1. Muslims represent about 88 percent of al-Zawiya's inhabitants, as was mentioned in the introduction. [BACK]

2. I use the word promise to highlight the fact that although religion is very important in forming a collective identity, it has to compete, as will become clear later, with other forces that shape people's daily life and struggles. [BACK]

3. This is not only true of this particular group. The state discourse continues to use similar negative constructions when officials and planners discuss ‘ashawi‘ at (unplanned or random areas). These areas are depicted as cancer cells, devilish expansions, and “factories for breeding terrorism” that should be surgically removed (see al-Ahram, August 1993; al-Haya t, April 17, 1993; al-Gumhuriyya, April 22, 1993; Hanna 1993). [BACK]

4. This was confirmed by the Minister of the Interior, who explained that the land was owned by the Governorate of Cairo and was designated to be used to build the Animal Feed Factory and a mosque for its workers. The Christian man bought it from another Muslim person in the area and acquired legal documents that proved his ownership of the land (Al-Akhbar, June 21, 1981: 3). [BACK]

5. Christian informants emphasize that the land was legally owned by ‘Aziz. Similarly, Milad Hanna (1997) wrote that the Christian man acquired documents from the court that proved his legal ownership. According to him, the Animal Feed Factory, with the support of the ruling party, managed to get an administrative order from the Governorate of Cairo to use the land to build a mosque. [BACK]

6. In January 1998, president Hosni Mubarak issued a decree that granted governors the authority to make decisions related to the repair and maintenance of churches. The power to license the building of new churches, however, is still retained by the president (see al-Ahram Weekly, January 29-February 4, 1998). [BACK]

7. According to the transcripts of the public prosecutor, Jama ‘at al-Jihad was the active group in al-Zawiya during these clashes (Ansari 1984). People, however, refer to these activists as al-Sunniyin. [BACK]

8. One Christian informant emphasized that the police were supportive of Muslims and that Sadat was to be blamed for these clashes. He told me that his family and relatives always say, “May God send Sadat to hell” (Allah yighimu). [BACK]

9. The Minister of the Interior stated that 10 people were killed (4 Muslims,

10. As usual, he blamed the communists for escalating the conflict, which started as “a simple fight” between two female neighbors, one of whom happened to be a Muslim and the other a Christian. [BACK]

11. One woman suggested that Sadat had to “say something” to explain the clashes when he was confronted by journalists and politicians in the United States. She emphasized that after coming back to Egypt, he retracted his statements. [BACK]

12. Boycotting Christian merchants has been publicized by Islamic groups asnecessary to prevent Copts from gathering money that they supposedly invest in buying weapons (Ansari 1984). [BACK]

13. Personally, I never managed to see physical differences between Muslims and Christians. The cross on the inner wrist and clothes, however, are strong visible indications of religious identity. [BACK]

15. While my discussion here is limited to the mosque, studies suggest that the church plays a similar role in the Christian community (Abdel Fattah 1997). [BACK]

16. This is to prevent confusion among those who do not know the rules of the performance and who could make mistakes by standing when they should be sitting or vice versa. [BACK]

17. In the women's section, which I had access to, the Friday prayer was coordinated by a woman who made sure that we were standing correctly and secured room to squeeze in newcomers. [BACK]

18. It is important to notice that my discussion of the mosque and religious identity is not a negation of their importance in the old location (see Early 1993 for a discussion of what she calls “popular Islam” and “religious conservatism” or “new orthodoxy” in Bulaq). I argue, though, that they gained more significance in articulating the presence of the people in al-Zawiya al-Hamra. [BACK]

19. The mosque also attracts many people who seek some basic modern services. Through charitable organizations, the mosque provides socially required services such as affordable education, health care, vocational training, day care services, and financial support to the poor. [BACK]

20. Young women who choose to pray in mosques outside their neighborhoods are also provided with a morally unquestionable chance for a social outing. Detailed narratives are constructed after each trip, describing such things as the long time they waited for the city bus, the impressive khutba, and the large crowd gathered to pray inside and outside the mosque. [BACK]

21. The most needy (such as widows) are offered small amounts of money to encourage them to attend these lessons together with their children. [BACK]

22. Other factors (such as passengers’ temporary captivity in the bus, the relative diversity of passengers, and the protection that the mobility of the bus offers to the activist) also make the bus a strategic site for al-Sunniyin. [BACK]

23. It is ironic that al-Zawiya is viewed as ‘ashwai‘ by many Egyptians and is often depicted as such in the state public discourse. [BACK]

24. Unlike Western modernity, this modernity includes a desire to maintain some form of continuity with the past. See Armbrust's (1996) study of Egyptian mass culture for a sophisticated analysis of this aspect of “Egyptian modernity.” [BACK]

25. A clear example of this is the widely publicized case of the “devil's worshipers.” The “transgression” of the accused was directly linked in the public discourse and daily conversation with money, traveling abroad, dressing in black, and listening to foreign music. [BACK]

26. For example, Sadat managed to get a religious decree (fatwa) to support his peace treaty and used part of the American aid in 1978 to strengthen the Koran Program Services (Diase 1996). [BACK]

27. See Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) for a critique of modernization theory and its assumptions regarding religion. [BACK]