NFPA Standards: Economics, Politics, and Process

While independent labs are both bolstered and constrained by the market for certification, the forces affecting membership organizations are clearly different. But the underlying reality, as observed by Anthony Downs, is essentially the same: "No bureau can survive unless it is continually able to demonstrate that its services are worthwhile to some group with influence over sufficient resources to keep it alive."^[18] This support need not come directly from the most obvious source, the membership. Membership dues account for 41 percent of ANSI's revenues; the sale of publications accounts for 54 percent.^[19] Other membership organizations are even more dependent on those purchasing their standards than on those writing them. Membership dues account for less than 8 percent of NFPA's revenues; publication sales account for almost 60 percent.^[20] Sufficient support from those who rely on standards can empower private standards-setters vis-à-vis their membership.

Beyond these market-based forces, other sources of support "such as the state subsidizing the organization or legally enforcing its policies" can supplement and transform constraints imposed by the membership.^[21] As a result, the demand for NFPA standards, and hence the nature of NFPA politics, is extremely variable. The National Electric Code, given the force of law in virtually every state in the country, generates intense interest from a wide range of groups. So does the Life Safety Code. In those instances, NFPA standards-setting is apparently characterized by lively interest-group politics. The health care industry battles with the building trades; the makers of plastic pipe oppose those who sell metal. Both standards were the source of scandals earlier this decade when specific commercial interests attempted to "pack" the annual convention to change the standard through an unusual floor vote.^[22] NFPA has since vested greater authority in its Standards Council, making it impossible to write code text on the convention floor.

This is not to say that NFPA standards are merely a reflection of the

most powerful interests on the relevant technical committees. First, these committees have a "balanced" membership designed to prevent any single group from dominating. Some of these interests, as discussed earlier in this chapter, are advocates of safety regulation. Second, installation and use standards permit a modicum of leeway unavailable to testing labs. Use standards are broader in scope than product standards, so that a demand for the standard will still exist even if it prohibits certain products or practices. Although NFPA desires to sell as many standards as possible, and this certainly affects which standards get written and how often they are updated, it is not beholden to particular interests in the same way as product certifiers. Accordingly, the National Fuel Gas Code prohibits propane cabinet heaters (and could do likewise with gas space heaters) without affecting the demand for the standard.

Unfortunately, the demand for other NFPA standards, including 61B and 408, is considerably weaker than that for the National Electric Code. The NFPA liaison to the grain elevator committee could not name a single organization or firm that actually uses NFPA 61B. The only apparent interest in NFPA 408 is from foreign countries. The stakes are much lower for standards with such little demand. These standards are more likely to fall behind the times as weak demand is reflected among the committee members. NFPA is also unlikely to pour organizational resources into standards that generate little income. The resulting politics are quite varied. But without a strong demand for the standard—created through, say, use by some government agency—NFPA committees lose an important source of leverage in determining how strict to make standards.

The politics of NFPA regulation also differ from what Wilson has described on the public side in one glaring respect: antibusiness sentiment does not drive private regulation. As a consequence, private regulation is largely unaffected by the injury statistics and major catastrophes that entrepreneurial politicians use to mobilize public support for regulation.^[23] NFPA investigated the Air Canada incident, but there were no apparent repercussions for any of the aviation safety committees. The series of grain elevator explosions in 1977 probably prompted the NFPA Agricultural Dusts committee to meet—revision of the standard was already overdue—but the explosions did not cause significant changes in the standard. The limited role of public sentiment in private regulation seems to account for the less hurried and often more thoughtful approach to standards-writing in the private sector. The

kind of pressure that motivated the FAA staff to want, above all else, to complete the rulemaking proceeding for aviation fire safety does not exist on the private side. The reduction in hastiness might come at the expense of timeliness, however. Lacking external pressure to "do something," the private sector sometimes does nothing at all. NFPA 408 was so neglected that by the late 1970s it was considered practically useless.

Lacking what Wilson calls the most potent method for overcoming opposition to regulation—the public sentiment that follows any catastrophe—the NFPA committees apparently do whatever can be accomplished through political compromise. This suggests a grim reality, with standards taking whatever shape business interests desire. Hence the conventional wisdom that private standards-setting organizations are "captured." The grain elevator case supports this hypothesis. The National Grain and Feed Association opposes any regulation of grain elevator housekeeping, and NFPA 61B is obliging. But this hypothesis has limited explanatory power. The political "compromise" reached in aviation safety, and possibly in many other NFPA standards, is surprisingly strict. More NFPA standards should be examined before general conclusions are drawn about the politics of NFPA standards-setting in specific, and of membership organizations in general.