psychology." trans. Wohlfarth, New Left Review , 46 (November-December, 1967), 71; Adomo, Negative Dialectics , trans. Ashton (New York, 1973), p. 123; Horkheimer, "The Latest Attack," Critical Theory , p. 146n; Adomo, Minima , p. 154 (§99). [BACK]

28. Adomo, Minima , pp. 38, 148-150 (§97, §17). [BACK]

29. Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment , trans. Cumming (New York, 1972), p. 204. [BACK]

30. Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," in Marcuse, Negations , trans. Shapiro (Boston, 1968), pp. 135, 142. [BACK]

31. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," Critical Theory , pp. 211, 214-215. [BACK]

32. Horkehimer, "Postscript," Critical Theory , p. 251; "Latest Attack," ibid., p. 162. [BACK]

33. Horkheimer, "Preface," ibid., p. viii. [BACK]

34. Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston, 1969), pp. 18-19. [BACK]

35. Adomo, Negative Dialectics , pp. 4, 207, 231, 360. [BACK]

36. The influence of Kojeve, whose lectures depicted Hegel as the forerunner of both Heidegger and Marx, was critical; see Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel , trans. Nichols (New York, 1969). Kojeve placed the master-slave relation at the heart of Hegel's phenomenology, a move echoed in Sartre's phenomenology, when the latter interprets human relations along a sadomasochistic axis of subjective domination (I look at you) and objective submission (I am looked at). break [BACK]