1. George W. Rathjens and Laura Reed, Neither MAD nor Starstruck—And Doubts, Too, About Arms Control (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986), pp. 14-15.

2. Center for Defense Information, "After the INF Treaty: U.S. Nuclear Buildup in Europe," Defense Monitor 17, no. 2 (1988): 5.

3. Rathjens and Reed, Neither MAD nor Starstruck, p. 5.

4. Time, cited in Morton H. Halperin, Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 41; Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, in The Nuclear Crisis Reader, ed. Gwyn Prins (New York: Vintage, 1984), p. 11; "The Belgrano Cover-Up," New Statesman (London), August 31, 1984, cited in Joseph Gerson, "What Is the Deadly Connection?" in The Deadly Connection: Nuclear War and U.S. Intervention, ed. Joseph Gerson (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1986), p. 13.

5. See Amos Perlmutter, Michael Handel, and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad (London: Corgi Books, 1982), pp. 46-48. See also Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 379. Citing one detailed study, Garthoff rejects the theory that the Soviets were supplying nuclear warheads.

6. See Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988).

7. Ibid., pp. 120-148, 159-189, 294-296; Rathjens and Reed, Neither MAD nor Starstruck, p. 20.

6. See Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988).

7. Ibid., pp. 120-148, 159-189, 294-296; Rathjens and Reed, Neither MAD nor Starstruck, p. 20.

8. Rathjens and Reed, Neither MAD nor Starstruck, p. 20.

9. Gordon Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," International Security 2, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 121; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 287.

10. Gary Milhollin, "New Nuclear Follies?" New York Times, November 25, 1987, p. A27.

11. Center for Defense Information, "First Strike Weapons at Sea: The Trident II and the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile," Defense Monitor 16, no. 6 (1987): 5-7 (emphasis in original).

12. Thomas B. Cochran, William A. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 1, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984), pp. 244, 84-88, 89-91, 82. In 1974 the Air Force reportedly removed nuclear warheads for air-to-air missiles from Air National Guard units nationwide after allegations that two Air National Guard fighter pilots were involved in drug trafficking (UPI, "Removal of Nuclear Weapons from Guard Units Revealed," Boston Globe, October 24, 1988, p. 5).

13. See, for example, essays by Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Admiral Noel Gayler, and Lieutenant General A. S. Collins, in Nuclear Crisis Reader, ed. Prins, and references cited in Chapter 3 of this book.

14. James M. Markham, "Soviet Bloc Seeks Battlefield Nuclear-Arms Talks," New York Times, January 6, 1988, p. A3. An interesting exception to the trend is Paul Nitze's unexpected informal proposal for a superpower treaty to ban nuclear-armed sea-based cruise missiles, depth charges, torpedoes, and possibly bombs carried by aircraft on ships. If done thoroughly, such a change could eliminate the sea-based tactical nuclear arsenals that, as we have seen, pose one of the most worrisome threats of nuclear escalation during conventional hostilities. The motive for this unusual proposal probably has less to do with reducing the risk of unintended escalation than with eliminating what many regard as a serious threat to the U.S. Navy in time of war. In our interviews, several ranking Navy officers complained that on balance tactical nuclear weapons at sea benefit the Soviets, one reason being that the United States has far more to lose if both fleets are destroyed in a nuclear war at sea. Nevertheless, unlike other arms control ideas, such a proposal could actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. See Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Aide Offers Plan to Cut Arms at Sea," New York Times, April 6, 1988.

15. For unusual press coverage of these activities, see Charles Scheiner, "Atlantic Activists Meet, Seek to Close Down Huge Ocean Arsenals," Guardian, October 21, 1987, p. 14.

16. See David Corn and Jefferson Morley, "A Nuclear Gulf," Nation, October 3, 1987, p. 331; Robert Schaeffer, "Making, Waves," Nuclear Times 6, no. 2 (November-December 1987): 23, 24. La Rocque reportedly focused not on the risk of the weapons' coming into unauthorized use but on the problems we would face if they were lost at sea or if their radioactive materials were scattered into the environment in conventional combat. Greenpeace's campaign has drawn criticism not only for focusing attention on tactical rather than strategic nuclear weapons, but also for opposing all sea-based nuclear weapons, including the strategic ones on ballistic-missile submarines, widely considered the most secure and stabilizing strategic weapons platforms.

17. Halperin, Nuclear Fallacy, p. 55.

18. Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, foreword to Deadly Connection, ed. Gerson, p. vii; Christine Wing and Frank Brodhead, "Peace Movements East and West," Resist, no. 205 (April 1988).

19. Cochran et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, p. 14.

20. Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 53; Paul Bracken, "Accidental Nuclear War," in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York: Norton, 1985), pp. 44-45.

21. Bracken, "Accidental Nuclear War," pp. 29, 49 (emphasis in original).

22. Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An "International Security" Reader, ed. Stephen E. Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 9 (first published in International Security 2, no. 4 [Spring 1978].

23. John H. Cushman, "War Stocks and the Weapons Pact," New York Times, September 27, 1987, business section, p. 1.

24. Nicholas Wade, "The Hazards of Arms Control," New York Times, February 10, 1988, p. A30; Cushman, "War Stocks," p. 1.

25. Richard Halloran, "NATO Chief Assails Notion That Arms Pacts Save Money," New York Times, February 8, 1988, p. A2; Wolfgang Demisch, cited in Cushman, "War Stocks," p. 1.

26. Cushman, "War Stocks," p. 1.

27. Paul Lewis, "Soviet Proposes Shift of Arms Cash to Third World," New York Times, August 26, 1987, p. A9.

28. G. Adams and D. A. Gold, "The Economics of Military Spending: Is the Military Dollar Really Different?" Defense Budget Project, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1985, cover page, p. 2.

29. Barry Bluestone and John Havens, "Reducing the Federal Deficit Fair and Square" (paper delivered at the Symposium on the Fortieth Anniversary of the Joint Economic Committee, "The American Economy in Transition: From the Second World War to the 21st Century," Washington, D.C., January 16-17, 1985), p. 24. See also Barry Bluestone and John Havens, "How to Cut the Deficit and Rebuild America," Challenge 29, no. 2 (May-June 1986): 22-29.

30. Gordon Adams, "Economic Conversion Misses the Point," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42, no. 2 (February 1986): 24-25, 27.

31. James G. Hershberg, "National Insecurity: How the Red Menace Derailed the Contragate Probe," Boston Phoenix, February 3, 1989, p. 10.

32. See Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador (Boston: South End Press, 1984).

33. Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (New York: Pantheon, 1982).

34. "To the Summit, and Beyond," New York Times, September 20, 1987, p. 26. For another prominent acknowledgment that the INF treaty has little military significance, see Graham Allison and Albert Carnesale, "Why Say No to 1,500 Warheads?" New York Times, November 15, 1987.

35. "An Arms-Control Precedent," Boston Globe, November 30, 1987, p. 16; Mary McGrory, "New View, Old Habits," Boston Globe, December 9, 1987, p. 21.

36. David K. Shipler, "U.S. and Russians Sign Pact to Limit Nuclear War Risk," New York Times, September 16, 1987, p. 1; Philip Shabecoff, "Dozens of Nations Approve Accord to Protect Ozone," New York Times, September 17, 1987, p. 1; "Reagan and Gorbachev to Meet This Year to Sign Missile Pact, Now Nearly Complete," New York Times, September 19, 1987, p. 1.

37. Dianne Dumanoski, "Ozone, Arms and Politics," Boston Globe, September 20, 1987, p. A25.

38. Shabecoff, "Accord to Protect Ozone," p. 1; Dianne Dumanoski, "Scientists Fear Fallout from Ozone Loss," Boston Globe, March 21, 1988, p. 3; Dianne Dumanoski, "Ozone Pact Clears Hurdle to Senate Ratification," Boston Globe, February 18, 1988, p. 75.

39. Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook 1: 15, 5.

40. Center for Defense Information, "After the INF Treaty: U.S. Nuclear Buildup in Europe," Defense Monitor 17, no. 2 (1988): 2.

41. "The Dirtiest Bomb," Boston Globe, August 15, 1987, p. 14; Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook 1: 58.

42. New York Times, January 24, 1988, p. 12. Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, give a yield of only 10-50 kilotons for the cruise missiles (1: 182).

43. Kaplan, "U.S. to Take Its Most Powerful Nuclear Bomb out of Mothballs," Boston Globe, August 6, 1987, p. 3; Dan Plesch, "NATO's New Nuclear Weapons," Defense and Disarmament Alternatives 1, no. 3 (May 1988): 2. The United States does plan to retire many obsolete nuclear weapons—bombs, artillery shells, and Lance missiles—from Europe as new ones are deployed, perhaps leading to reductions in the total number of U.S. warheads there. But as the commander of American and allied forces in Europe, General John R. Galvin, acknowledges, such reductions would be unilateral, would have nothing to do with the INF treaty, and would in no way weaken military capabilities. Like earlier warhead reductions in Europe and in the United States, such reductions would simply reflect modernization, which allows fewer, more advanced weapons to surpass the capabilities of larger numbers of obsolete weapons. See Richard Halloran, "NATO Chief Sees a New Reduction in Warheads," New York Times, August 11, 1988, p. A7. See also Natural Resources Defense Council, "A New Improved Nuclear Arms Race?" (advertisement), New York Times, December 6, 1987, p. 31.

44. Diana Johnstone, "Strategic Realignment," Nuclear Times, September-October 1987, p. 14.

45. Richard Halloran, "U.S. Weighs Effect of New Arms Pact," New York Times, December 6, 1987, p. 17.

46. The views we expressed in "Arms Control: Misplaced Focus" ( Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42, no. 3 [March 1986]: 39-44) have been misinterpreted as a call for improved relations with the Soviet Union. See the letter by Howard Moreland, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43, no. 2 (March 1987): 61.

47. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 941-942.

48. Rathjens and Reed, Neither MAD nor Starstruck, pp. 17-18.

49. Nicholas Wade, "Hazards of Arms Control," p. A30; Ralph Earle II, "America Is Cheating Itself," Foreign Policy, no. 64 (Fall 1986): 16.

50. United Press International, "Afghan City Reported Under Siege; Many Dead," Boston Globe, December 9, 1987, p. 28; Philip Taubman, "Moscow Proposes Foreign Warships Quit Persian Gulf," New York Times, July 4, 1987, p. 1.

51. See "2 Soviet Warships Reportedly Nudge U.S. Navy Vessels," New York Times, February 13, 1988, p. 1; "Soviet Vessels Bump Two US Navy Warships," Boston Globe, February 13, 1988, p. 1; "Moscow Blames U.S. for Incident Between Warships in Black Sea," New York Times, February 14, 1988, p. 1; "Soviets See a Setback in Collision of Ships," Boston Globe, February 14, 1988, p. 8. Neither the Times nor the Globe reported the nuclear weapons capabilities of the American ships involved.

52. Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook 1:244; "Bumped US Ship Was Spying, Report Says," Boston Globe, April 22, 1988, p. 3.

53. "An Arms-Control Precedent," Boston Globe, November 30, 1987, p. 16; Fred Kaplan, "Questions Raised on Scope of Treaty Plan," Boston Globe, December 2, 1987, p. 13.

54. Ibid.

53. "An Arms-Control Precedent," Boston Globe, November 30, 1987, p. 16; Fred Kaplan, "Questions Raised on Scope of Treaty Plan," Boston Globe, December 2, 1987, p. 13.

54. Ibid.

55. "The Treaty After the Treaty," New York Times, December 9, 1987, p. A34; Michael. R. Gordon, "Reagan's Missile Cut Offer Throws Open 'Window of Vulnerability' Debate," New York Times, December 7, 1987, p. A20.

56. Rathjens and Reed, Neither MAD nor Starstruck, p. 21.

57. Michael M. May, George F. Bing, and John D. Steinbruner, Strategic Arms Reductions (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 6.

58. Ibid., p. 54. In the other two 3,000-warhead scenarios—proportional reductions from current forces and modernized forces designed for attacking enemy missiles as well as for invulnerability—target coverage for retaliation after absorbing a first strike "falls off for the lower-priority targets." Nevertheless, even in these improbable scenarios, the victim of a first strike could strike most of the important military and industrial targets of its attacker and could of course utterly destroy the attacker's cities even if the victim waited until the attack was over before launching any weapons in retaliation (ibid., p. 54).

57. Michael M. May, George F. Bing, and John D. Steinbruner, Strategic Arms Reductions (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 6.

58. Ibid., p. 54. In the other two 3,000-warhead scenarios—proportional reductions from current forces and modernized forces designed for attacking enemy missiles as well as for invulnerability—target coverage for retaliation after absorbing a first strike "falls off for the lower-priority targets." Nevertheless, even in these improbable scenarios, the victim of a first strike could strike most of the important military and industrial targets of its attacker and could of course utterly destroy the attacker's cities even if the victim waited until the attack was over before launching any weapons in retaliation (ibid., p. 54).

59. John D. Steinbruner, "The Purpose and Effect of Deep Strategic Force Reductions," in Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, Reykjavik and Beyond: Deep Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arsenals and the Future Direction of Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988), p. 14 (emphasis added).

60. May, Bing, and Steinbruner, Strategic Arms Reductions, p. 7; Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., "The Impact of Defenses on Offensive Reduction Regimes," in Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Reykjavik and Beyond, p. 23. Indeed, both sides could probably threaten the amount of damage Keeny describes even if all strategic weapons were abolished. The United States and the Soviet Union each have many weapons systems that are not considered "strategic" but that could in fact be used to deliver nuclear warheads to the other's territory. For example, as Alexander Flax notes,

All military aircraft—including all of our fighters—are tanker-refueled many times when they are flown to Europe. That is how they get there. Thus, they have intercontinental range. ... tactical transport aircraft like the C-141, C-5, and the C-130. ... have cargo doors in the rear that open for parachute extraction so that loads can be dropped to troops in the field. Those doors are also very good for extracting cruise missiles. They are also good for extracting anything else ... even space-launch vehicles, which originally were all converted ballistic missiles, are perfectly good ICBMs. And one can test all of the elements except the reentry vehicle by conducting a space launch.

61. May, Bing, and Steinbruner, Strategic Arms Reductions, pp. 67-68. The authors note that the high 3,000-warhead Soviet fatality rates we cite result from one assumption: that the United States equips its Trident submarines with D-5 missiles, which have a much higher yield than current Poseidon and Trident C-4 submarine-based missiles.

62. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

61. May, Bing, and Steinbruner, Strategic Arms Reductions, pp. 67-68. The authors note that the high 3,000-warhead Soviet fatality rates we cite result from one assumption: that the United States equips its Trident submarines with D-5 missiles, which have a much higher yield than current Poseidon and Trident C-4 submarine-based missiles.

62. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

63. "Is Arms Control Obsolete?" Harper's 271, no. 1622 (July 1985): 50; "An Arms-Race Precedent," Boston Globe, September 19, 1987, p. 14.

64. John B. Judis, "Would Long-Range Arms Treaty Be a False START For Peace?" In These Times, December 16-22, 1987, p. 3. Judis, like Kaplan, is referring to the NRDC study.

65. Michael Howard, "Is Arms Control Really Necessary?" (lecture delivered to the Council for Arms Control, London), excerpted in Harper's 272, no. 1632 (May 1986): 14; Halloran, "New Arms Pact," p. 17; Halloran, "Arms Pacts," p. A2. Even strategic arms cuts far deeper than START would not necessarily save money. One reason is that both sides would probably feel the need to restructure their forces, at great cost, to avoid concentrating their remaining warheads in a few of the giant delivery platforms they now use today. Flax writes: "Because of the relatively small numbers of launch platforms that may be involved as we go to 3,000 warheads and below, we really have to consider modifying our launch platform concepts. We probably do not want Trident submarines carrying 24 missiles. We probably do not want big bombers carrying 20 cruise missiles.... It could be that we will end up with a force of one-third the size of our current force, costing roughly what the present strategic force costs." See Flax, "Impact of New Technologies,'' in Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Reykjavik and Beyond, pp. 32-33.

66. Halloran, "New Arms Pact," p. 17.

67. Steinbruner, "Deep Strategic Force Reductions," p. 13.

68. George Rathjens, "The Conditions for Complete Nuclear Disarmament: The Case for Partial Nuclear Disarmament," in A New Design for Nuclear Disarmament, ed. William Epstein and Toshiyuki Toyoda (Nottingham: Spokesman,

1977), cited in Rathjens and Reed, Neither MAD nor Starstruck, p. 21; Rathjens and Reed, Neither MAD nor Starstruck, pp. 21-22.

69. Rathjens and Reed, Neither MAD nor Starstruck, p. 23.

70. H. D. S. Greenway, "Nuclear-Poor, Not Nuclear-Free," Boston Globe, December 11, 1987, p. 23.

71. Rob Leavitt, "Vision Quest," Defense and Disarmament News (Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies), August-September 1987, p. 7.

72. "Activists Greet Arms Pact with Guarded Optimism," Guardian, October 14, 1987, p. 6.

73. Information on the concept of the peace system is available from EXPRO, Department of Sociology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167.