Notes
1. Lewis 1961, 3. [BACK]
2. The terms "Kemalist" and "Atatürkist" are commonly applied to supporters of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), founder of the Turkish Republic. The same terms are also applied to political ideologies and programs associated with the founder. [BACK]
3. Anderson 1991 [1983] and Gellner 1983. Also see Hobsbawm (1990), who gives a fuller account of what can be called "imperial nationalism" in late-nineteenth-century Europe (but neglecting the instance of the Ottoman Empire). See Deringil (1998), who demonstrates that the Ottomans pursued policies of imperial nationalism in the same manner and at the same time as other late European empires. [BACK]
4. The specific designation "modular nationalism" presumably belongs to Anderson (1991), but other theorists of nationalism describe a similar process without so naming it. [BACK]
5. Lewis 1961, 1. See Kayalıı's (1997) study of the extent to which Ottoman elites remained committed to the imperial system even into the years of the Great War. [BACK]
6. Lewis 1961, 478-79. [BACK]
7. Ibid., 53-55. [BACK]
8. I have in mind various currents of authoritarianism that were currentin Turkey around 1980, and in particular the "Turk-Islam" (Türk-ııslam) movement as represented by the "Hearth of the Enlightened" (Aydıınlar Ocağıı). See Zürcher 1993, 302, 303). [BACK]
9. The range of targets was very broad. It included feminists, leftists, Kurds, and Alevis. Once the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) of Turgut Özal came to power, these policies were tempered and in some instances reversed. [BACK]
10. For a recent assessment of the place of the Alevis in the politics of religion, see Shankland 1999. [BACK]
11. For a discussion of this aspect of early dynastic history, see Kafadar 1995. [BACK]
12. Cf. Tapper and Tapper (1987), who argue that Turkish nationalism has a certain kinship with Islamic fundamentalism. Accordingly, they trace nationalist authoritarianism to the Semitic religious tradition. Delaney (1991) takes a similar view. I would argue instead that the authoritarianism of both Kemalists and Islamists is more directly an imperial legacy, and that religion was itself shaped by this imperial legacy. [BACK]
13. The comparison of Empire and Republic is inspired by Foucault's (1975) analysis of "modern" western European institutions in terms of a microphysics of power that works through a disciplinary tactic. I have attempted to understand "modern" Ottoman institutions as based on an entirely different microphysics of power working through a different disciplinary tactic. Although this approach is perhaps not exactly that recommended by Asad (1993), I am nonetheless indebted to his critique of anthropological studies in terms of their emphasis on symbols to the neglect of disciplines. [BACK]
14. Cf. Mardin 1969 on the parallels between the state officials of the Empire and the Republic. [BACK]
15. Lewis 1961, 23. [BACK]
16. By Lewis's estimation, there was hardly anything left of the old Ottoman Empire by the end of the first great Ottoman reform, the "Reordering" (Tanzimat): "The destruction of the old order had been too thorough [by 1871] for any restoration to be possible; for better or for worse, only one path lay before Turkey, that of modernization and Westernization" (ibid., 125). [BACK]
17. The works in question are cited in parts 2 and 3. Those that have been most important to the present study are: Akarlıı 1988, Aksan 1999a, 1999b, Aktepe 1951–52, Barkey 1994, ıınalcıık 1977, Kafadar 1995, Kunt 1983, Nagata 1976, Özkaya 1977, Sakaoğlu 1984, and Veinstein 1975, 1991. I am also especially indebted to the distinguished local historians of Of and Sürmene, Umur (1949, 1951, 1956) and Bilgin (1990), respectively. [BACK]
18. The widening of the circle of participation is considered in chaps. 3, 4, and 5, where I rely on Barkey's (1994) study of state policies relating to this issue during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. [BACK]
19. Cf. Mardin 1969 on the local elites imitating the palace. [BACK]
20. State protocol and ceremony is considered in chap. 4, where I rely on Ne-cipoğlu's (1991) study of the imperial palace. [BACK]
21. The period of decentralization in Trabzon is considered in chaps. 3, 4, and 5, where I rely on ıınalcıık 1977. [BACK]
22. Here I shall mention how my regional study departs from Keyder's (1987) analysis of state and class in the Turkish Republic. For Keyder, the statist orientation of contemporary Turkish society is an imperial legacy, but only insofar as it represents a continuation of an official, Ottoman "statolatry." The question is then why this statolatry was never successfully challenged and defeated by bourgeois ideology, even with the rise of a commercial class during the later Republic. To find an answer, Keyder relies on dependency theory, analyzing the place of the Turkish polity and economy in the world system. In my analysis, I have considered how the official state system was supplemented by a nonofficial state society. [BACK]