The Conference Committee Hearing
The Conference Committee held its hearing on AB 816 on March 23, but most of the program advocates observing the process thought that they had little ability to affect the outcome. Isenberg used the hit list that CSR and the CMA had prepared and widely circulated (without attribution) to ridicule the program. According to Miller, those who wished to protect the Health Education Account were not given much of an opportunity to do so:
It was a fairly perfunctory hearing. …I mean, after berating us, they didn't take any evidence. Then Phil announced the findings that he intended to move the money out of Health Education into these other programs. And I remember Ken Maddy [Republican minority leader] was sitting next to him and Ken turned to him and said, “But we all agreed that that was not possible.” And Phil said something to the effect that “things are different now.” And I realized that that was the first Maddy knew they were going to go for four-fifths and that they were going to change it. It was a Democratic initiative, 816 was. …Maddy quickly realized what was going on and got on board in a hurry.[20]
Supporters of the health education programs were surprised to find that Isenberg was a leader in attacking the programs. Isenberg sought to paint the health advocates who were seeking to protect Proposition 99 as being just another special interest now addicted to public funding. Isenberg pointed out to a Los Angeles Times reporter that many of the same groups who were now fighting the use of Health Education Account funds for health screening and prenatal care programs had agreed to this use in the past. According to Isenberg, these groups “have taken on the garb of a religious crusade.”[1]
Martin, responding on behalf of the ALA, wrote that they were “shocked” by Isenberg's comments.[39] She pointed out that Proposition 99 funds distributed to ALA represented less than 4 percent of ALA's budgets from around the state of California and was only .001 percent of the 1993-1994 tax revenues. She argued that the appropriation should be made, not only because it was a voter mandate but also because the program had demonstrated its effectiveness. She pointed out that “criticizing a few programs cannot erase the tremendous total impact of this complex prevention program.” Neither ACS nor AHA took Proposition 99 money.
The University of California had generally been quiet about the Research Account, reflecting its position as a public body whose board of regents is chaired by the governor. This stance sometimes frustrated the university's allies. For example, in 1992 AHA officials had written to University of California president Jack Peltason to express their disappointment at the university's failure to oppose diversion of the Research Account funds and the hope that “the University of California will take a leading role in opposing such attempts.”[40] Put to the test again in 1994, the university would again play a cautious role.
UC lobbyist Cathrine Castoreno was frustrated trying to protect the Research Account in the 1994 hearings. University representatives testified on behalf of the Research Account—but without drawing any lines in the sand—and, in fact, worked to accommodate Isenberg. According to Castoreno,
I gave explicit testimony about what was most definitely illegal versus what they might possibly be able to do. This is a point in the proceedings towards the end of the Conference Committee on 816 where it was clear that there was going to be a diversion of Research Account monies. The issue was how much and how. We were pretty well beat up by that time…so, in an effort to try and keep the program from being completely defunded and to keep them from making a move that would be wholly illegal, I worked with our counsel and Dr. [Cornelius] Hopper [UC's vice president for health affairs] to put
― 260 ―together an analysis of 99 and see, given their goal to divert money, how they might do it legally. …We made it very clear that simply using the money straight out of the Research Account for health services or any other purpose was obviously and clearly illegal and challengeable in court. And they thanked us very much for that [laughter].[18]
The university even provided a written proposal on how the Research Account might legitimately be used for other purposes, such as by explicitly amending the initiative to put the diverted money into the Unallocated Account instead of directly funding medical care from the Research Account. The university's official position on reducing the Research Account from 5 percent to 3 percent was “neutral.”[41]
The schools were also subjected to a harsh review by Isenberg, who was frustrated by the lack of tobacco programming there. By March 1994, after the program had been running for four years in the schools, the evaluation conducted for the California Department of Education (CDE) by Southwest Regional Laboratory reported that 41 percent of youth in grades 7 through 12 reported at least one tobacco lesson and activity event.[42] This finding also meant, of course, that 59 percent did not, despite the fact that the schools had received a total of $147 million in Proposition 99 funds in the 1993-1994 fiscal year.[43] Through the spring of 1994 all schools were getting entitlement money based on average daily attendance. The report also pointed out that “the DATE [Drug, Alcohol, and Tobacco Education] program needs clear definition of the model and its components in order to standardize and focus prevention and reduction efforts targeting school youth.”[42] The health groups generally agreed with Isenberg's criticisms of the schools.[20]