1. Rezeption and Levels of Exegesis

Exegesis of the Torah by means of concepts and terms derived from Greek philosophy did not begin with Philo. Fragments of the writings of his predecessor and fellow-Alexandrian Aristobulus (perhaps ca. 100 B.C. ) survive. In his books, Philo often enough refers to other Jewish exegetes who had proposed a philosophical interpretation of Scripture. For example, at QG 1.8 he attributes to others the important (Middle) Platonizing exegesis of Genesis 1:27 as referring to an intelligible, and of 2:7 as

referring to a sensible, Man ("some ... have said").^[1] Aristobulus had already stated that Pythagoras, Plato, and Socrates, as well as Orpheus, Linus, Hesiod, Homer, and even Aratus, are dependent on Moses (ap . Euseb. PE 13.12=Aristob. frr. 3-5). As is well known, this is also Philo's view. According to the fragment De deo 6-7 (partly printed at SVF 2.422),^[2] Moses spoke of the "technical fire" which informs the world long before the (Stoic) philosophers did, and much more dearly. Plato's account of the formation of the world and of man in the Timaeus had been anticipated in a superior way in the first chapters of Genesis.^[3] The paradoxical view of the Stoic Zeno that only the wise man is free (Prob . 53) and his ethical principle that one should live in agreement with nature (160) have been derived from the lawgiver of the Jews (57, 160). Heraclitus's view that as long as we are in the body we live the death of the soul^[4] has been derived (LA 1.107) or even stolen (QG 4.152) from Moses, and his theory that the opposites are "one" comes from the same source (Her . 214, QG 3.5). The "deeper meaning" of Genesis 15:18 is said to have been "praised by some of the philosophers who came afterward: Aristotle and the Peripatetics, ... Pythagoras" (QG 3.16). In a remarkable passage (Aet . 76), Philo argues that the Stoics Boethus of Sidon and Panaetius, who abandoned the theory of the periodical conflagrations and regenerations of the world, did so under "divine inspiration" (theoleptoi ; this is the only occurrence of the adjective listed in the Index Philoneus ).

There is today a growing consensus that Philo was, first and foremost, a deeply religious Jewish person who lived according

[1] Cf. below, p. 81, pp. 87ff.

[2] Newly translated from the Armenian by E Siegert, Drei hellenistisch-jüdische Predigten , Wiss. Unt. N.T. 20 (Tübingen, 1980), 84ff.

[3] For the influence of Tim . see the exhaustive study by D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato , Philosophia antiqua 44 (Leiden, 1986).

[4] Cf. my paper "Heraclitus, Empedocles and Others in a Middle Platonist Cento in Philo of Alexandria," in Vig Chr . 39 (1985), 131ff.

to the Mosaic laws and whose primary objective as a writer and scholar was the faithful interpretation of Scripture. This, it is thought, explains what is often called his eclecticism,^[5] or rather, (as I would prefer to say) his preferences in the fields of Greek philosophy. To attribute a naive sort of eclectic attitude to him or to suggest that he was merely a constant dabbler in the commonplaces found in abundance in the philosophical and rhetorical circles of his day would be not only unfair but false. There is more system in his interpretation of the sacred text than is visible at first blush: there are themes, such as the creation of the world by a provident God, or the "migration" of the soul, that are overwhelmingly present in most of what survives. Furthermore, once it is acknowledged that some of the individual tracts constituting the Allegorical Commentary are constructed as a series of questions and answers geared to the exegesis of the individual verses that form a biblical pericope, after the pattern of the much more formal Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim and In Exodum , these treatises turn out to be far less rambling and incoherent than they have often been assumed to be.^[6] I would like to add that in these more formal commentaries the individual questions and answers dealing with separate lemmata tend to group themselves in dusters which possess a definite thematic unity; they are therefore comparable to the individual allegorical tracts with their larger and more varied themes. Indeed, for all their roots in the Sabbath liturgy of the synagogue and the study-house which may have been connected therewith, and for all their

[5] See V. Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire de l'Ecriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie , ALGHJ 11 (Leiden, 1977), 191f.

[6] P. Borgen and R. Skarsten, "Quaestiones et Solutiones: Some Observations on the Form of Philo's Exegesis," Studia Philonica 4 (1976-1977), 1ff; Nikiprowetzky (n. 5 above), passim, and his chapter in D. Winston and J. Dillon, Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria , Brown Univ. Jud. St. 25 (Chico, California, 1983), 5ff. See now also D.T. Runia, "The Structure of Philo's Allegorical Treatises," Vig. Chr . 38 (1984), 209ff., and R. Radice, "Filone d'Allessandria nella interpretazione di V. Nikiprowetzky e della sua scuola," Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 76 (1984), 15ff.

affinities with earlier Greek literary forms (the scientific problemata , or the "problems and solutions" literature dealing with the poets already mentioned by Aristotle in Poet . 25.1460b6), large sections of the Quaestiones are very much concerned with one dominant theme: the vicissitudes of the human soul. That, presumably, can be explained on the assumption that Philo was familiar with a Middle Platonist exegesis of the Odyssey^[7] according to which Odysseus's arduous journey home symbolizes the labors of the soul attempting to return to its original abode. (But we do not know that this was a formal commentary of the "problems and solutions" type.)

However, a better understanding of Philo's exegetical aims and method of presentation is by no means equivalent to an explanation of his so-called eclecticism, that is to say, his important use of Greek philosophical ideas. The matter is much more complicated than that. Philo belongs to two different worlds and to two traditions, that of Greek philosophy and that of the Jewish exegesis of the Bible. Perhaps the German term Rezeption , less ambiguous and more informative than eclecticism , should be preferred. In Philo's case, as in that of some of his Jewish predecessors, Rezeption —for which "assimilation" is perhaps a better equivalent than the ugly "reception"—is concerned with two inherited historical complexities, each of which has its own definite and special character. Yet Philo endeavors to interpret each of these in terms of the other. Consequently, the attempt to unravel

[7] Cf. P. Boyancé, "Echos des exégèses de la mythologie grecque chez Philon," in Philon d'Alexandrie (Lyon, 1967), 169ff.; U. Früchtel, "Die kos-mologischen Vorstellungen bei Philon von Alexandrien," ALGHJ 2 (Leiden, 1968), 104-5; J. Dillon, "Ganymede as the Logos: Traces of a Forgotten Allegorization in Philo?" CQ 31 (1981), 183ff.; and esp. H. Tobin, The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation , Cath. Bibl. Qu. Monogr. 14 (Washington, D.C., 1983), 150ff., with other references to the learned literature. F. Buffière, Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque (Paris, 1956), 392ff., remains important for the allegorized Odyssey , although he failed to take account of the evidence in Philo.

the strands of his ingenious fabric is uphill work. His attitude toward Greek philosophy is dependent on his position as an exegete, and his attitude toward the Bible is to a large degree dependent on his philosophical beliefs. The student of Philo is therefore faced with an interpretive circle that threatens to be vicious rather than hermeneutical. Philo's attitude toward Greek philosophy may be eclectic, and his Rezeption be determined by his Jewish background. However, his attitude toward the exegesis of Scripture may also be eclectic, both because, from a philosophical point of view, he believed that certain things in Scripture are more important than other things, and insofar as concerns his evaluation of the works of his Jewish predecessors (some of whom were themselves interested. in Greek philosophy).

But the history of pre-Philonic Alexandrian exegesis of the Torah (for a dear general reference to which see, for example, Mos . 1.4) must for the most part be extracted from Philo's own works.^[8] Furthermore, as I shall argue, Philo is both capable of assimilating an existing "eclectic" doctrine—or, as I would prefer to say, of reinterpreting and integrating doctrines considered to be Classical (here names such as Posidonius, Antiochus, and Eudorus come to mind)—and of distinguishing between the main schools of Greek philosophy in a more historically responsible manner. He is, moreover, quite capable of aligning himself with a doctrine that does fall outside the scope of, say, the Middle Platonism of his day. He is even capable of an eclectic, or reinterpretive, attitude toward certain Middle Platonist doctrines.

There is another important point. Philo throughout distinguishes between what he calls the "literal" and what he calls the "allegorical" interpretation, the latter as a rule representing the core of his thought. This distinction is largely unheeded in the

[8] See Tobin (n. 7 above), passim, and the unphilosophical B.L. Mack, "Philo Judaeus and the Exegetical Tradition in Alexandria," ANRW 21 (Berlin, 1984), 227ff.

scholarly literature,^[9] and understandably so, because the "literal" interpretations presented (or cited from others) often look quite allegorical to us. One should, however, follow Philo's own indications, for these are relevant to the evaluation of his attitude toward Greek philosophy (his "eclecticism"). I shall argue presently that philosophical theories exist which can be adduced at the literal but not at the allegorical level, and conversely.

But I do not wish to argue against the growing modem consensus^[10] that claims that much of Philo's philosophizing reflects the reinterpretive system of his so-called Middle Platonist contemporaries. For instance, although Philo read the Timaeus for himself, De opificio mundi , the first treatise of the Exposition of the Law , is much influenced by Middle Platonism, and its points of view can be paralleled from numerous passages elsewhere in Philo. This is important, since our sources for Middle Platonism (with the exception of Timaeus Locrus and a few fragments of Eudorus and Arius Didymus) are all rather later than Philo. We are therefore in a position to postulate that this reinterpretive system originated in Alexandria after, say, 50 B.C.^[11]

However, there are other works which cannot, by any stretching of the term, be called Middle Platonist. For instance, if his

[9] Tobin's pioneering and inspiring study (n. 7 above) is a notable exception.

[10] Boyancé (n. 7 above), "Sur la théologie de Varron," REA 57 (1955), 57ff.; "Fulvius Nobilior et le Dieu ineffable," RPh 29 (1955), 172ff.; "Sur le discours d'Anchise," in Homm. Dumézil , Coll. Latomus 45 (Brussels, 1960), 60ff.; "Etudes philoniennes," REG 76 (1963), 64ff.; "Sur l'exégèse hellénis-tique du Phèdre," in Miscellanea Rostagni (Turin, 1963), 45ff. Boyancé tends to overemphasize Antiochus's contribution. W. Theiler, "Philon von Alexandria und der Beginn des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus" (1965), repr. in his Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur (Berlin, 1970), 484ff.; "Philon yon Alexandria und der hellenisierte Timaeus," in Philomathes: Festschrift Merlan (The Hague, 1971), 20ff. Früchtel (n. 7 above). J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London, 1977), 139ff. P.L. Donini, Le scuole l'anima l'impero (Turin, 1982), 100ff. Tobin (n. 7 above), 11ff. Interesting and useful critical remarks in Runia (n. 3 above), 483ff., 505ff.

[11] For my discussion of this aspect of Philo's thought, cf. n. 4 above.

only surviving works were Quod omnis probus liber and De animalibus , would we not say that "if he had made a few little changes," Philo could be designated a "most genuine Stoic," even more so, perhaps, than Antiochus, for whom the sobriquet was coined by Cicero (Acad . 2. 132)?^[12] In Philo's day, the theories of the Stoics (unlike those of the Presocratics) lived on not only in books, but also in persons who saw themselves as Stoics. Indeed, not only does there exist the phenomenon known as Roman Stoicism, but there were even Stoics around in the days of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plotinus. It may therefore be of some importance to point out that Philo's contemporary and fellow-Alexandrian, Chaeremon, who was a notorious enemy of the Jews, was a Stoic. Chaeremon interpreted Egyptian religion in the terms of Greek philosophy, just as Philo did for the Jewish religion; he appears to have been a member of the Egyptian embassy to Gaius in A.D. 40, just as Philo was one of the Jewish embassy.^[13] Philo may have been familiar with Chaeremon's views, for (Mos . 1.23) he speaks of the Egyptian "philosophy conveyed in symbols, as displayed in the so-called holy letters" (the hieroglyphs), thus mentioning one of Chaeremon's favorite themes.^[14] If even an Egyptian could be a Stoic in Alexandria, there must, of course, have been other Stoics in town.

Furthermore, in another philosophical work, De aeternitate mundi , Philo, rather than proceeding in a Middle Platonist way, displays a rather thorough knowledge of the various doctrines concerned with this topic as professed by the important schools

[12] For Prob . cf. M. Petit, Oeuv . PhA . 28, 54ff., 78ff.; for Anim . see A. Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De animalibus , Stud. Hell. Jud. 1 (Chico, California, 1981), 49f., and "A Critical Introduction to Philo's Dialogues," ANRW 21 (1984), 277f. (also on Stoic arguments in Prov ).

[13] See now P.W. van der Horst, Chaeremon: Egyptian Priest and Stoic Philosopher , EPRO 101 (Leiden, 1984).

[14] Cf. fr. 12 van der Horst. On Mos . 1.23 see P.W. van der Horst, "The Secret Hieroglyphs in Classical Literature," Actus: Festschrift Nelson (Utrecht, 1982), 116, who, however, does not suggest that Philo may have known Chaeremon's work.

and is perfectly capable of distinguishing the Stoics from Plato and Aristotle, and Aristotle from the Stoics and Plato. He lists three views concerning the cosmos that have been put forward:^[15] (1) that the world is eternal, uncreated and imperishable; (2) the opposite view, that it is created and will be destroyed; the third view (3) is a compromise, which "takes from"^[16] (2) the idea that it is created and from (1) that it is imperishable (Aet . 7). This presentation is systematic, not historical.

The three main views are presented in the manner of a Skeptic "disagreement" followed by a compromise. In Aet . 7, the Aristotelian (and Pythagorean) view is cited first and that of (Democritus), Epicurus, and the Stoics second; in 8-12, this order is reversed. The view of Plato (and Hesiod) is cited last both at 7 and at 8-18. The suggestion at Aet . 7 that the third view is a compromise between the other two is of course only tenable from a systematic and not from a historical point of view (cf. n. 16 above). The "Succession" in the descriptive passage (8-18) is determined by both systematic and historical considerations. The important views, those of the Epicureans-and-Stoics/Aristotle/ Plato, are presented in an inverted historical sequence. Presumably, Philo believes that the history of Greek philosophy is one of decadence and that the farther one goes back, the nearer one gets to the truth, that is to say, to what Moses taught. The same

[15] Cf. my paper "Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought," in M.J. Vermaseren, ed., Studies in Hellenistic Religion , EPRO 78 (Leiden, 1979), 136ff.; D.T. Runia, "Philo's De aeternitate mundi," Vig. Chr . 35 (1981), 105ff.

suggestion is entailed by the series of ancestors of the main views—Democritus/some Pythagoreans/Hesiod—the earliest of whom is again closest to Moses.

Philo, naturally, sides with Moses.^[17] However, the text of De aeternitate , after an extensive presentation of Aristotle's case (taken up—as Philo shows—also by Theophrastus and other Peripatetics, and by some Stoics) against the orthodox Stoic view that the world will necessarily be destroyed and reborn again, breaks off with the announcement that the Aristotelian arguments will be met "point by point" (150).

The various doctrines, I would like to suggest, are here described in an order of validity. The theory of Democritus and Epicurus, cited first, is farthest from the truth, because these thinkers, when generating and destroying a plurality of worlds, only appeal to matter and chance. The Stoic theory is better, because it ascribes the generation of the one world to God and its destruction to Fire. It is curious that Philo has here chosen to present a very unorthodox Stoic view of the world-conflagration; possibly he could not resist the temptation to forget that the Stoic Fire is the same god as the god who generates the universe, in order to have the Stoic Fire resemble the elemental instrument used by his own god. He also argues that in a way the Stoics present the world as being eternal. Presumably, he emphasizes this aspect of genuine Stoic thought in order to expose it as a bastard form of Aristotelianism, or at any rate in order to bring it closer to Aristotle's view. Aristotle's theory, he argues, is better insofar as it is more God-fearing, since he does not want to credit God with creating something that would be less than perfect, i.e., destructible. Plato's theory however, is the best, because it comes closest to Moses'.

The best parallels for this presentation in the guise of an evaluative sequence are to be found in the later philosophical works

[17] Cf. Runia (n. 15 above), 126f.

of Cicero, for which I may refer to W. Görler's discovery^[18] of what he calls a Stufensystem , a triadic pattern according to which you first have a "low" view; next, an "elevated" view sharply opposed to the low view; and, third, a "middle" view that is a sort of compromise between the two others. In ND 1, for instance, the Epicurean view, the first to be discussed, is rejected (cf. the position of the Epicurean view in De aeternitate ). The Stoic position, presented next (ND 2), is admired, but a more moderate view is argued in book 3. According to Görler, Cicero does not really choose between the more elevated and the middle position; the latter is to be preferred from a rational point of view, while the former is what he would really like to prefer. Görler argues that this refusal to take sides in a definite way is characteristic of Cicero and in fact is what his philosophical position amounts to, which may be right. What cannot be right, however, is his claim that the pattern of presentation is Cicero's, for this is ruled out by the parallel in Philo.^[19] Philo, who has no affinities with Skepticism so far as his own convictions are concerned, is in a position to make a definite choice among possible options.^[20] Cicero and Philo each use the pattern in their own way, which I think proves that the scheme is traditional.

However this may be, as one studies the way Philo presents various philosophical doctrines in De aeternitate mundi , it gradually becomes clear that he is not merely dependent on "eclectic"

[18] W. Görler, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Philosophie (Heidelberg, 1974), esp. 20-62; there is a survey of "stages" (Stufen ) at p. 61, and Cicero is called "originator of this method" at p. 15. Cicero's Skepticism should be freshly studied in the light of Behrends's argument that the legal experts of Cicero's generation were all influenced by Skepticism; this, I think, helps to explain Cicero's change (or rather return) to Skepticism in his later years (O. Behrends, Die Fraus Legis [Göttingen, 1982]; cf. also the review by U . Manthe, Gnomon 56 [1984], esp. 145-46, and Glucker's study in this volume).

[19] More instances from Philo are cited by Runia (n. 15 above), 147 n. 94.

[20] See further below, part 2.

systems such as the (largely hypothetical) Alexandrian Platonism of his day, but is also familiar (as is Cicero), with a more historical approach to the great men and systems of the Greek past which enables him to state, compare, and judge their respective views. Actually, Philo's contemporary, the Neo-Pythagorean or Middle Platonist Eudorus, is also said to have written an extensive historical work in which he described the various doctrines of the schools, and Arius Didymus apparently did something similar.^[21]

In another philosophical work, De animalibus , Philo in his reply to Alexander's array of arguments (73-100) defends the Stoic view that the animals do not possess reason; they have been created for the benefit of man. Although Philo does not say so, it is certain that the opposite view is unacceptable to him, not only because it conflicts with the prescriptions of the Mosaic cult but also because it cannot be squared with statements about man and the animals in Scripture; in this work, however, no biblical references are given.^[22] At Genesis 2:19, man is said to have given names to the animals (this is Philo's sensible man, to be distinguished from the intelligible man at Genesis 1:27). At Opif . 148-49 and 1.18, 20, 21, Philo argues that man obtains this honor because he is the lord of the animals (cf. Praem . 9). Scriptural support for the latter idea is found elsewhere, at Genesis 1:26 (archetosan ) and 1:28 (archete ), i.e., in the pericope which, according to Philo, deals with the intelligible man. There is only one quotation of Genesis 1:28 in Philo: at QG 2.56 (pp. 140-41 Marcus), where it serves to explain God's speech to Noah at Genesis 9:1-2 (which echoes 1:28). Noah is made "righteous king of earthly creatures" and is said to have "been equal in honor not to the molded and earthly Man [of Genesis 2:7] but to him who was made in the likeness and form, who is incorporeal" (p. 141 Marcus, whose partly hypothetical translation I

[21] Cf. Dillon (n. 10 above), 116.

[22] See Terian (n. 12 above), 46f.

have corrected; cf. also Oeuvr. Ph. ad loc .). According to Philo (p. 142 Marcus), this is the "literal" interpretation—which, one should note, he does not reject; the "deeper meaning" is concerned with the domination of mind over the body, the senses, and the passions. The theme of man's domination of the animals (in a literal sense) also occurs elsewhere (e.g., Opif . 83-84, 142, Agric . 8, Prov . 1.9, 2.105), where scriptural evidence is not quoted.

It appears to be the case that Genesis 1:26 and 28 were no favorites with Philo (and/or with the Jewish exegetical tradition he is following) and that he preferred to conflate the idea of domination from Genesis 1:26 and 29 with that of the giving of names at Genesis 2:19, which figures much more prominently in his oeuvre. That tralaticious material is used by Philo also appears from QG 2.66, where another tradition is followed (or another possibility is exploited) and Noah is made to represent the "first molded [i.e., sensible] man."

The lack of biblical references in De animalibus may therefore be explained by means of Philo's attitude toward Genesis 1:26 and 28 elsewhere. Furthermore, it does not seem to have been noticed that in a remote corner of the QG (1.94), where he comments on Genesis 6:7 (God will wipe out man and destroy the beasts), Philo argues as follows: "The literal meaning is this [N.B. what follows has also been preserved in Greek]: it makes it clearly known that the beasts [aloga] were not primarily generated for their own sakes, but for the sake of men and for their service . And when these were destroyed, the former were rightly destroyed together with them, since there no longer existed those for which they were made" (my italics). This "literal meaning" of Genesis 6:7 (for which cf. also Abrah . 45) not only agrees with the interpretation of Genesis 2:19 at Opif 148-49 and QG 1.18, 20, 21 (where, as we have noticed, the idea of domination has been blended in from Genesis 1:26 and 28) but also with the point of view defended by Philo in Anim . 73-100. According to QG 1.94,

the "allegorical meaning" is that "Man is the mind within us, and beast is sensation." The latter is very dose to the view presented in the allegorical commentary (LA 2.9-18; exegesis of Genesis 2:19 again), where, however, the animals are said to represent the passions (for which cf. also the "deeper meaning" at QG 2.56).

Another parallel is at QG 2.9 (on Genesis 6:17, "whatever is on earth shall die." Question: "What sins did the beasts commit?"). Here the "literal meaning" is set out at much greater length, and an interesting and significant link with the philosophical views rejected in De animalibus is to be found in Philo's phrase, "the beasts were made, not for their own sake, as wise men reason , but for . . . men" (my italics). According to the "deeper meaning" as set out here, the animals represent the "earthly part of the body," i.e., the senses, which must die together with the body (of. QG 1.94) when the latter is "deluged by streams of passion. . .. For a life of evil is death." (Cf. also Conf . 23-24.)

It follows that the philosophical view defended by Philo in De animalibus , which is that of the Stoics, is pertinent only at the literal level of the interpretation of the relevant texts in Scripture. According to Philo, the literal interpretation, if it provides a satisfactory sense, is fully acceptable; the symbolic or allegorical or deeper interpretation, however, is what his exegesis is really about. Apparently, it is important for Philo that the literal interpretation of man's naming of the animals, blended with the idea of his lordship over them, can be defended on purely philosophical grounds and that here Greek philosophy (in the guise of a Stoic doctrine) and Scripture meet. It should also be noted that the allegorical interpretation, i.e., the domination of mind over the body, the senses, the passions, is derived from (or, rather, geared to) the domination of the animals by man in the literal interpretation. The deeper meaning exploits themes familiar from both Stoic and Platonic philosophy: reason versus the passions

or, more Platonically, reason versus the body. De animalibus itself only enters the outer orbit of Philo's thought, that connected with the literal interpretation.

From the passages studied above it appears that Philo's attitude toward Greek philosophy is a very complicated one indeed. He may draw on "eclectic" Middle Platonist theories for the literal interpretation of the creation story as well as on purely Stoic ideas for the literal interpretation of man's relation to the animals. But what is useful at the literal level need not be so at the allegorical. Furthermore, even at the literal level Philo may see fit to produce an interpretive blend of his own, as in the case of the world's possible end, described in terms both Platonic and Stoic. The demands of scriptural exegesis seem often to be decisive in respect to the option chosen. Some of Philo's literal interpretations seem to be an already traditional part of Jewish philosophical exegesis (e.g., the two types of man, QG 1.8). Doubtless, there are also unphilosophical Jewish motifs of an already traditional nature in Philo, which further influenced his selection among possible options; but this is a subject better left to the historians of Jewish thought.^[23] Reading through Philo, however, one cannot help feeling that for all his Jewish piety and loyalty to Moses and for all his indebtedness to specifically Jewish exegetical themes, Greek philosophy really dominates the field,^[24] and that Moses and the Jewish prophets are virtually converted into Greek philosophers. The attitude of Philo and his Alexandrian predecessors was not adopted by the rabbis who gave shape to the orthodox Judaism which was to develop after the destruction of the temple by Titus. This shows that in the interpretation of Scripture other options were open.

[23] See R Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria: A Critical and Synthetical Survey of Research since World War II," in ANRW 21 (Berlin, 1984), 124ff., 132ff.; P. Borgen in M. E. Stone, ed., Jewish Writings of tile Second Temple Period [Compendia rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum , Section 2] (Assen, 1984), 259ff., 264ff.; Mack (n. 8 above).

[24] Cf. also Runia (n. 3 above), 535ff.

An important question, then, which I believe has not yet been answered in a fully satisfactory way, is: why did Philo and his Alexandrian predecessors choose to interpret Scripture as a (Greek) philosophy? The answer, I believe, is provided by Philo's (and his predecessors') view of the history of Mosaic philosophy. Moses came first, and the Greeks have taken over his ideas, or perhaps in individual cases been favored with a special revelation which made them talk in the manner of Moses. It follows that, for Philo, it is perfectly legitimate to adduce the views of the Greek philosophers for the interpretation of Scripture; for all practical purposes, they can be seen as fellow-exegetes . Without exception, Philo cites his Jewish predecessors without giving their names. A few times, he gives the names of his Greek predecessors, but their views, too, are usually cited (or even paraphrased) anonymously.^[25] In this way, Greek philosophy, which by no means always provides a correct interpretation of Scrip-rare, is as indispensable to exegesis as the not always correct views of the Jewish exegetes cited by Philo.

Furthermore, the history of Greek philosophy itself can be understood as one of (re-)interpretation: Aristotle's interpretation of Plato,^[26] Zeno's interpretation of Plato and Aristotle (think of Antiochus). The Middle Platonists of Philo's Alexandria certainly belonged to such an interpretive tradition or school of thought, and it is only natural that Philo tamed to these contemporaries and studied the most up-to-date interpretation of Plato that was available (indeed, his predecessors who introduced the two types of man seem already to have done so). The study of Greek philosophy, when viewed from this angle, is, ultimately, a study of the pagan interpretive tradition which itself, in the last

[25] Why Greek names are (sometimes) given, but Jewish names never, remains a mystery; in the Talmud names are the rule. Perhaps the simple fact is that before, and in, Philo's time most Jewish exegetes preferred anonymity, whereas the Greek philosophers had after all signed their works and were persons of great prestige.

[26] Note, however, that Philo, Aet . 16, is aware of important innovations on Aristotle's part.

resort, is nothing but an interpretation of Scripture, either directly or at one or more removes.

When placed in this perspective, Philo's so-called philosophical works are not as singular as they have often been thought to be. All of them deal with matters that are ultimately geared to the interpretation of Scripture. Philo must really have felt rather superior to his Greek colleagues, for they did not have the books of Moses. His willingness in the philosophical works to meet them, as it were, in their own field (cf. Det . 1ff.) shows his sense of security: only the follower of Moses (to whose authority a discreet reference is several times inserted at focal points of the argument) is in a position to adjudicate between the competing views of the Greek. experts. On the other hand, Philo believes that the study of pagan philosophy (itself the sequel to the study of the "standard curriculum" [enkuklia ]) is a necessary condition for the study and understanding of the true, i.e., the Mosaic philosophy.^[27] This suggests that he believed the Greeks had often been better exegetes of Scripture than their Jewish colleagues, or at least not inferior to them. The philosophical works, among which De animalibus and De providentia z have been proved to be works of Philo's old age,^[28] in this sense pave the way for the exegesis of Scripture.

Some of these writings (Aet., Prov . 1, and Prob .)^[29] may have had as their intended public the pagan philosophical milieu, and others (Prov . 2, Anim .) the Jewish apostates. This does not entail, however, that no systematic position is reserved for them in the developing grand design of Philo's work. Philo's proof, presented to the Greeks, that their own philosophy in its most representative and valuable aspects is confirmed by and even derived from

[27] See P. Borgen, Bread from Heaven , Suppl. n.s. 10 (Leiden, 1965), 99ff.; Nikiprowetzky (n. 5 above), 97ff.; A. Mendelson, Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria , Monogr. Hebr. Un. Coil. 7 (Cincinnati, 1982), 35ff.

[28] Terian (n. 12 above) (1981), 28ff.; (1984), 289ff. Note that this proof is valid for the dialogues only, not for Prov . 1, Prob., Aet .

[29] The dates of Aet . and Prov . 1 are uncertain, but the old hypothesis of the "early writings" has lost its charm.

the Law implies that it would be useful for Greek philosophers to study the Torah. Jewish apostates who use Greek philosophy against the Torah, as Alexander did, are invited to return to the truth. Simultaneously, however, these works may serve as an introduction to the more important discussions of Greek philosophers about subjects that are dominant in the Torah, an introduction already doctored to suit the Jewish point of view, which those who want to interpret Scripture in a rational way may use with profit.

Because the Greek philosophers are Philo's predecessors, he can use them the way he uses his Jewish colleagues: he can read them with an open mind, reject what is wrong or one-sided, and adduce and use what is satisfactory and feasible. On the other hand, his use of Scripture is not as invariably decisive as a modern consensus would want us to believe. I have already referred^[30] to the curious way Genesis 1:26 and 28 are treated, and I would like to add a related instance.

In Philo, we find both the view that Genesis 1:27 and 2:7 are about the creation of the same man and that they are about different types of man, i.e., the "created man" (epoiesen ) and the "molded man" (eplastesen ). The latter view, as we have noticed, is attributed by him to others (QG 1.8)^[31] but not rejected (it is also the starting point of the allegory at LA 1.35ff.).^[32] The other view is not rejected either. Tobin has argued that the "two types" interpretation is later than the "one man" interpretation.^[33] There is an interesting complication which, to my knowledge, has not

[30] Above, p. 82.

[31] Above, p. 71.

[32] Biblical scholarship attributes Genesis 1:27 to the Priesterschrift , 2:7 to the Jahwist . See, e.g., R. Smend, Die Entstehung des Alten Testaments , Theol. Wiss. 1 (Stuttgart , 1984), 40. Philo and his predecessors were faced with a real exegetical problem, that of the double version of the same story which also inspired the modern (Quellenforschung . The LXX introduces the word Adam only at Genesis 2:16; in parts, this translation is a midrash .

[33] Tobin (n. 7 above), 102ff. Runia (n. 3 above), 556ff., with backward references, has bravely argued that according to Philo, Genesis, 1:27 and 2:7 are about one and the same man.

been observed: Genesis 5:1b-2 does not enter into this discussion. Here, it would appear, the text of the Bible states beyond possible doubt that the "created" (intelligible) man, i.e., the man "in the image" of Genesis 1:27, and the "molded" (sensible) man of 2:7 are the same person:

(1b) On the day on which God created [epoiesen ] Adam, he created [epoiesen ] him in the image of God. (2) Male and female he created [epoiesen ] them, and he praised them. And he called them by the name of Adam, on the day on which he created [epoiesen ] them. (3) And Adam lived for two hundred and thirty years and begat . . .

The (sensible) Adam (the "molded" man of 2:7) who begat Seth (5:3, cf. 4:25) is "male and female," just like the (intelligible) anthropos at 1:27, and the verb for created at 5:1b-2 is none other than the epoiesen also found at 1:27. Yet Philo can be very dogmatic about the differences between the two types of man (as at Opif . 134-35).

Now, as long as Jewish exegetes believed that 1:27 and 2:7 refer to the same man, they were in a position to ignore 5:1b-2, which merely confirms this view. But it is certainly odd that those who believed that two types of man are involved ignored 5:1b-2, which contradicts this interpretation (they also virtually ignored Genesis 1:26 and 28, likewise hard to square with the two different types).^[34] One may; of course, assume that they kept silent about this part of the evidence on purpose, but it is perhaps more to the point to assume that what they did was not so much interpret the Bible as reinterpret the view of their predecessors, who had only discussed 1:27 and 1:7. Philo never quotes or refers to Genesis 5:1b-2, although he quotes and comments on 5:1a, "this is the book of the generation of men."^[35] Most remarkably; however, he connects this half-verse. not with what follows but with what precedes, that is, with the brief genealogy of Adam

[34] The point I am about to make corroborates Tobin's thesis that the "one man" interpretation is earlier.

that concludes Genesis 4 (QG 1.79-80, Det . 138-39; cf. esp. Abrah . 9, epilegei ). Yet he knows that Genesis 5 also contains the (full) "genealogy of Adam," for he cites and interprets the characterization of Seth at QG 1.81 from this chapter (Genesis 5:3). Thus the awkward, or unwelcome, verses 5:1b-2 were tactfully omitted. To repeat, we may perhaps assume that Philo, rather than willfully distorting the evidence, felt committed, without noticing what this entailed, to an exegetical tradition that had failed to take these verses into account. Yet in a person who is merely a loyal follower of Moses this procedure is most noteworthy. We are justified in concluding that his predecessors, and Philo himself, really wanted very much to produce a (Middle) Platonizing interpretation of the creation story in Genesis. In other words, they were prepared to be silent about scriptural evidence that could not find a place in their philosophy. And yet, at (QG 3.3 (Greek fragment), Philo posits that one should not interpret Scripture by arguing from the part to the whole, but, conversely, should adduce all the evidence available.